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Abstract 
Analysis of raw memory dumps has become a critical capability in digital forensics 
because it gives insight into the state of a system that cannot be fully represented through 
traditional disk analysis. Interest in memory forensics has grown steadily in recent years, 
with a focus on the Microsoft Windows operating systems. However, similar capabilities 
for Linux and Apple OS X have lagged by comparison. The volafox open source project 
has begun work on structured memory analysis for OS X. The tool currently supports a 
limited set of kernel structures to parse hardware information, system build number, 
process listing, loaded kernel modules, syscall table, and socket connections. This 
research addresses one memory analysis deficiency on OS X by introducing a new 
volafox module for parsing file handles. When open files are mapped to a process, an 
examiner can learn which resources the process is accessing on disk. This listing is useful 
for determining what information may have been the target for exfilitration or 
modification on a compromised system. Comparing output of the developed module and 
the UNIX lsof (list open files) command on two version of OS X and two kernel 
architectures validates the methodology used to extract file handle information.  
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FORENSIC MEMORY ANALYSIS FOR APPLE OS X 
I. Introduction 
Desktop and mobile computing platforms are central to many law enforcement 
and enterprise investigations due to their enormous capacity for digital evidence. 
Identification, individualization, association, and reconstruction of such evidence are all 
steps of the forensic process (Inman & Rudin, 2002). Professionals rely on both technical 
expertise and appropriate tools when applying these steps to digital sources. Because an 
examiner cannot always anticipate the platforms encountered during the course of an 
investigation, he or she must be prepared to deal with any of them. Tools for data 
acquisition and analysis are therefore required across a breadth of common endpoint 
devices in order to assure needed flexibility, Apple’s OS X among them. 
Apple currently holds the number three position in PC manufacturing (Schonfeld, 
2012), with its OS X operating system representing about 10% domestic market share 
(Donnini, 2012) and 6% globally (Net Applications, 2012). While this accounts for a 
small minority when compared with Microsoft Windows, OS X has become the operating 
system of preference for many individuals. As a result, it cannot be ignored as a possible 
target during forensic investigation.  
Forensic memory analysis has become a critical capability in digital forensics 
because it allows insight into the state of a system that cannot be fully represented 
through traditional disk analysis. From an investigative standpoint, computer memory 
may be the only source of data capable of revealing the use or misuse of computer at time 
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of seizure. Additionally, it may hold the sole evidence of malware or other compromise 
influencing the conclusions of the examiner. Interest in memory forensics has grown 
steadily in recent years, with a focus on the Microsoft Windows operating systems 
(Cohen & Collett, 2008). However, similar capabilities for platforms such as OS X have 
lagged by comparison. 
Memory analysis depends on capabilities for RAM acquisition and tools for 
abstracting information from raw memory. Though tools exist to capture memory on OS 
X (Section 2.4), the sole project focusing on structured data analysis (Lee, 2011) is 
immature by comparison to its counterpart for Windows and Linux (Volatile Systems, 
2012). This leaves primarily context-free options available to the forensic examiner, such 
as string searches and file carving. The challenge is to perform better than context-free 
memory analysis so ultimately tools can be developed to replace more invasive incident 
response methods for determining the state of a running system. This research addresses 
one component in the suite of data collected during live response: a list of file handles 
associated with running processes. 
When open files are mapped to a process, an examiner can learn which resources 
the process is accessing on disk. This listing is useful in determining what information 
may have been the target for exfilitration or modification on a compromised system. 
Handles may also help identify a suspicious process when unexpected file access or 
modifications are observed. For example, malware masquerading as an innocuous 
executable while editing log files to its cover tracks. Because open files can help 
characterize process activity and highlight misuse of a computer during an investigation, 
it is desirable to recover this information from a memory capture. 
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1.1 Research Objectives and Assumptions 
The goal of this research is to implement and document a capability for parsing 
file handles from raw memory captured on OS X. Two objectives are derived to support 
this goal. First, perform design recovery of the kernel data structures responsible for 
handling open files. Second, develop a flexible process for programmatically handling 
structures defined for different kernel architectures and operating system versions. This 
necessitates extensible software design resilient to changes in future versions of OS X.  
Assumptions related to achieving the research goal include: 
1. A method already exists for copying physical memory to file in a forensically 
sound manner. 
 
2. Because analysis is always performed on a forensic duplicate of imaged memory, 
the tool developed is not guaranteed nor required to ensure data integrity. 
 
3. Prior work can determine the addresses associated with key kernel symbols and 
perform virtual to physical address translation. 
 
4. Direct validation of tool output is not possible and must therefore be compared 
with approximate data, the acquisition of which alters the state of memory. 
 
5. Code defining the parsed kernel data structures is open source. 
 
6. The set of architectures under consideration is limited to Intel i386 and x86_64. 
 
7. The set of OS X operating systems under consideration is limited to 10.6.x Snow 
Leopard and 10.7.x Lion. 
 
8. The set of handle types supported by the implementation is not comprehensive. 
 
The first two assumptions leverage existing work described in Sections 2.4 and 2.5.2 
respectively. Validation challenges are addressed in Section 4.1. Design assumptions and 
emergent research limitations are discussed throughout Chapter 3 and formally classified 
in Section 4.1.2. 
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1.2 Methodological Approach 
The open source volafox project (Lee, 2011) has begun the work of analyzing raw 
memory dumped on OS X with modules for parsing hardware information, system build 
number, process listing, loaded kernel modules, syscall table, and socket connections. 
One omission in the existing volafox feature set is an ability to list file handles. This 
research presents the memory analysis methodology required to extract file handles in use 
by each process, and demonstrates its application through a new volafox module. The 
research module outputs handle information corresponding to process name, PID, file 
descriptor, access mode, handle type, size/offset, catalog node ID, and name. Supported 
handles include regular files, directories, symbolic links, character special files, memory-
mapped files associated with the process executable and its current working directory.  
Chapter 3 describes methodology for implementing the new file handles module. 
Software design requirements and constraints are listed along with a format specification 
for the information displayed to the user. Next, design recovery of key kernel data 
structures is presented. The relevant members and relationships of 36 xnu kernel 
structures are used to parse the required handle information. Package organization, key 
objects, and functions from the existing volafox source code are then described. Object-
oriented design of the new file handles module is depicted using UML and a description 
of the data structure template development process is presented. Chapter 3 closes with a 
discussion of outstanding implementation issues. Results of the new module are validated 
against the UNIX command-line tool lsof (list open files) in Chapter 4. Versions 10.6 
Snow Leopard and 10.7 Lion of the OS X operating system for both 32 and 64-bit kernels 
are the tested configurations. 
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1.3 Research Implications 
 Design recovery of the OS X kernel data structures related to process file handles 
in Section 3.2 and summarized in Appendix B is a primary implication of the research. 
Development of the new volafox module for parsing handle information exists in part to 
demonstrate this part of the methodology in a practical form. While core UNIX 
technologies lead to many similarities with other systems, OS X’s unique design 
architecture makes it distinct from other platforms. The research is novel because kernel 
structures parsed by the tool differ from those considered in the literature for Linux and 
Windows. 
The research module also demonstrates a process developed for dynamically 
handling data structure layout in memory across multiple architecture and operating 
system versions. The process is broken down in three parts. Section 3.4.2 first describes 
how C struct templates are built to an interface specification for each OS and architecture 
configuration. Next, a solution is given for selecting the correct template at runtime using 
an abstract object initializer. Finally, Section 3.4.3 presents an external C program for 
generating template syntax using the kernel header files defining key structures. The 
process itself adds value because it simplifies program logic and readability of the 
resulting source code. Though unverified, the process is extensible by design and 
therefore may also support future versions of OS X and additional kernel structures 
outside the immediate research scope. 
Finally, the new volafox module for listing open files is validated in Chapter 4 
and found to reasonably approximate output from the UNIX lsof command. After 
addressing outstanding constraints and deficiencies, work based on this tool could one 
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day replace at least one required executable from an incident response toolkit. This result 
directly addresses the problem statement and therefore implies a successful research 
outcome.  
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II. Literature Review 
Digital evidence is integral to modern forensic investigation because of its 
pervasiveness in the consumer, enterprise, and government domains. Practitioners require 
tools to simplify the collection and analysis of such evidence across the breadth of 
endpoint devices encountered in the field. An investigator may employ tools from a 
variety of open-source, commercial, and underground sources in pursuit of needed 
capabilities. The work presented in this thesis evolves an existing open-source project for 
analyzing the memory of Apple’s OS X desktop operating system. 
This chapter introduces digital forensics and the related process of incident 
response, with specific focus on memory analysis. Strategies for capturing memory on 
OS X are discussed as a component of incident response, and necessary precursor to 
analysis. A review of existing work for analyzing raw memory drumped on Linux serves 
as a baseline for higher-abstraction analytic capabilities. Finally, the volafox tool being 
extended for this research is presented, along with its methodology for acquiring kernel 
symbols and parsing key data structures. 
2.1 Digital Forensics 
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) describes digital evidence as “[i]nformation 
stored in binary form that may be introduced and relied on in court” (2008, p. 52). In 
order to meet the latter half of this definition, evidence must be handled in a manner 
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consistent with accepted forensic practice. Generally accepted standards include at 
minimum (NIJ, 2008): 
• A process for ensuring evidence remains unchanged. 
• Assuring technical expertise of personnel responsible for analysis. 
• Detailed documentation of all actions affecting the evidence. 
A similar definition by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
describes computer forensics as the “practice of gathering, retaining, and analyzing 
computer-related data for investigative purposes in a manner that maintains the integrity 
of the data” (2008, p. D-1). Digital forensics is therefore a process characterized by the 
preparation for, and execution of, the following activities (NIST, 2006): 
1. Data collection – identifying and preserving useful data from all possible sources 
of digital evidence according to a standardized subprocess. 
2. Examination and analysis – a methodical approach to correlating evidence from 
various sources to determine the characteristics and impact of an event. 
3. Reporting – a procedural log and analysis summary used to demonstrate the 
integrity of the process overall and present its findings. 
Given the wide array of platforms and environments capable of supporting digital 
evidence, these definitions describe what the digital forensic process requires rather than 
how to accomplish it. 
 The implementation described in Chapter 3 is specific to the evidence analysis 
component of the three-part process above. However, in order to understand the input for 
analysis, the collection of digital evidence is discussed here. 
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2.2 Incident Response 
Motivation for applying the digital forensic process is known as an incident, 
“violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use 
policies, or standard security practices” (NIST, 2008, p. D2). Organizations with a 
mission involving digital forensics need an established policy for handling such events 
that describes recommended practices for mitigating the effects. Performing the actions 
prescribed in such a policy is defined as incident response, an organizational standard 
describing how the process of digital forensics is to be applied within a specific context. 
An incident response almost always incorporates components of data collection and 
reporting as specified by the digital forensics process. Depending on mission needs of the 
affected systems, analysis may take place on site, be deferred, or a combination of the 
two. Deferred analysis may be necessary when it requires technical skills beyond that of 
incident responder, tools unavailable at the scene, or is expected to take more time than 
can be reasonably allocated. 
The tool implemented in Chapter 3 could operate as a component of incident 
response but is more likely to be employed during deferred analysis. Data used as input to 
the tool is volatile and therefore its capture must be conducted as part of an incident 
response policy in order to make analysis possible. 
2.2.1 Volatile Data. 
Volatile data describes digital evidence of a dynamic or transient nature that is 
sensitive to time, system state, or power. It is contrasted with nonvolatile data such as that 
stored on a magnetic hard drive, smart card, or flash memory (NIJ, 2008). While sources 
of nonvolatile data may be collected directly as hardware or imaged during incident 
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response, volatile data is fragile and therefore has distinct collection and analysis needs 
(NIST, 2006). This section motivates the collection of volatile data during incident 
response as a compliment to traditional disk analysis, and provides an overview of the 
process. Note that system characteristics and the collection process described focus on 
Linux systems due to similarity with OS X. 
 Several arguments for seizing and analyzing volatile data exist. First, no usage 
snapshot is complete without a record of what the machine was doing before shutdown. 
This action is usually a prerequisite to imaging a system for deferred disk analysis (NIST, 
2006). Valuable evidence such as running processes, network connections, and currently 
open files may all be irretrievably lost as soon as the target is powered off (NIST, 2008). 
Critical systems may also be unavailable for imaging because the downtime would 
adversely affect user experience or services, making traditional disk analysis infeasible. 
The so-called Trojan Defense is also a concern. One classic example is Aaron Caffrey’s 
acquittal following a defense which could have been disproven using evidence in volatile 
data (Leyden, 2003). Modern malware is specifically engineered to avoid the disk as a 
means of preventing detection. This means volatile data may be the only source of 
evidence available to prove its presence or absence. Dolan-Gavitt (2008a) demonstrates 
how a cached version of the Windows registry can be exploited without leaving any 
evidence on the disk. 
The slow but progressive adoption of full-disk encryption offers what may be the 
single best argument for integrating volatile data collection into any reasonable incident 
response (Casey, Fellows, Geiger, & Stellatos, 2011). Data on disk may be essentially 
worthless to the investigator once the target is powered off if its contents become fully 
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encrypted. Full disk encryption became a standard feature on OS X when FileVault 2 was 
included with the release of 10.7 Lion. Tools for breaking FileVault 2 encryption via 
memory exploit are now available both open source and commercially (Kessler, 2012; 
Maartmann-Moe, 2012). However, none of the known attacks work after the target is 
turned off. 
2.2.2 Volatile Collection Process. 
Recovering volatile data from a Linux target typically involves a toolkit 
consisting of trusted executables needed to dump specific operating system information, 
exfiltrate output, and maintain integrity of evidence (Mandia, Prosise, & Pepe, 2003). On 
UNIX systems and their derivatives, the toolkit can be built using commands available on 
the platform, compiled as static binaries verified using the ldd tool on Linux (Burdach, 
2004), or otool on the Mac (Webb, 2010). The volatile data of interest and some of the 
Linux commands associated with its collection are summarized below (Burdach, 2004; 
Carvey, 2009; Mandia et al., 2003): 
• date – system date and time 
• w – login sessions 
• ls – directory listing including MAC times 
• netstat – network connections and open ports with associated applications 
• ps – process list 
• arp, route – arp and routing cache tables 
• cat /proc/modules – loaded kernel modules 
• lsof – process-to-file mappings 
• cat /proc/version – OS version 
• cat /proc/sys/kernel/name – host name 
• cat /proc/sys/kernel/domainame – domain name 
• cat /proc/cpuinfo – hardware info 
• cat /proc/swaps – swap partitions 
• cat /proc/partitions – local file systems 
• cat /proc/self/mounts – mounted file systems 
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• cat /proc/uptime – uptime 
• Physical memory image (kernel-specific) 
• Clipboard contents (distribution-specific) 
• Command-line history (shell-specific) 
The toolkit is typically delivered to the target via read-only media to protect its integrity, 
and its output usually stored to external media or piped over a network connection. After 
constructing such a toolkit, commands for collecting, naming, and storing the evidence 
collected are scripted for the native command-line interface. The command order should 
give consideration to the perishability of the data (NIST, 2006): 
1. Network connections 
2. Login sessions 
3. Contents of memory 
4. Running processes 
5. Open files 
6. Network configuration 
7. Operating system time 
Webb offers details on toolkit compilation and scripting for incident response on OS X 
which roughly approximates the aforementioned process (2010). 
A possible alternative to this incident response methodology by Choi, Savoldi, 
Gubian, and Lee (2008) integrates both collection and analysis. The Linux Evidence 
Collection Tool (LECT) is a framework for live evidence collection aimed at server 
investigations. It consists of a console-based collection tool and graphical analysis 
environment. The tool emphasizes collection of log files and other disk-borne data for 
offline analysis and correlation with volatile data. Because of this hybrid approach, LECT 
is not well aligned with the research goals of this thesis. 
The preceding exploration of volatile collection strategies for Linux serves to 
characterize the kinds of information that are most critical to the investigator. In the 
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following section, an alternative methodology is proposed to replace many of the 
commands mentioned with a tool for parsing this information from an image of physical 
memory. Use of a volatile collection toolkit as described in this section establishes a 
baseline against which memory forensics can be measured in terms of both analytic 
power and system impact. 
2.3 Memory Forensics 
This section describes background needed to understand the sub-field of digital 
forensics concerned with analyzing the contents of raw memory. Random-access memory 
(RAM), physical memory, or main memory are all terms used interchangeably to 
describe the first backing store for the operating system’s virtual memory manager 
(Gorman, 2004). Physical memory is of interest to the forensic examiner because it stores 
current and recent data being acted on by the CPU and various memory-mapped I/O. 
Suiche (2010) asserts that on UNIX systems the term physical memory is synonymous 
with /dev/mem, the character device used to abstract the hardware implementation. 
A variety of hardware and software solutions exist to copy the contents of 
physical memory to file for offline analysis. Output of such a tool is commonly referred 
to as an image or memory dump. The sophistication of memory analysis varies, but by 
one definition represents an “attempt to use memory management structures in computers 
as maps to extract files and executables resident in a computer’s physical memory” 
(Urrea, 2006, p. 2). The more specific definition required by this research classifies 
structured memory analysis as the examination of kernel structures present in an image to 
partially characterize the state of a computer at time of capture. The two-part process of 
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analyzing physical memory generally involves the capture of RAM during incident 
response in a manner consistent with forensic principles, and subsequent examination of 
its contents using tools capable of parsing kernel structures or other useful patterns from 
the resulting file. 
In its simplest form, the value of memory introspection will be familiar to any 
programmer who has used a debugger to analyze a core dump. Exploit developers use 
many of the same tools for analyzing the state of RAM during execution to craft payloads 
for corrupting memory in order to achieve a desired effect (Miller & Zovi, 2009). 
Analysts on both sides of the ethical divide observe memory in action to reverse engineer 
systems, applications, or malware. From a forensic standpoint, the state of a system can 
be most comprehensively recorded by capturing the raw contents of RAM. However, 
modern computers guarantee this information alone is incomplete and fragmented due to 
virtual memory and other architectural mechanisms. Further complicating its analysis are 
operating system protection schemes such as Address Space Layout Randomization 
(ASLR), which seek to obfuscate the location and structure of memory as a means of 
safeguarding information. 
2.3.1 Advantages of Memory Analysis. 
Despite the challenges, there are several compelling reasons to prefer structured 
memory analysis over the techniques for investigating volatile data described in Section 
2.2.1. First, because memory contains both in-use and recently-used data, it is possible to 
reconstruct a limited timeline of system usage. Recently used memory segments may 
provide information not represented in the log files and other incident response toolkit 
output because, like free disk space, these segments are marked for recycling by the 
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operating system. Solomon, Huebner, Bem, and Szezynska assert that “[d]espite the fast 
decay of user pages in free memory, it is still a worthwhile source of forensic data” 
(2007, p. 71). The most recent work on Linux even suggests that it may be possible to go 
about such reconstruction in a coherent and organized fashion (Case, Marziale, Neckar, 
& Richard, 2010). 
A second advantage of structured memory analysis is its resilience to system 
tampering when compared with other strategies for reconstruction using disk analysis or 
incident response toolkit output. Syscall hooking, log manipulation, and other anti-
forensic measures are common features of modern malware (Ligh, Adair, Hartstein, & 
Richard, 2011; SANS Institute, 2008). These exploitation tactics can lead to missed 
evidence and incorrect conclusions if the results of other analysis are not compared 
against evidence in memory (Hay & Nance, 2009). Even when employing static 
executables, memory analysis may be the only way to reveal running malware when 
faced with a sophisticated kernel rootkit. Dolan-Gavitt (2008a) also demonstrates how 
physical memory may contain the only evidence of registry tampering on Windows. 
The third benefit is that physical memory may contain evidence that is never 
saved to disk and would otherwise be lost. Consider that one reason for performing hard 
power-off of a system prior to imaging is to preserve the temporary files that might be 
overwritten in a graceful shutdown operation (NIST, 2006). This action also results in the 
unfortunate loss of any files that have not been saved because they exist only in memory 
at the time of shutdown. If memory is imaged during the incident response, these files are 
preserved and “sections of memory can have more traditional forensic procedures applied 
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to them such as file carving and hashing” (Case, Cristina, Marziale, G. G. Richard, & 
Roussev, 2008, p. S70). 
Finally, volatile data collection using a scripted response toolkit has an inherent 
disadvantage: changes to the system state which occur as a result of collection. Dumping 
information in a forensically sound manner means “[s]ome of the response tools may 
even substantially alter the digital environment of the original system” (Law, Chow, 
Kwan, & Lai, 2007, p. 137). A trusted tool must overwrite existing memory on the target 
system when both the executable and all its static libraries are copied from disk in order 
to preserve the forensic integrity of the output. Next, a series of I/O operations are needed 
to support the exfiltration of the output. The process is then repeated for each distinct 
piece of volatile data sought. This leads to a situation where “[t]he credibility of the 
acquired data relies solely on the reliability of the tool and the expertise of the user” (Law 
et al., 2009, p. 1). By contrast, capturing physical memory for deferred analysis has the 
potential to be much less invasive. Some techniques, such as FireWire acquisition, do not 
require any execution on the target system. Similarly, suspending a virtual machine 
allows memory capture on the guest with minimal impact. 
The lack of investigator-friendly methods for analyzing memory images provides 
the facing argument to the use of structured memory analysis outlined in the preceding 
paragraphs. When deciding between an imperfect incident response toolkit and an 
indecipherable collection of bits, it is clear that a potentially corrupt dataset is preferable 
to no information at all. A dump of raw memory is only as useful as the tools available to 
abstract information for human analysis. Therefore the acquisition and analysis 
capabilities for this method are equally important. 
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2.3.2 Memory Forensics Process. 
Analysis of raw memory is procedurally similar to many types of digital evidence, 
generally following the steps of capture, analysis, and reporting. Carvey (2009) provides 
a description of the memory forensics process, with a focus on Windows since it is the 
only platform where this type of analysis has matured. 
The first step is to choose a method of capture based on the hardware, operating 
system, state of the target, and context of the investigation. Next, a delivery method is 
selected. Most common today is a USB device that acts as both capture toolkit and 
storage for the resulting memory image. The toolkit hash is documented prior to use, and 
appropriate physical and policy measures taken to prevent altering the contents of the 
device before incident response. When the tool is executed on a target, system time and 
hash value of the output are documented in the incident response log. Carvey (2009) 
argues the hash should be recorded once memory dump is complete due to changes that 
occur during the capture process. After memory is captured, measures must again be 
taken to avoid changes to the storage media. Analysis occurs only on copies of the 
original image file, the integrity of which can be verified using the recorded hash. This is 
done using a write-blocker on a forensic workstation capable of copying the storage 
media without changing it. Analysis then proceeds on the copy according to the needs of 
the investigation and the tools available. The process for parsing any results is 
documented in detail such that it can be reproduced, and the conclusions of the examiner 
are summarized in a written report. Since the reporting aspect is largely determined by 
organization policy or legal requirements it is not discussed further, but the details of 
capture and analysis for OS X and similar platforms are now presented. 
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2.4 Mac Memory Acquisition 
This section focuses on physical memory capture for the platform under research 
consideration: OS X running on Intel architecture. While this thesis addresses primarily 
the analysis component of the memory forensics process, acquisition of RAM is a 
prerequisite to making such research worthwhile and is therefore discussed first. 
2.4.1 FireWire, Cold-boot, and VM Extraction. 
The IEEE 1394 or FireWire interface is susceptible to direct memory access 
(DMA) on OS X as well as Windows. Its vulnerability, the underlying PCIe bus, is 
shared by a variety of I/O on the Mac including ExpressCard, SD slot, and the new Intel 
Thunderbolt port (Graham, 2011). Using this interface to reliably capture RAM on the 
Mac was first demonstrated by the pyfw attack (Becher, Dornseif, & Klein, 2005). 
While useful, the project is not explicitly designed as a forensic tool (Hermann, 2008). 
Numerous forensic implementations have emerged since, including Goldfish (Gladyshev 
& Almansoori, 2010, 2011), and libforensic1394 (Witherden, 2010). 
There are several shortcomings to DMA capture. First, the vulnerability is limited 
to the first 4GB of system memory (Gladyshev & Almansoori, 2010). Kubasiak and 
Morrissey further characterize the method as “somewhat invasive and involves tricking 
the system into thinking an iPod is being connected” (2009, p. 528). Finally, the attack is 
easily mitigated using the lock screen if user switching is disabled (Garrison, 2011). 
The alternative Kubasiak and Morrissey suggest to FireWire exploitation is 
msramdump (2009, p. 528; McGrew, 2008). This technique calls for cold boot 
extraction, where the target system is forcibly shutdown and then quickly booted from 
external media before the contents in memory are fully wiped by momentary loss of 
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power. This tool builds on earlier research where the hardware DIMMS were physically 
cooled and removed from the target so the contents could be read externally. The risk of 
evidence loss appears to be high with this strategy and the authors suggest it only as a 
method of last resort for extracting the decryption key of a Mac using FileVault. 
Another option is to copy the memory backup file maintained by the host system 
of an OS X virtual machine (VM) during suspension. Ligh, Adair, Hartstein and Richard 
list the location of such files for various virtualization products and describe how they 
can be used with Volatility for Windows analysis (2011). This represents perhaps the 
least invasive method available, however there are two caveats. First, until the release of 
OS X 10.7 Apple’s software license agreement only permitted virtualization of its server 
operating system. Second, due to tight hardware-software integration on the Mac it would 
be rare to encounter such an installation in the field, thereby limiting its usefulness to the 
forensic examiner. Possible exceptions include enterprise installations of OS X Server or 
VMs used for research, software development, or reverse code engineering. 
2.4.2 Kernel Module Capture. 
Classic methods for extracting memory from UNIX systems involved reading 
directly from the /dev/mem or /dev/kmem character device using dd. This ability has 
been disabled in the Linux kernel for some time and when OS X transitioned to Intel 
architecture it became similarly depreciated on the Mac. Singh (2006a) describes the 
problem and makes several suggestions for implementing a custom version of 
/dev/kmem to read from kernel memory directly. This approach was demonstrated by 
Suiche (2010) with an emulation of /dev/mem used to dump RAM on a Mac. The 
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presentation also describes how critical symbols retrieved from the mach_kernel 
executable can be used to build a kernel memory manager capable of virtual to physical 
address translation. Such translation is required to fully browse kernel address space and 
copy its contents. This capability did not become publically available until the release of 
Mac Memory Reader (Architecture Technology Corporation [ATC], 2011), a free 
component of the commercial Mac Marshal product. Technical limitations and design 
decisions lead to several details worth nothing about the tool’s output (ATC, 2011; Inoue, 
Adelstein, & Joyce, 2011; Leat, 2011): 
• Output file format is a Mach-O, equivalent to Linux ELF (Apple Inc., 2009). 
 
• The -H option prints MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, or SHA-512 hash to stderr. 
 
• Using ‘-‘ for the output filename prints to stdout for command piping. 
 
• Physical memory map used is the same format as the showbootermemory 
macro in the Apple Kernel Debug Kit. 
 
• Only addressable pages can be copied from physical memory, excluding a small 
number of pages missing from the memory map. 
 
• Memory segmentation is maintained along with offsets in the file using a header 
listing, the results of which can be interpreted with Apple’s otool. 
 
• Memory-mapped I/O device segments and memory ports are not captured. 
 
• Memory allocated to a virtual machine hypervisor is not captured. 
There are several disadvantages to this form of acquisition. First, Mac Memory 
Reader requires administrator privileges to load the needed kernel module. While this 
may limit its use during some investigations, in many cases a cooperative administrator 
may be available to provide the password. Second, output from such a tool could be 
corrupted by the presence of memory forensic countermeasures (Haruyama & Suzuki, 
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2012) or advent of a rootkit explicitly designed to subvert collection. “Fortunately, unless 
the subversion mechanism is very deeply embedded in the OS, a substantial amount of 
overhead may be incurred to prevent acquisition, potentially revealing the presence of a 
malicious agent” (Case et al., 2008, p. 2). Finally, because a kernel module must be 
loaded into the memory in order to perform the capture, its use alters the target system. 
The problem is addressed by the Mac Memory Reader README text (ATC, 2011): 
Pieces of the MacMemoryReader executable code and data will certainly 
appear within the RAM snapshot, simply because MacMemoryReader is 
running in the same memory space being acquired. This is a known 
"footprint" and aspect of live analysis. 
While this represents a violation of the first forensic principle outlined in section 2.1, it is 
likely to be no worse than the other practical methods discussed (VM analysis 
notwithstanding). This method of capture also has the advantage of being self-
documenting, in that its usage is represented within the resulting output. Despite the 
challenges, availability of this robust acquisition capability for the Mac encourages 
additional research and emphasis on analytic capabilities for the platform. 
2.5 Structured Memory Analysis 
Most literature and web references to memory analysis on OS X discuss context-
free techniques such as string searches, manual hex examination, file carving and the like. 
Valenzuela (2011) writes about these rudimentary methods in a blog post responding to 
the release of Mac Memory Reader. Malard (2011) expands these approaches to include 
session information and password extraction in a paper discussing hacking tactics for OS 
X. One early effort to achieve systematic analysis of raw memory on the Mac is a tool for 
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automatically extracting login credentials using the FireWire exploit cited previously 
(Makinen, 2008). The attack iterates over all pages in memory searching for a string flag 
known to occur at a particular offset and then performs a keyword search for ‘username’ 
and ‘password’ within that page to reveal the target information. This tool is valuable for 
decrypting disks with FileVault enabled but is only effective against OS X 10.4 Tiger. 
Unfortunately, all context-free methods for memory analysis are inherently limited, 
imprecise, and inefficient. 
2.5.1 Linux Memory Analysis. 
This section offers a review of existing work concerning higher-abstraction 
memory analysis, presented as a timeline. Linux is chosen as a reasonable analog upon 
which to model research for OS X because it is the most similar platform to have 
received attention in the literature with regard to forensic memory analysis. However, 
note that Linux diverges significantly in terms of the kernel structures used to reconstruct 
information (Singh, 2006b). 
An early paper on memory analysis for Linux proposes tools to aid embedded 
developers with identifying misused or wasted system memory (Movall, Nelson, & 
Wetzstein, 2005). While not well suited for forensic application, this work demonstrates 
how memory forensics follows as a natural extension of dynamic debugging. Burdach 
demonstrates this concept in a 2004 blog post on live forensic analysis for Linux systems. 
The blog notes acquisition of /proc/kcore should be favored over /dev/mem 
because its ELF core format allows for introspection using gbd. By comparing the 
addresses in Symbol.map with those from /proc/kcore, the author demonstrates 
how memory analysis can be used to perform rootkit detection. There is also a 
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description of how /proc/kcore can yield keyword searches with the UNIX strings 
command and regular expressions. 
Moving beyond keyword searches and file carving techniques requires an 
understanding of operating system internals to determine how the kernel organizes 
information in what would otherwise be an incoherent block of data. Urrea (2006) began 
this work by enumerating many of the Linux structures relevant to forensic examination 
and shows how they might be extracted using a set of ridged Perl scripts. Burdach (2006) 
continued to enhance the analytic potential on the platform when he released a proof-of-
concept toolkit called IDETECT to simplify introspection on memory, again using gdb. 
The same year FATKit framework (Petroni, Walters, Fraser, & Arbaugh, 2006) emerged 
as a major step forward by offering a modular approach to abstracting and visualizing 
forensic evidence from raw memory. Tool design is general and extensible enough that 
even in early releases FATKit featured modules for both Windows and Linux.  
Case, Cristina, Marziale, Richard, and Roussev developed RAMPARSER to 
address “the lack of available memory parsing tools for Linux” (2008, p. S67). 
RAMPARSER can list running processes and perform introspection on specific ones to 
detail open files and socket information. Case, Marziale and Richard (2010) later extend 
RAMPARSER to make it “substantially less brittle with respect to kernel versions”. This 
paper frames one of the major challenges to forensic memory analysis: most tools are 
specific to a particular platform version and must be reworked when even minor updates 
to an operating system occur. The constraint is especially dire for Linux distributions, 
where there is a great deal of kernel fragmentation. This same challenge is also the 
motivation for Foriana (Petroni, Walters, Fraser, & Arbaugh, 2006), a research tool 
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designed to explore solutions for memory analysis when the exact target OS version is 
not known. The tool has support for multiple architectures and operating systems, 
including BSD (from which Apple’s UNIX foundation derives). Vidas (2011) suggests an 
open corpus for memory analysis to build support across a breadth of kernel versions. 
While most of the work discussed exists primarily in the research domain, tools 
for Linux memory analysis are also represented commercially (Pikewerks Corporation, 
2011). However, the open source forensics community has been slow to support Linux 
with tools built for users when compared to the capabilities available for Windows. In 
2008 serious work began on this deficiency when the Digital Forensics Research 
Workshop (DFRWS) sought to develop tools specifically for Linux memory analysis. 
This emphasis resulted in several Linux extensions for the open source Volatility 
framework (Cohen & Collett, 2008). Case (2011a, b, c) writes extensively about 
subsequent work leading to the Linux branch available in beta from the Volatility project 
website. Integrated Linux support is anticipated for the 3.0 release of the project (M. 
Cohen, Volatility developer mailing list, March 26, 2012). In addition to the Linux 
commands shown in Table 1, Volatility has additional modules for analyzing network 
configuration, kmem cache, dmesg buffer, and auxiliary process details. 
2.5.2 Volafox Project. 
The first effort to provide higher-abstraction analytic capabilities for raw memory 
dumped on the Mac began with the open source release of volafox, a Google Code 
project described as a “Memory Analyzer for Mac OS X” (Lee, 2011). This text-based 
tool is implemented in Python 2.5 and borrows heavily from the Volatility source code. 
Volafox is operable on flat memory images captured from OS X 10.6-7 with 32 or 64-bit 
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architecture. Table 1 summarizes the volafox parsing modules and offers a comparison 
with those available for the Linux support branch of Volatility and tools built-in to the 
OS X command line. Little has been written about the usage of volafox, but Shuster 
(2011) describes its basic functionality in his blog. 
 Revision 52 of volafox, the version extended in Chapter 3, does not natively 
support the Mac Memory Reader (MMR) output format. Leat (2011) and ATC developer 
Hajime Inoue contributed to experimental support for MMR which is operational in 
revisions 23-38 on the project website. The feature was later removed with the 
introduction of 64-bit addressing support due to compatibility problems. A stand-alone 
flatten.py utility authored by Inoue is still available to convert MMR files to a linear 
format, but only works for 32-bit kernel installations. 
An alpha feature is also implemented in volafox to analyze network information, 
the output of which appears to be a simplified version of the UNIX netstat command. 
While difficult to ascertain the state of this module given the lack documentation, in 
Table 1. volafox modules and their Volatility equivalents. 
volafox OS X Terminal 
Volatility 
( Linux branch ) Description 
os_version sw_vers  OS X build version 
machine_info sysctl linux_cpuinfo kernel version, CPU, and 
memory specifications 
mount_info mount linux_mount mounted filesystems 
kext_info kextstat linux_lsmod kernel extension (KEXT) list 
-m   KEXT dump 
proc_info ps linux_task_list_ps process list 
-x vmmap linux_proc_maps process dump 
syscall_info   syscall table with hooking 
detection 
net_info netstat linux_netstat network socket list 
See Chapter 3 lsof linux_list_open_files open files list 
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limited testing the feature only appears to support IPv4 TCP and UDP protocols. It is also 
unknown which kernel structures the module parses because this methodology is not 
included in the work by Suiche as with the others. 
2.5.3 Symbol Table Construction. 
In order to perform meaningful analysis of raw memory, an understanding of the 
composition and location of key kernel structures is required. Because Darwin (Apple’s 
open source core for OS X) is freely available, the composition of kernel structures can 
be determined from the header files they are defined in. Locating the structures in 
memory requires a mapping of identifiers and offsets, or a kernel symbol table. Suiche 
notes “[s]ymbols are a key element of volatile memory forensics without them an 
advanced analysis is impossible” (2010). The KPCR structure can be used in Windows to 
get the symbols directly from memory, conveniently this structure is located at a static 
offset (Dolan-Gavitt, 2008b). Unfortunately, the same approach cannot be used on OS X 
because “kernel sections are destroyed as soon as the kernel (mach_kernel) is loaded by 
removeKernelLinker() function” [slides] (Suiche, 2010). A solution to the 
equivalent problem in Linux is addressed by Volatility, which maintains a database of 
overlay files containing the requisite symbol tables for select distributions and kernel 
versions (Case, 2011a). In both Linux and OS X therefore, the “easiest way to retrieve 
kernel symbols is to extract them from the kernel executable of the hard-drive” (Suiche, 
2010, p. 4). 
Figure 1 shows key features of the mach_kernel executable file, located at the 
root directory of the OS X file system. Using the SYMTAB load command structure, a 
kernel symbol table can be constructed mapping the strings pointed to by 
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symtab_command.stroff with the static addresses stored in nlist.n_value. 
Such a table is valid for any installation sharing the same build version as the 
mach_kernel file used to derive it. This works because while the majority of physical 
memory is devoted to dynamic allocation for use by running processes, a portion of the 
layout is reserved for the kernel and its static data structures (Bovet & Cesati, 2006). 
 
Figure 1. mach_kernel executable. 
nfat_archFAT_MAGIC
fat_arch:
0..nfat_arch
char[ strsize ]
CPU_TYPE_I386 cpusubtype offset
align
size
mach_header
MH_MAGIC cputype cpusubtype filetype
ncmds sizeofcmds flags
cmd cmdsize
load_command:
0..ncmds
cputype cpusubtype offset
align
size
LC_SYMTAB cmdsize symoff nsyms
stroff strsize
n_strx n_value
command-specific
nlist:
0..nsyms
_kernproc\0
n_strx n_value
n_strx 0x004EB008
…           \0…           \0
fat_header
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In revisions 25 and older, volafox built the symbol table directly from 
mach_kernel each the tool was executed. This was inefficient and also led to an 
undesirable dependency on the kernel executable. In practice, mach_kernel would 
therefore need to be copied from a target when performing memory acquisition. Leat 
provided a patch to the source, bringing the overlay functionality available in the Linux 
branch of Volatility to the volafox project (Leat, 2011; Lee, 2011). The current build (r52 
at time of writing) includes an overlay_generator.py utility allowing symbol 
table generation for unsupported builds of OS X. A selection of overlay files is also being 
distributed with the project. However, since Apple does not publish a comprehensive list 
of OS X build numbers it is difficult to know whether this database is complete. A list of 
known builds is provided in Appendix A, but it is recommended that mach_kernel 
still be copied at time of memory acquisition to guarantee functionality. 
2.5.4 Useful Structures. 
The symbol table provides memory locations for a number of kernel structures 
useful in a forensic examination. The composition of these C structures (members and 
their types) can be determined via examination of the Darwin source code in which they 
are defined. Suiche (2010) describes several useful symbols and their associated 
structures as summarized in Table 2. This work mirrors core functionality of the volafox 
project so its equivalent module commands are also listed (Lee, 2011). Note the proc 
structure contains many additional members of interest to be explored in Chapter 3. 
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Table 2. volafox commands with associated symbols and kernel structures. 
volafox Command os_version 
Kernel Symbol version 
struct Name   none (points to 100-byte string) 
Source Definition /xnu/osfmk/i386/lowmem_vectors.s 
Useful Members operating system, kernel version, date and username of compilation 
  
volafox Command machine_info  
Kernel Symbol machine_info  
struct Name   machine_info  
Source Definition xnu/osfmk/mach/machine.h  
Useful Members 
integer_t major_version; 
integer_t minor_version; 
uint64_t max_mem; 
uint32_t physical_cpu; 
int32_t logical_cpu; 
// major kernel version 
// minor kernel version 
// size of physical memory 
// number of CPU cores 
// number of threads 
   
volafox Command mount_info  
Kernel Symbol mountlist  
struct Name   mount  
Source Definition xnu/bsd/sys/mount_internal.h  
Useful Members TAILQ_ENTRY(mount) mnt_list; // linked-list of mounts struct vfsstatfs mnt_vfsstat;  
struct Name   vfsstatsf  
Source Definition xnu/bsd/sys/mount.h  
Useful Members 
char f_fstypename; 
char f_mntonname; 
char f_mntfromname; 
// file system type 
// directory mounted at 
// mounted name 
   
volafox Command kext_info  
Kernel Symbol kmod  
struct Name   kmod_info  
Source Definition xnu/osfmk/mach/kmod.h  
Useful Members 
struct kmod_info *next; 
int id; 
char name[KMOD_MAX_NAME]; 
char version[KMOD_MAX_NAME]; 
int reference_count; 
vm_address_t address; 
vm_size_t size; 
// next linked module 
 
 
 
// refs to this module 
// starting address 
// total size 
   
volafox Command syscall_info  
Kernel Symbol nsysent  
struct Name   none (points to an int)  
Source Definition unknown  
Useful Members OS-dependent arithmetic required to find sysent based on the address of nsysent. Suiche (2010) provides details for OS X 10.5 and 10.6. 
struct Name  sysent  
Source Definition xnu/bsd/sys/sysent.h  
Useful Members sy_call_t *sy_call;  // implementing function 
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volafox Command proc_info  
Kernel Symbol kernproc  
struct Name   proc  
Source Definition xnu/bsd/sys/proc_internal.h  
Useful Members 
LIST_ENTRY(proc) p_list; 
pid_t p_pid; 
pid_t ppid; 
char p_comm[MAXCOMLEN+1]; 
struct pgrp *p_pgrp 
// linked-list of procs 
// process identifier 
// parent pid 
// process name 
struct Name   pgrp  
Source Definition xnu/bsd/sys/proc_internal.h  
Useful Members struct session * pg_session;  
struct Name   session  
Source Definition xnu/bsd/sys/proc_internal.h  
Useful Members char s_login[MAXLOGNAME]; // process username 
The syscall table is potentially valuable for identifying hooked functions. Each 
system call addresses should match those stored on-file in mach_kernel, any 
discrepancies in the comparison could be evidence of tampering (Wowie, 2009). 
Location of the sysent structure in memory changes between versions of OS X, 
making the feature difficult to maintain. At present, the syscall_info command is 
broken in volafox for 10.7 captures due to this difficulty. 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter defined key terms and presented the processes for digital forensics, 
incident response, and memory analysis. Options available for capturing RAM on Intel 
Macs running OS X were discussed along with development and limitations of the Mac 
Memory Reader tool. A review of existing work in Linux memory analysis was then 
followed by a description of the volafox project being extended for this research. 
Technical details required in constructing a kernel symbol table on OS X and several 
useful kernel structures were also introduced.  
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III.  Methodology 
This chapter describes the implementation of a new forensic capability for parsing 
open file information from OS X memory captures. When open files are mapped to a 
process, the forensic examiner learns which resources the process is accessing on disk. 
This listing is useful in determining what information may have been the target for 
exfilitration or modification on a compromised system. File handles may also help 
identify a suspicious process when unexpected file access or modifications are observed. 
Carvey further describes how a list of open files can compliment disk analysis to “get an 
understanding of files you should be concerned with during an investigation” (2009, p. 
132). Because open files can help characterize process activity and highlight misuse of a 
computer, it is highly desirable to recover this information from memory. 
A number of factors influence the decision to implement the feature selected. 
First, an open files listing is the first to-do item on the volafox project wiki. Second, this 
functionality is already represented in the Linux branch for Volatility (Table 1). Third, as 
described in Section 2.2.2, capturing this information is a recommended practice during 
incident response. Listing network connections was also considered due to the high 
forensic value of this information. However, because volafox already includes this as an 
alpha module, file handles were determined to have the greater research impact. 
The chapter begins with the design goals of the system. Kernel structures 
responsible for the target information are then discussed. Organization of the volafox 
source is reviewed. Next, implementation of the new volafox module is described along 
with modifications to the exiting project source. Finally, the outstanding issues are listed. 
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3.1 System Design 
 The developed system consists of software for extracting the open files associated 
with processes from a raw memory image on OS X. Implementation extends the existing 
volafox tool to parse a variety of kernel structures not previously described in the 
literature. Object-oriented design provides a solution that is flexible with respect to both 
kernel architecture and operating system version. 
3.1.2. Target Functionality. 
The desired process-to-file handle information is an approximation of output from 
the commands lsof for UNIX and OS X (Apple Inc., 2011), or the Sysinternals 
equivalent handle (Russinovich, 2011) for Windows. Common to these tools is the 
process associated with each handle, a type classification, and unique identifier. The 
Linux branch of Volatility offers a possible format for this information as shown in 
Figure 2. Important to note in the output are the handle types for resources other than 
files on-disk, such as pipes used for inter-process communication (IPC) and network 
sockets. 
PID: 2095   TASK: d1970550  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "gdm-binary" 
ROOT: /    CWD: /var/gdm 
 FD    FILE     DENTRY    INODE    TYPE  PATH 
  0  d184b300  d14b9dd8  d19b90a0  CHR   /dev/null 
  1  d14c4380  d14b9dd8  d19b90a0  CHR   /dev/null 
  2  d0d0e500  d14b9dd8  d19b90a0  CHR   /dev/null 
  3  d1520500  cf410338  d07ff9a8  SOCK  socket:/[6645] 
  4  cca45f00  cbdfcb30  ccc025d8  PIPE   
  5  d14c4ec0  cf422228  cf74bb28  PIPE   
  6  d1407540  d150d800  d150ee40  CHR   /dev/console 
  7  d1bd7380  cd59cf70  cf74b9d4  PIPE   
  8  d14eb500  cf12add8  d0e83884  REG   /home/stevev/.xsession-errors 
  9  d14ece40  cf12a888  cc0c821c  PIPE   
 11  d150bd80  cbdfcb30  ccc025d8  PIPE 
Figure 2. Volatility linux_list_open_files output (Cohen & Collett, 2008). 
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A second consideration in deciding on an output format is the resource available 
for validating the results. Because the lsof (list open files) command is included with 
OS X, it offers a convenient and reliable source of information for comparison. 
Emulating the output of this tool not only simplifies such analysis, it also gives the 
examiner a familiar interface to interact with. For these reasons, lsof was selected as 
the model for output format. Figure 3 shows sample output for the lsof command and 
Table 3 describes the information in each column. The new volafox module for listing 
open files includes functionality for parsing the nine default lsof fields present in 
Figure 3 and the mode identifier integrated with the FD column. 
 
  
  
$ lsof –p 109 
COMMAND  PID  USER  FD  TYPE  DEVICE  SIZE/OFF   NODE NAME 
bash     109  6ad  cwd   DIR   14,2        578 202041 /Users/6ad 
bash     109  6ad  txt   REG   14,2    1346544 262558 /bin/bash 
bash     109  6ad  txt   REG   14,2    1054960 264388 /usr/lib/dyld 
bash     109  6ad  txt   REG   14,2  213385216 466405 /private/var/db/ 
                                                       dyld/dyld_shared 
                                                       _cache_x86_64 
bash     109  6ad    0u  CHR   16,0      0t369    611 /dev/ttys000 
bash     109  6ad    1u  CHR   16,0      0t369    611 /dev/ttys000 
bash     109  6ad    2u  CHR   16,0      0t369    611 /dev/ttys000 
bash     109  6ad  255u  CHR   16,0      0t369    611 /dev/ttys000 
Figure 3. UNIX list open files (lsof) command. 
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3.1.3 Implementation Constraints. 
While an ideal implementation would fully duplicate the functionality and 
nuances of the lsof command, the diversity of data structures required to accomplish 
this makes it impractical with the development resources available for this research. A 
design choice is made to focus on file rather than socket or IPC handles for this research 
due to the forensic value of the information and because file handles logically divide the 
development workload. Constraints of the tool implemented are formalized in Chapter 4, 
but there are two key decisions that influence the implementation. 
  
Table 3. UNIX lsof output fields. 
COMMAND First nine characters of the UNIX command associated with the process. 
PID Process identification number. 
USER Login name of the user to whom the process belongs. 
FD 
File descriptor is a numeral index into the process open handle array optionally 
followed by a mode identifier: r (read access), w (write access), or u (both). Two 
other descriptors commonly seen are cwd representing the current working 
directory for the process and txt used for program text (code and data). These 
files are of high forensic value because they include the executable from which 
the command was launched, linked libraries, and other memory-mapped files. 
See the output section of the lsof manpage for a full list of descriptors used 
(Apple Inc., 2011). 
TYPE 
Node type associated with the handle. See the output section of the lsof 
manpage a partial type listing (Apple Inc., 2011). Note that numerous 
undocumented types were encountered in testing such as FSEVENT. 
DEVICE 
Major and minor device numbers separated by a comma. The first number 
describes a class of hard/software device and the second is a unique identifier 
for a particular instance of that class. 
SIZE/OFF Size or offset of a file reported in bytes. Offsets are preceded by a leading 0t to distinguish when the column is mixed. 
NODE 
The node number for a local file. This unique identifier is filesystem dependent. 
For example, files stored on HFS+ report the catalog node identifier (CNID) for 
this field, whereas DEVFS files use a UNIX inode number instead. 
NAME Mount point and file system on which a file resides, or name of character special device. 
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First, the volafox open files module supports a subset of handle types, and only 
those subscribing to the virtual node (vnode) interface. The excluded types mean POSIX 
semaphores and shared memory files, kernel event queue files, pipes, and sockets are 
reported as part of the file descriptor table, but with DEVICE, SIZE/OFF, NODE and 
NAME fields unsupported. Additionally, the UNIX lsof command classifies sockets by 
a variety of subtypes that the volafox open files module groups together using the generic 
description ‘SOCKET’ in the TYPE field. 
Second, the module supports a subset of the filesystems available for OS X, 
specifically HFS+ and DEVFS. HFS+ is the default format for the OS X boot volume and 
DEVFS is used to abstract certain devices, such as special character files. Among other 
uses, special character files describe ttys devices controlling the print streams stdin, 
stdout, and stderr of terminal programs. HFS+ and DEVFS account for the 
filesystems most commonly encountered during development and testing, but the vnode 
interface makes reference to at least 20 other types. One impact of this constraint is that 
files stored on network filesystems, FAT32, NTFS and others, do not have volafox 
support for lsof fields outside the vnode interface. 
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3.2 Key Kernel Structures 
This section documents the kernel design recovery research objective specified in 
Section 1.1. Implementing the new volafox module for listing open files requires 
knowledge of 32 unique C data structures from the OS X source code, four of which are 
described by Suiche (2010) to list running processes. These include 26 structure (struct), 
three enumeration (enum), and three union definitions. Identifying the data structures 
containing critical information and the relationships between them is one of the primary 
contributions of this research because “the kernel isn’t heavily commented and its 
internals aren’t documented, so you learn by tracing code by hand” (Sesek, 2012). Figure 
4 shows an overview of the relevant structures and associated UNIX lsof fields from 
Table 3. The names, source files, interesting members, and relationships between these 
data structures appear as series of relationship diagrams in Figures 5-8 and Appendix B. 
 
  
 
Figure 4. C struct relationship overview. 
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 Extracting open file information begins with the kernel symbol table, shown in 
Figure 5 and described in Section 2.5.3. Symbol _kernproc provides an address for the 
head of the process list, kernel_task (PID 0), which is unique in its use of static data 
structures (Singh, 2006b, p. 293). Because of this property, PID 0 does not appear in the 
output of UNIX commands such as ps or lsof and therefore is excluded from the file 
handles module implementation. The COMMAND and PID fields are members of 
struct proc, and USER is located in struct session. Note that p_list is a 
substructure, meaning proc contains it as a member rather than using a pointer to 
reference it. 
 
Figure 5. Symbol table and process list. 
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Structure task, as pointed to by proc in Figure 5, provides the link to program 
text files (FD txt). Program text refers to the code and data segments of an executable, 
as well as linked libraries and any other memory-mapped files. This information is 
invaluable for identifying rouge processes, which often masquerade as legitimate 
executables to avoid detection (SANS Institute, 2008). 
Figure 6 shows how these files are referenced. Structure _vm_map stores the 
header for a ring of vm_map_entry structures containing the union member object. 
Each memory object may reference a struct vm_object or recursively refer to 
another entry. Memory mapped files are backed by a vnode pager, but the pager may be 
located in the shadow object for external memory managers (Singh, 2006b, p. 571). 
 
  
 
 
Figure 6. Memory-mapped files (txt). 
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The file descriptor table and current working directory are referenced from 
struct filedesc as shown in Figure 7. Member filedesc.fd_ofiles is a 
pointer to the start of a fileproc array. Elements of the array that contain a valid 
fileglob pointer reference a handle, those that do not are available to hold one. The 
index into this array represents the numerical file identifier used by the FD field of the 
lsof output. Integer filedesc.fd_lastfile indexes the last file in the array and 
provides an iteration bound. The array itself makes up the file descriptor table, used by a 
process to reference all open files (ASCII, word processing, logs, temp, etc.). File mode, 
or read/write access, is determined from the value of fileglob.fg_flag using the 
bitmap definitions in bsd/sys/fcntl.h. Member fileglob.fg_offset is the 
offset for FIFO and special character files as reported in the lsof SIZE/OFF field. The 
 
Figure 7. File descriptor table. 
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fileglob.fg_data member is a generic pointer that may reference a variety of 
structures. As described in Section 3.1.3, full support is constrained to vnode types. 
Enumerator fileglob.fg_type holds destination type of the pointer. Any non-vnode 
handle can be typed using the values of enum file_type_t, but DEVICE, 
SIZE/OFF, NODE and NAME fields are unsupported for such handles using this 
research implementation. 
Figure 8 shows the struct vnode referenced by proc, vnode_pager, 
filedesc and fileglob structures shown in Figures 5-7. The lsof NAME field is a 
concatenation of the device name from mount.vfsstatfs.f_mntfromname and a 
path of vnode.v_name strings recursively references using vnode.v_parent. 
Member vnode.vtype describes the file type of any supported file, and 
vnode.v_tag holds the associated filesystem. The number of combinations created by 
vnode.v_type and vnode.v_tag leads to branches at union v_un and the 
generic pointer v_data. NODE is stored at devnode.dn_ino for all files using the 
VT_DEVFS filesystem and in cnode.cat_desc.cd_cnid for VT_HFS. An 
encoded device identifier is found at specinfo.si_rdev for VT_DEVFS and in 
mount.vfsstatfs.fsid.val[0] for VT_HFS. The device identifier is decoded 
using macros in bsd/sys/types.h that return major and minor device numbers. 
Returning the correct lsof SIZE/OFF value requires knowledge of vnode.v_type. 
For VREG files the size is found in ubc_info.ui_size, however this structure is not 
valid for system vnodes that are otherwise regular (Singh, 2006b, p. 605).  
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Figure 8. Virtual node (vnode). 
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VDIR file size is calculated using the count in cnode.cat_attr.cau_entries, 
the equation: 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠  +   2   ∗  AVERAGE_HFSDIRENTRY_SIZE 
found in bsd/hfs/hfs_vnops.c, and the macro definition from bsd/hfs/hfs.h. 
Finally, VLNK sizes are located in filefork.cat_fork.cf_size.  
Starting with the address pointed to by _kernproc, this section describes the 
structures and relationships for retrieving information needed to emulate lsof output 
for all vnode type files stored on HFS+ or DEVFS filesystems. Table 4 summarizes the 
structure members needed to support the required fields. 
 
  
Table 4. Open file data locations. 
 !  DTYPE 
_VNODE 
DTYPE_VNODE 
 VT_HFS VT_DEVFS 
 VREG VDIR VLNK VFIFO  
COMMAND proc.p_comm 
PID proc.p_pid 
USER session.s_login 
FD & mode filedesc.fd_ofiles[i] + fileglob.fg_flag 
TYPE fileglob. fg_type vnode.v_type 
DEVICE  mount.vfsstatfs.fsid.val[0] specinfo. si_rdev 
SIZE/ 
OFF  
ubc_info. 
ui_size 
cnode. 
cat_attr. 
cau_entries 
filefork. 
cat_fork. 
cf_size 
fileglob. 
fg_offset 
NODE  cnode.cat_desc.cd_cnid devnode. dn_ino 
NAME  mount.vfsstatfs.f_mntfromname + recurse(vnode.v_parent->v_name) + vnode.v_name 
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3.2.1 OS X Abstraction Layers. 
OS X is a commercial operating system integrating a collection of technologies, a 
subset of which are made open source by the Darwin UNIX distribution. This research is 
concerned with data structures defined by the Darwin kernel, known as xnu. The xnu 
kernel is composed of several additional abstraction layers. Mach, sometimes described 
as the xnu microkernel, provides critical low-level services. These are leveraged by BSD, 
“the primary system programming interface” (Singh, 2006b, p. 31). Among other 
features, the BSD layer supports a process model and virtual file system (VFS) layer. 
BSD hooks into Mach for numerous services, such as task operations responsible for 
execution and the virtual memory subsystems (Singh, 2006b, p. 33). 
Much of the preceding design recovery is a consequence of manual inspection of 
the Darwin source code and headers, combined with prototype development in volafox to 
verify the purpose of various structure members. However, there are several instances 
where the destination of a pointer reference is of unknown or ambiguous type, 
complicating this analysis considerably. Figure 9 demonstrates the problem using 
struct proc. While three of the members shown are explicitly typed, such as pid_t 
p_pptr, the structure pointed to by task is unknown using the definition alone. 
Similar issues occur at vm_object.pager, fileglob.fg_data, vnode.v_un 
struct proc { 
 LIST_ENTRY(proc) p_list;  
 pid_t            p_pid; 
 void *           task; /* corresponding task (static)*/ 
 struct proc *    p_pptr;  
 … 
}; 
Figure 9. struct proc. 
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and vnode.v_data. These generic object pointers appear at locations where an 
interface is needed between two or more different abstraction layers. In the example, 
struct proc is a BSD structure and proc.task points to a Mach structure. Figure 
10 summarizes the relevant layer interfaces. Note that while fileglob.fg_data only 
branches back into the BSD layer for this implementation, support for additional file 
types would involve structures such as those for pipes and sockets that may exist outside 
the BSD abstraction layer (Singh, 2006b, p. 919).  
3.3 Project Volafox 
This section describes software design details of the volafox project needed to 
understand implementation of the new open file listing module. First, the relevant source 
files and Python classes are introduced. Next, the execution flow for the main project file 
is traversed to explain where the new module interfaces with the existing code. 
 
Figure 10. Abstraction crossover. 
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3.3.1 Package Organization 
Figure 11 shows a summary of the source files from the volafox package related 
to OS X memory analysis. Public classes in each file are indicated in bold. Connections 
represent file dependencies, which are labeled with the public function names. The new 
open files module, lsof.py, is shown but not discussed until Section 3.4. 
  
 
Figure 11. volafox package diagram. 
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Main program execution depends on the following source files and directory: 
addrspace.py – houses FileAddressSpace class responsible for file operations 
on linear memory images. 
 
macho.py – support for the Mac Memory Reader image format (Mach-O), the 
MachAddressSpace class is written to be the MMR format equivalent of 
FileAddressSpace. As of revision 48 of the project this functionality was 
disabled due to compatibility problems with 64-bit analysis. 
 
x86.py / ia32_pml4.py – these files house the address space agnostic classes 
IA32PagedMemoryPae and IA32PML4MemoryPae respectively. They are 
responsible for performing virtual to physical address translations that can 
subsequently be converted to file offsets by either FileAddressSpace or 
MachAddressSpace (whichever is passed to the initializer). All requests for 
reading raw memory are passed through one of these two objects. PML4 is a 
reference to the 4th level page map used by the Intel IA-32e paging scheme (Intel 
Corporation, 2012), meaning the second file is the one responsible for handling 
64-bit architecture images where the first is used for 32-bit. 
 
imageinfo.py – the imageInfo class inspects a memory image file to determine 
the file format (MMR or linear) and kernel architecture (32 or 64-bit) required to 
initialize the correct address space and PAE objects already described. It also 
returns the OS X build version information for the image needed to select the 
correct overlay file. This file also has a main so it can be executed as a stand-
alone utility. 
 
Usage: $ python imageinfo.py IMAGE.mem 
 
overlays/ – as of revision 48, volafox.py no longer accepts a mach_kernel file 
argument for building the symbol table. All symbols are read from files in the 
overlays directory labeled by OS version and architecture using the Python 
pickle library for object serialization. New overlays can be generated from the 
kernel executable with the overlay_generator.py utility. 
 
volafox.py – houses the project main() and class volafox responsible for 
marshaling the remaining files and classes to preform analysis of OS X memory 
images. 
 
Usage: $ python volafox.py -i MEMORY_IMAGE 
       [-o INFORMATION][-m KEXT ID][-x PID] 
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The volafox package also includes several stand-alone utilities: 
 
showbootermemorymap.py – outputs the load commands from an MMR image in 
the same format as the showbootermemorymap kernel macro debug script 
and the /dev/pmap device.  
 
 Usage: $ python showbootermemorymap.py IMAGE.mmr 
 
flatten.py – converts MMR image files from Mach-O into a linear equivalent which 
can be analyzed by volafox.py. This script is only operable on 32-bit 
architecture, as verified using the imageinfo.py utility. 
 
 Usage: $ python flatten.py SOURCE.mmr DEST.flat 
 
overlay_generator.py – reads the symbol table from a mach_kernel executable 
and stores to file in the form of a serialized Python dictionary for use in the 
overlays directory. 
 
 Usage: $ python overlay_generator.py MACH_KERNEL 
       10.MAJOR.MINOR_ARCH.overlay [32|64] 
 
3.3.2 Module Interface. 
As summarized in Table 1, volafox features a number of command options for 
parsing information from raw memory. The code implementing these branches, around 
1300 lines, is contained within the source file volafox.py. This monolithic software 
design is not particularly modular, but the implementation of the new open files 
functionality strives to be. This section explains where the new code interfaces with the 
existing project. 
Since volafox.py is intended to be run in Python executable mode, the support 
code of concern begins in main(). This function performs the following actions: 
1. Handle command line arguments and the usage statement. 
 
2. Instantiate a new volafox object with path to the raw memory image file. 
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3. Delegate to volafox object for initialization of the correct address space and 
PAE objects, a method that also returns the architecture and OS version needed to 
select the correct overlay file. 
 
4. Import a symbol table as a Python dictionary from the correct overlay stored on 
file as a serialized object. 
 
5. Pass addresses for the _IdlePDPT and _IdlePLM4 symbols to the volafox 
object, which uses them to initialize the page table map and thereby completes 
setup for virtual to physical address translation. 
 
6. Pass address for the _machine_info symbol to the volafox object, which 
uses it to determine the kernel version and stores the result as an instance variable 
for branching based on OS (Lion versus Snow Leopard). 
 
7. Branch based on user information requested to call the appropriate class 
volafox method. Each information method accepts a kernel symbol address and 
returns a string matrix of results. 
 
8. Print results and exit. 
 
The new module adds code to main() for additional argument handling and a branch 
for calling a new lsof method in class volafox. Method lsof branches on 
architecture to correctly read and unpack the _kernproc symbol and delegates all other 
open file analysis to the new source file lsof.py shown in Figure 11. 
3.4 File Handle Module Implementation 
This section introduces a new file handle module for volafox revision 52. First, 
the Unified Modeling Language (UML) is used to present a graphical view of how the 
new lsof.py source file is organized in Figures 12-13 and Appendix E. The solution to 
flexible analysis of multiple kernel architecture and OS versions follows. Next, the issue 
of ambiguous data types is discussed. Finally, modifications to the existing volafox 
source code are listed. 
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3.4.1 Object-oriented Design. 
While the open files module does not require a complex inheritance hierarchy, a 
class diagram still offers the best visual explanation of the software’s design. UML is 
therefore used to provide an overview of the lsof.py source file, the complete version 
of which is available as a single graphic in Appendix D. Some liberty has been taken with 
the standard since the source integrates both object-oriented and imperative programming 
elements. Note that aggregate associations are modeled when a class definition includes 
an explicit instance variable of another class, while dependencies are used if a class 
constructs instances for use only within method scope. 
Figure 12 shows the class elements corresponding to structures of the process list 
and the file descriptor table. It also specifies the abstract superclass Struct, the parent 
of all remaining classes in lsof.py. Figure 13 covers structures related to the vnode 
interface and memory-mapped files. The utilities box describes global variables and 
function dependencies outside the class hierarchy. The lsof.py box shows imperative 
functions which depend on the classes, including the public getfilelist() and 
printfilelist(), which serve as an interface to the remaining volafox source code. 
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Figure 12. UML 1 – process list and file descriptors. 
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Figure 13. UML 2 – vnode interface and memory-mapped files. 
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Though Python is not a strictly object-oriented language, its support for classes 
allows for a modular implementation that maps to the network of kernel structures 
previously discussed. Because C structs group data types, a natural solution to parsing 
their content uses object instances as containers for the address space they occupy and 
class methods for handling the unpacked data (see Appendix C. Python struct 
Library). The open files module defines classes for 18 of the structures described in 
Section 3.2, the remaining substructures are handled inside the class methods since they 
occupy the address space of the struct in which they are defined. 
3.4.2 Structure Templates. 
Sections 3.4.2 - 3.4.5 collectively document the research objective from Section 
1.1 that requires a flexible process for programmatically handling kernel data structures 
defined for different kernel architectures and operating system versions. Existing volafox 
modules are not readily extensible and require additional logic branching for each variant 
in size or composition of the underlying kernel data structures. The module implemented 
for this research uses a dynamic runtime solution consisting of two parts. 
First, the following interface is defined to describe required members of each 
structure for a given architecture and OS version: 
 
template = { MBR_NAME : ( MBR_TYPE, OFFSET, SIZE, FIELD, 
                          SUB_STRUCT ), … } 
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Table 5 lists Python types from the C struct template interface, which itself is 
implemented as a dictionary. Substructures are defined as those contained within the 
memory allocated for a super structure. They share the same dictionary format as regular 
structures and their values are referenced recursively. Figure 14 shows the 32-bit Snow 
Leopard variant for the struct proc template. 
The second component in the template solution is a Python class initializer that 
dynamically selects the correct template for a given subclass at runtime based on the OS 
version and architecture of the memory image under analysis. Because classes in the open 
template = { 
    'p_list' : ( 'LIST_ENTRY(proc)', 0, 8, '' , { 
        'le_next' : ( 'struct proc *', 0, 4, '' ), 
        'le_prev' : ( 'struct proc **', 4, 4, '' ) 
        } 
    ), 
    'p_pid' : ( 'pid_t', 8, 4, 'PID' ), 
    'task' : ( 'void *', 12, 4, '' ), 
    'p_fd' : ( 'struct filedesc *', 104, 4, '' ), 
    'p_textvp' : ( 'struct vnode *', 388, 4, '' ), 
    'p_comm' : ( 'char[]', 420, 17, 'COMMAND' ), 
    'p_pgrp' : ( 'struct pgrp *', 472, 4, '' ) 
} 
Figure 14. struct proc template, 10.6 x86. 
Table 5. Template interface fields. 
Variable Python Type Description 
template dict template implementing the C stuct interface 
MBR_NAME str dictionary key, variable name for a struct member 
template[MBR_NAME] tuple dictionary value, a struct member description 
MBR_TYPE str C type of the named member 
OFFSET int offset in bytes for the member 
SIZE int size in bytes for the member type 
FIELD str lsof field represented by member 
SUB_STRUCT dict recursively defined substructure (optional) 
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files module manage fields and methods associated with a particular kernel structure, all 
inherit from the abstract superclass in Figure 15. 
 
 The first four static variables belong to the abstract class and are shared by all 
Struct subclasses. The mem variable is a reference to one of the PAE objects described 
in Section 3.3.1. Verbose flag ver indicates if all file descriptors should be printed, 
including those for types not fully supported by the open files module. The arch and 
kvers variables report the kernel architecture and version respectively. The final three 
fields are virtual static variables because their assignment is deferred to the subclasses. 
The constant TEMPLATES is a nested dictionary from which the static template is 
assigned the first time the initializer runs based on value of arch and kvers. The static 
class Struct(object): 
 
  mem  = None 
  ver  = False 
  arch = -1 
  kvers = -1 
  
  TEMPLATES = None 
  template = None 
  ssize = -1 
  
  def __init__(self, addr): 
  
    if self.__class__.template == None: 
   
      self.__class__.template = self.__class__.TEMPLATES[Struct.arch] \ 
                                                        [Struct.kvers] 
    
      for item in self.__class__.template.values(): 
        if ( item[1] + item[2] ) > self.__class__.ssize: 
          self.__class__.ssize = item[1] + item[2] 
 
self.smem = Struct.mem.read(addr, self.__class__.ssize); 
Figure 15. Simplified abstract class Struct (no error handling). 
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ssize is subsequently assigned based on the selected template and determines how 
many bytes the initializer reads from the address passed as an argument to provide 
coverage of all members specified in the structure template. 
 Combining the structure template interface with an abstract initializer offers a 
solution that greatly simplifies the program logic needed to support a selection of 
architectures and OS versions. The result is also highly extensible because new templates 
can be added without any code refactoring as long as the member names remain 
consistent across versions. Figure 16 shows the concrete subclass corresponding to 
struct devnode and demonstrates use of the structure template solution. 
3.4.3 Member Offsets and Type Sizing. 
While the dictionary constants used to implement structure templates are easy to 
work with programmatically, generating their syntax is labor intensive. The open files 
module uses (18 classes * 2 versions * 2 architectures) = 72 struct templates, requiring a 
class Devnode(Struct): 
 
  TEMPLATES = { 
    32:{ 
      10:{'dn_ino':('ino_t',112,4,'NODE')} 
      , 11:{'dn_ino':('ino_t',112,4,'NODE')} 
    }, 
    64:{ 
      10:{'dn_ino':('ino_t',192,8,'NODE')} 
      , 11:{'dn_ino':('ino_t',192,8,'NODE')} 
    } 
  } 
 
  def __init__(self, addr): 
    super(Devnode, self).__init__(addr) 
   
  def getnode(self): 
    return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['dn_ino'], INT) 
Figure 16. Concrete class Devnode. 
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great deal of error-prone coding and debugging if generated by hand. Determining size 
and offset values for each member in the template is also very difficult to accomplish 
manually due to the complexity of defined types included in the kernel structures. The 
solution to both of these challenges is an external C program that dissects kernel 
structures and automates the generation of the Python dictionary syntax needed for each 
template. 
The offsets.c program was developed to find the size and offset of each 
required structure member and print the results as a structure template for use in 
lsof.py. Figure 17 shows a function from the program that prints a template for 
struct _vm_map. The variable member is a C structure defined in the program to 
hold the fields described in Table 5 and printmember() formats each as a key/value 
pair for the enclosing Python dictionary. The argument mh is a function pointer to a 
substructure that is printed recursively. 
int vm_map() { 
 
 member m; 
 int (*mh)(unsigned long int offset) = &vm_map_header; 
  
 printf("struct_vmmap = {"); 
  
 m.var_name = "hdr"; 
 m.var_type = "struct vm_map_header"; 
 m.offset = offsetof(struct _vm_map, hdr); 
 m.size = sizeof(struct vm_map_header); 
 m.field = ""; 
 printmember(m, mh); 
  
 printf("}\n"); 
 return 0; 
} 
Figure 17. Template generation function. 
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The C language sizeof operator is used to find the size of any type, and the 
preprocessing macro offsetof defined in stddef.h can return the offset of any 
member for a given structure. However, most of the header files defining the structures 
described in Section 3.2 are not available in the include path for OS X. Sesek (2012) 
explains the problem and suggests a workaround in a blog post about kernel debugging: 
Structs […] are merely human-friendly offsets into a region of memory. 
Their definition and layout can be shamelessly copied from the XNU open 
source headers into your kext’s project so that you can access fields in 
kernel private structures. As it turns out, virtually ever structure within the 
kernel is designed to be opaque to a kext. Apple decided to do this so that 
they can freely change the kernel structures, but it also makes writing a 
debugging tool like this a little harder. To do so you need to edit the 
headers so they compile in your project through a process I call 
“munging.” 
Sesek’s method was modified to access the kernel definitions needed for offsets.c 
using the following steps applied to each required header: 
1. Identify all required definitions in a given header file, cut the file content after the 
last statement needed to avoid irrelevant dependencies. 
2. Remove any #ifdef macros necessary to expose the target definitions. 
3. Remove any #include statements for kernel dependencies and replace with a 
local version of each header file containing a required definition. 
4. Recursively apply steps 1-4 for each local header added. 
5. Troubleshoot ad nauseam until the target header can be included without 
compilation error. 
These steps must be completed for each supported version of OS X due to subtle changes 
within the header files. For the 10.7 version of the offsets program 27 different header 
files were required to define the data structures needed by the open files module. The 
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10.6 version uses only 17 headers because many of the required definitions are relocated 
to the dependent file rather than including them recursively. 
 Three out of 18 template functions written for offsets.c are known to produce 
incorrect member offsets for 64-bit kernel architecture. The problem is believed to be a 
complex definition conflict for some low-level types. Several C types are defined for 
userspace with standard libraries such as stdio.h. However, the kernel sometime uses 
different sizes for these same types and forced redefinition yields a compilation error. 
When the offsetof macro measures a userspace definition the result is an error for 
some architectures. Figure 18 shows the offsets.c template contradicting the value 
calculated manually from the structure definition in Figure 19. 
struct ubc_info { 
 memory_object_t         ui_pager; // 8-byte pointer 
 memory_object_control_t ui_control; // 8-byte pointer 
 uint32_t                ui_flags; // 4-byte int 
       // 4-byte PAD (ptr alignment) 
vnode_t                 ui_vnode; // 8 byte pointer 
kauth_cred_t            ui_ucred; // 8 byte pointer 
       // -------------- 
      // 40-byte offset 
 
off_t                   ui_size; // 8-byte int 
... 
}; 
Figure 19. Manual offset calculation for 64-bit struct ubc_info (annotated). 
struct_ubcinfo = {'ui_size':('off_t',32,8,'SIZE/OFF')} 
Figure 18. 10.7 x64 template for struct ubc_info. 
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The printhex() utility written for the open files module can be used to print 
the address space in hex of a problematic structure for debugging. Output can be used to 
confirm manual sizing as shown in Table 6. The correct value of ui_size in the 
example can be verified using output from the UNIX lsof command on the machine the 
memory was captured from to be sure the interpretation is correct. This analysis indicates 
ui_size should have a 40-byte offset instead of 36 in the template for struct 
ubc_info. Similar offset issues exist in the offset.c templates for struct 
vnode_pager and struct task. Manual offset calculation and hex analysis was 
effective in resolving the problem for these templates as well. In all three cases, the 
solution is a manual adjustment made to the TEMPLATES constant of the equivalent 
structure class in lsof.py. 
 A wrapper for offsets.c called printstructs.py is written to verify the 
output dictionary as executable Python code and also print the structure members in a 
human-readable format for ease of debugging. Figure 20 shows the output of the 
program. The architecture argument on the command line instructs printstructs.py 
to compile offsets.c using gcc –arch with either i386 or x86_64 specified as 
Table 6. Manual hex sizing. 
ubc_info ui_pager ui_control 
hex A03F4207 80FFFFFF C02B3B07 80FFFFFF 
human ffffff8007423fa0 ffffff80073b2bc0 
 
ubc_info ui_flags  ui_vnode 
hex 1F000000 00000000 00104007 80FFFFFF 
human 31  ffffff8007401000 
 
ubc_info ui_ucred ui_size 
hex 00000000 00000000 00EE1400 00000000 
human NULL 1371648 
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appropriate. The –arch flag is an Apple-only option according to the gcc manpage, 
though in limited testing the standard –m32 and –m64 flags also appear to work. Setting 
the flag allows one version of offset.c to produce templates for both the 32 and 64-bit 
installations. Dictionary output from printstructs.py was then pasted into the 
TEMPLATES constant of each class in lsof.py to complete the definition.  
3.4.4 Unions and Type Ambiguity. 
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, the union data structure and generic pointers can 
lead to ambiguity which must be well-handled by the open files module. One example is 
the vm_object member of struct vm_map_entry. This union may refer to a 
pointer for vm_object or _vm_map and the address itself cannot be used to distinguish 
the two. The open files module deals with this situation by implementing a template test, 
which unpacks the values at certain offsets and attempts to match these with the types 
expected for the template of a particular structure. The initializer for class 
Vm_object demonstrates the technique in Figure 21. 
$ ./printstructs6.py 64 -p 
struct_proc = {'p_list':('LIST_ENTRY(proc)',0,16,'',{'le_next':( [...] 
 
----------- struct proc (6x64) ----------- 
LIST_ENTRY(proc) p_list   0 16  
  struct proc *le_next    0  8  
  struct proc **le_prev   8  8  
pid_t p_pid              16  4 PID 
void *task               24  8 
struct filedesc *p_fd   200  8 
struct vnode *p_textvp  664  8 
char[] p_comm           700 17 COMMAND 
struct pgrp *p_pgrp     752  8 
Figure 20. Template output from printstructs.py. 
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The vm_object object structure is characterized by two pointer members followed by a 
lock, which is in contrast to the lock followed by two pointers in the _vm_map 
definition. Moreover, vm_object appears to initialize these pointers with the address of 
the object itself, suggesting both should always be valid when tested. The template test 
provides a reliable indicator of the structure type for the pointer stored at 
vm_object.vm_map_entry and is used to branch program logic. 
3.4.5 Modifications to volafox.py. 
The implementation for listing open files is confined to the source file lsof.py 
whenever possible in order to support modular software design. However, three 
noteworthy changes are required to integrate new code with the existing volafox.py 
source file. First, additional argument handling is needed to direct execution of the open 
files module from the command line. The modified volafox usage statement in Figure 22 
explains the new options. 
 
class Vm_object(Struct): 
 
  TEMPLATES = {...} 
     
  def __init__(self, addr): 
    super(Vm_object, self).__init__(addr) 
    self.map = None 
 
    ptr1 = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['memq'][4]['next'], INT) 
    ptr2 = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['memq'][4]['prev'], INT) 
 
    if ptr1 == 0 or ptr2 == 0 \ 
      or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(ptr1)) \ 
      or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(ptr2)): 
  
 # on failure, create map instance to be called recursively 
self.map = Vm_map(addr) 
Figure 21. Template testing. 
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The optional –p flag emulates the UNIX lsof command option to print open files only 
for a specified process. Because the new module only fully supports the handle types 
described in Section 3.1.3, the –v flag was added to avoid output of limited value to the 
examiner by default. The code supporting the new options is of generic, imperative 
design is therefore not discussed in detail. 
  
$ python volafox.py  
 
volafox: release r52; lsof research build 1.0 
project: http://code.google.com/p/volafox 
   lsof: osxmem@gmail.com 
support: 10.6-7; 32/64-bit kernel 
  input: *.vmem, *.mmr (Mac Memory Reader, flattened x86) 
  usage: python volafox.py -i IMAGE [-o COMMAND [-vp PID]] 
                                    [-m KEXT_ID][-x PID] 
 
WARNING: this is an experimental development build adding support for 
listing open files. The code here is NOT in sync with project trunk. 
 
Options: 
-o CMD : Print kernel information for CMD (below) 
-p PID : List open files for PID (where CMD is "lsof") 
-v     : Include unsupported types in listing (where CMD is "lsof") 
-m KID : Dump kernel extension address space for KID 
-x PID : Dump process address space for PID 
 
COMMANDS: 
os_version    Mac OS X build version 
machine_info   kernel version, CPU, and memory specifications 
mount_info     mounted filesystems 
kern_kext_info kernel KEXT (Kernel Extensions) listing 
kext_info      KEXT (Kernel Extensions) listing 
proc_info      process list 
syscall_info   syscall table 
net_info       network socket listing (hash table) 
lsof           open files listing by process (research) 
Figure 22. volafox usage statement. 
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Figure 23 shows the second modification, a new module branch added to main(), note 
the call to printfilelist(), one of two public functions in lsof.py. 
 
 
 
Finally, Figure 24 shows the stub method added to class volafox which calls the 
second public function getfilelist(). 
 
  
elif oflag == 'lsof': 
  filelist = m_volafox.lsof(symbol_list['_kernproc'], pid, vflag) 
  if vflag: 
    print ""  
    printfilelist(filelist) 
    sys.exit() 
Figure 23. volafox lsof command branch. 
 
def lsof(self, sym_addr, pid, vflag): 
  
  if self.arch == 32: 
    overlay starting at symbol _kernproc 
    kernproc = self.x86_mem_pae.read(sym_addr, 4); 
  
    proc_head = struct.unpack('I', kernproc)[0] 
   
  else: # 64-bit 
    kernproc = self.x86_mem_pae.read(sym_addr, 8); 
    proc_head = struct.unpack('Q', kernproc)[0] 
   
  return getfilelist(self.x86_mem_pae, self.arch, self.os_version, \ 
               proc_head, pid, vflag) 
Figure 24. lsof method stub added to class volafox. 
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3.5 Open Issues 
While the majority of system design goals outlined for the open files module in 
Section 3.1 are met by the implementation described in 3.4, there are two outstanding 
deficiencies not accounted for in the constraints specified. Both describe limitations of 
the kernel structure analysis rather than programming error. Problems reporting the 
correct process user and sizing the /dev directory are discussed in this section. 
3.5.1 User Field Reporting. 
The manpage for the UNIX lsof command describes the output of the USER 
field as “the user ID number or login name of the user to whom the process belongs, 
usually the same as reported by ps(1)”. However, output from the volafox open files 
module is known to incorrectly report the process login name as shown in Figures 25-26. 
  
$ ./volafox.py –i 10.6.8x86.vmem –o lsof –p 15 
COMMAND   PID   USER   FD      TYPE     DEVICE  SIZE/OFF   NODE […] 
distnoted  15   root  cwd       DIR       14,2      1088      2 […] 
distnoted  15   root  txt       REG       14,2     50672 268317 […] 
distnoted  15   root  txt       REG       14,2   1054960 264388 […] 
distnoted  15   root  txt       REG       14,2 213385216 466405 […] 
distnoted  15   root    0r      CHR        3,2       0t0    297 […] 
distnoted  15   root    1      PIPE         -1        -1     -1 […] 
distnoted  15   root    2      PIPE         -1        -1     -1 […] 
distnoted  15   root    3u   KQUEUE         -1        -1     -1 […] 
distnoted  15   root    56u   SOCKET        -1        -1     -1 […] 
Figure 25. volafox user output. 
# lsof –p 15 
COMMAND   PID     USER   FD    TYPE     DEVICE  SIZE/OFF   NODE […] 
distnoted  15   daemon  cwd     DIR       14,2      1088      2 […]  
distnoted  15   daemon  txt     REG       14,2     50672 268317 […] 
distnoted  15   daemon  txt     REG       14,2   1054960 264388 […] 
distnoted  15   daemon  txt     REG       14,2 213385216 466405 […] 
distnoted  15   daemon    0r    CHR        3,2       0t0    297 […] 
distnoted  15   daemon    1    PIPE 0x02fe2af8     16384     […] 
distnoted  15   daemon    2    PIPE 0x02fe2af8     16384     […] 
distnoted  15   daemon    3u KQUEUE                             […] 
distnoted  15   daemon   56u   unix 0x02fdef80       0t0     […] 
Figure 26. lsof user output. 
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The difference shown is not consistent across all processes of a full file listing. In many 
cases the expected USER value is reflected in the output, but not always. 
The first test in investigating this issue is to determine whether the problem is 
specific to the volafox open files module implementation. Since this part of the open files 
methodology is taken from the proc_info command, the same erroneous output for a 
given process is expected from both commands. Figure 27 shows that both the lsof and 
proc_info commands agree on the USER ‘root’, demonstrating the problem is not 
isolated to the open files module. 
The second test confirms correctness of the volafox proc_info command 
implementation. Volafox parses the username based on Suiche’s original analysis, which 
states a “[p]ointer to the process group, pgrp structure, allows us to retrieve the 
username of the person who launched the program because this structure contains a 
pointer to a structure called session with the username” (2010). Figure 28, a 
screenshot from his conference slides, shows the username nfi for the launchd 
process. Here nfi (short for Netherlands Forensic Institute) is a local user and therefore 
cannot be the correct username for the launchd process. As Singh explains, “user-level 
startup is initiated when the kernel executes /sbin/launchd as the first user process” 
$ ./volafox.py –i 10.6.8x86.vmem –o proc_info 
list_entry_next pid ppid process name username 
02f74d20         0 0 kernel_task   
02f747e0         1 0 launchd       6ad  
02f74540        10 1 kextd             root  
02f74000        11 1 notifyd       root  
03271d20        12 1 diskarbitrationd root 
03271540   15 1 distnoted  root 
... 
Figure 27. volafox proc_info output. 
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(2006b). The launchd process is therefore always associated with the username root 
since the kernel is responsible for executing it. This demonstrates the problem is also not 
specific to the volafox implementation of Suiche’s methodology. 
  
  
 
Figure 28. Suiche process list output (2010). 
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The third test determines whether the discrepancy could be the result of a 
semantic difference between the user/username fields from the Suiche analysis and the 
lsof manpage. The manpage’s “login name of the user to whom the process belongs” 
could contradict Suiche’s definition of a user as “the person who launched the program.” 
The ps command offers a variety of keywords associated with users and names that can 
help. Figure 29 shows the ps output for PID 15, the same example previously shown. 
This result rules out the possibility that Suiche was discussing a different, but 
nevertheless related and valid username. Figure 30 is the same output for launchd, 
showing the username nfi for PID 1 must also be incorrect for all user keywords. 
In a fourth test, output of the ps command is used to analyze the structures 
involved with username output. The ps manpage states the keyword logname reports 
the “login name of user who started the session” and sess is the “session ID.” Both 
keywords are likely related to the session structure Suiche pulls the username from. 
Figure 31 shows the output of both for the ongoing example. 
# ps –p 15 –o ucomm,pid,logname,ruser,user 
UCOMM  PID LOGIN  RUSER  USER 
distnoted 15 daemon  daemon  daemon 
Figure 29. ps name keywords. 
# ps –p 1 –o ucomm,pid,logname,ruser,user 
UCOMM  PID LOGIN  RUSER  USER 
launchd 1 root  root  root 
Figure 30. launchd name keywords. 
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The hex output for field “session ID” is equivalent to 50161136 in decimal, so the value 
appears to be a pointer rather than an integer as one might expect from the ps definition. 
The simple modification in Figure 32 to the class Session initializer allows volafox 
to print this address for comparison as shown in the output Figure 33. 
Because the ps keyword sess and volafox both report the same address for struct 
session, there is evidence to suggest the session.s_login[MAXLOGNAME] 
member interrogated by volafox is correct for the keyword logname. The discrepancy 
therefore does not appear to be a fault in the source analysis by Suiche. 
# ps –p 15 –o ucomm,pid,user,logname,sess 
UCOMM  PID USER   LOGIN  SESS 
distnoted 15 daemon  daemon 2fd65f0 
Figure 31. ps session keywords. 
 
$ python volafox.py –i 10.6.8x86.vmem -o lsof -p 15 
Session address: 2fd65f0 
COMMAND   PID USER   FD   TYPE DEVICE SIZE/OFF NODE NAME 
distnoted  15 root  cwd    DIR   14,2     1088    2 /dev/null 
... 
Figure 33. struct session address. 
class Session(Struct): 
  
  TEMPLATES = {...} 
 
  def __init__(self, addr): 
    super(Session, self).__init__(addr) 
    print "Session Address: %x" %addr 
 
  ... 
} 
Figure 32. class Session testing modification. 
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The final test in this investigation determines if the intermittent discrepancy can 
be explained by changes to the structure linked-lists during memory capture. Hay and 
Nance (2009) discuss problems associated with inconsistent memory snapshots resulting 
from state changes during capture. The goal is to show that the pgrp and session 
structures that are returned for these failure cases are in fact correct for the process, and 
not in some momentary transitional state recorded in the image. To accomplish this, 
volafox is modified to print the values of additional struct members not required for the 
open files module implementation. The results of these experiments have shown: 
1. In all cases observed, proc.p_pid == proc.p_pgpid, meaning the 
process group identifier can be used as a reference to a process. Note that as 
verified in ps, the keyword gid	  ≠  pgid. The process group identifier references 
a specific process within a group, it does not identify the group itself. 
 
2. For all failure cases	  proc.p_pgrpid	  ==	  pgrp.pg_id	  ==	  session.s_id. 
Since all three structures store a correct identifier referencing the source process, 
a reference error does not appear to be at fault. 
 
3. The	  session.s_leader	  member is a proc	  structure pointer described in the 
comments as “Session leader. (static)”. In all failure cases, this points back the 
source process so there is no reference error apparent from either direction. 
 
4. The proc.si_uid	  member is the only example in any of the three structures 
discussed that is typed uid_t	   (user identifier). However, it does not correctly 
identify the process UID output of ps. Therefore, supplying the UID rather than 
username does not appear to be a valid alternative. 
 
Despite the previous analysis, neither the source nor the solution to the username 
field-reporting error is identified. There is also no known method to determine when the 
session structure returns the correct value. The bug derives from prior work that is not 
the direct focus of the research and therefore is not explored further. 
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3.5.2 Sizing the /dev Directory. 
A second problem identified during development is an inability to correctly report 
the SIZE/OFF field for certain directories. The /dev directory is typed DTYPE_VNODE 
in fileglob.fg_type and VDIR in vnode.v_type. However, it has a tag of 
VT_DEVFS from vnode.v_tag rather than the VT_HFS seen for most other 
directories. Figure 34 shows an example of /dev as reported by the UNIX lsof 
command. 
Note that 4495  mod  34   ≠   0, and therefore sizing by the entry count as 
described in Section 3.2 is not valid for this directory. Table 4 gives three alternate 
locations for the size applicable to other file types, but none were found to be effective in 
this case. Fortunately, due to the unique combination of tag and type for /dev, the 
failure is possible to detect. Since the location of the size is unknown, the volafox open 
files module prints -1 for the size of /dev to indicate the field is unsupported. 
  
# lsof +d /dev 
COMMAND PID USER   FD   TYPE     DEVICE SIZE/OFF NODE NAME 
launchd   1 root    8r   DIR 20,5853800     4495  305 /dev 
Figure 34. /dev directory size. 
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3.6 Summary 
Section 3.1 of this chapter introduces the goals for a new volafox module to list 
open files from a raw memory dump. Section 3.2 covers design recovery of the kernel 
structures responsible for the process file descriptor table and memory-mapped files. 
Section 3.3 reviews technical details for the existing volafox source code. Section 3.4 
describes the open files module implementation, including the new source file lsof.py 
and external programs offsets.c and printstructs.py. Finally, Section 3.5 
offers an analysis of open issues related to the implementation. 
Significant effort is put forth to ensure a well-engineered solution which adheres 
to fundamental software design principles. The result is a modular, object-oriented 
implementation with a minimal interface to the existing volafox source. For comparison, 
the analogous volafox output for the information printed by the UNIX lsof command in 
Figure 3 concludes this chapter as Figure 35. 
 
  
$ ./volafox.py –i 10.6.8x86.vmem –o lsof –p 109 
COMMAND  PID  USER   FD  TYPE DEVICE  SIZE/OFF   NODE NAME 
bash     109  6ad  cwd   DIR    14,2       578 202041 /Users/6ad 
bash     109  6ad  txt   REG    14,2   1346544 262558 /bin/bash 
bash     109  6ad  txt   REG    14,2   1054960 264388 /usr/lib/dyld 
bash     109  6ad  txt   REG    14,2 213385216 466405 /private/var/db/     
                                                       dyld/dyld_shared 
                                                       _cache_x86_64 
bash     109  6ad    0u  CHR    16,0     0t400    611 /dev/ttys000 
bash     109  6ad    1u  CHR    16,0     0t400    611 /dev/ttys000 
bash     109  6ad    2u  CHR    16,0     0t400    611 /dev/ttys000 
bash     109  6ad  255u  CHR    16,0     0t400    611 /dev/ttys000 
Figure 35. volafox open files listing. 
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IV. Results and Analysis 
This chapter tests the effectiveness of the volafox module implemented for listing 
open files from an OS X memory capture. As discussed in Section 3.1.2, one reason for 
selecting the UNIX lsof (list open files) command as the output format model for the 
volafox handles module is the relative ease with which it can be validated. When 
executed with administrator privileges on a test system, output provided by lsof acts as 
a baseline against which analysis on memory captured from the same system can be 
measured. 
The following sections define a successful research outcome and describe the 
tools, processes, and definitions used to analyze the implementation. A suite of software 
test cases consisting of two OS X versions running both 32 and 64-bit kernel architecture 
is used to validate the tool. Finally, physical memory captured on a variety of Mac 
models is used to exercise the tool on real-world data. 
4.1 Module Evaluation Methodology 
A successful implementation of the volafox open files module must accurately 
report all file handles, adjusted for stated constraints and known deficiencies. However, 
because the module represents novel research, no tool exists to validate the output using 
only the image of physical memory. Therefore, validation must compare data that 
approximates the state of open files when the collection occurred. The UNIX lsof 
command offers a source of data for comparison when output is redirected to a file just 
before suspending a VM or executing the Mac Memory Reader capture tool. 
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Given the difficulty of direct validation, success must be redefined in terms of the 
degree to which the volafox output matches that of the UNIX lsof command. The 
complex nature of a modern operating system like OS X guarantees changes to the 
system state between the time when the lsof command is run and the memory dump 
occurs (Hay & Nance, 2009). Some allowance is necessary to account for changes during 
this interval. A successful implementation therefore becomes one that can be validated 
against the UNIX lsof command, adjusted for stated constraints, known deficiencies, 
and accuracy of the validation method. 
 By this definition, limitations of the program that are also shared by lsof are 
not an indication of correctness. For example, while the HFS+ filesystem supports 16-bit 
Unicode file names, lsof “only outputs printable […] 8 bit characters” per its manpage.  
Therefore, the lack of Unicode support within the volafox open files module is not 
considered a shortcoming of the implementation for the purpose of this research analysis. 
4.1.1 Test Configuration and Design. 
The following sections provide a step-by-step description of the processes used to 
configure, collect, and compare the results discussed in Section 4.2 and employ the 
research tools capture.py and validate.py developed for analysis. 
4.1.1.1 Controlled Test Configuration. 
This section describes the process for configuring OS X virtual machines used to 
validate the research implementation. Output of the process is a virtual machine prepared 
for the data collection process. The resulting configuration is intended to minimize 
operating system activity during the time between when the validation data is gathered 
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and the memory image is created. This is done so that analysis may focus on differences 
caused by the implementation, rather than those resulting from temporal changes that 
occur during normal operating conditions. Graphical navigation paths begin with 
references to items in the OS X menu bar. 
1. Install guest using the VMware Fusion Virtual Machine Assistant with default 
settings for the OS X version being configured. Wizard will select minimum 
RAM configuration for that version. Note: Apple specifies 2 GB of RAM in the 
system requirements for 10.6 Server, however VMware selects 1 GB which 
installed and tested without issue during this research. 
2. Install guest updates (10.6.8 and 10.7.3 test cases only):  à Software Update 
3. Disable optional virtual hardware and host interaction in VMware Fusion. 
a. Do not install the VMware Tools daemon. 
b. Virtual Machine à Settings à USB & Bluetooth à uncheck all 
c. Virtual Machine à Settings à Sound Card à Sound Card: OFF 
d. Virtual Machine à Settings à CD/DVD à Enable CD/DVD Drive: OFF 
e. Virtual Machine à Settings à Display à Accelerate 3D Graphics: OFF 
f. Virtual Machine à Settings à Sharing à Shared Folders: OFF 
4. Disable networking. 
a. Guest:  à System Preferences à Network: remove all interfaces 
b. VMware Fusion: Virtual Machine à Settings à Network Adaptor à Enable 
Network Adaptor: OFF 
5. Remove OS X startup items in the guest. 
a. Select and delete any items in the following directories: 
~/Library/LaunchAgents 
/Library/LaunchAgents 
/Library/LaunchDaemons 
/Library/StartupItems 
b.  à System Preferences à Users & Groups à Login Items: remove all 
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6. Disable other daemons in the guest. 
a.  à System Preferences à Software Update à Check for updates: uncheck 
b.  à System Preferences à Date & Time à Set date and time automatically: 
unckeck 
c.  à System Preferences à Desktop & Screen Saver à Start screen saver: 
never 
d.  à System Preferences à Energy Saver à Computer sleep: never; Display 
sleep: never; uncheck all other options 
e. Spotlight indexing, Terminal.app: 
# mdutil –a –i off 
f. Server administrative daemon (10.6 Server test case only), Terminal.app: 
 
# cd /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ 
# launchctl unload –w com.apple.servermgrd.plist 
4.1.1.2 Controlled Data Collection. 
This section describes the process for collecting validation data and an image of 
physical memory from virtual machines configured to test the tool. The process outputs a 
text file containing the handles reported by the lsof command, and an image of physical 
memory saved by VMware Fusion when the virtual machine is suspended (Section 
2.4.1). All steps reference actions in the guest OS unless stated otherwise. 
1. Launch Terminal.app from /Applications/Utilities. Perform an 
execution of lsof with administrator privileges prior to data collection. The 
lsof manpage indicates certain data structures may be cached so this ensures 
minimum filesystem interaction when the command is run for data collection. 
2. Let the system stabilize with no user interaction for approximately 5 minutes. 
3. Collect validation data, from Terminal.app: 
# lsof > ~/lsof.out 
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4. Once command-prompt reappears, user immediately navigates to and clicks the 
suspend button in the upper-left-hand corner of the virtual machine window. 
5. Host: copy suspended memory image, from Terminal.app: 
$ cp PATH/TEST_CASE.vmwarevm/*.vmem ~/Desktop 
6. Resume virtual machine and recover the lsof.out validation data file. Because 
networking and sharing are disabled, USB support is enabled in the guest so the 
file can be copied to the host via external media. 
 
4.1.1.3 Real-word Data Collection. 
This section describes the process used to collect real-world data from Mac 
computers. The process outputs a text file containing the handles reported by the lsof 
command, and an image of physical memory originally created by the Mac Memory 
Reader tool, which is then converted using the volafox utility described in Section 3.3.1. 
1. Create a collection toolkit using a forensic workstation. First format external USB 
media as HFS+ in the OS X Disk Utility application. Next, copy the script 
capture.py (Section 4.2.4) and a directory containing Mac Memory Reader 
kernel extension along with its dependencies to the root of the formatted device. 
2. Plug toolkit into the Mac targeted for collection. 
3. Double-click the USB device; this should appear on the desktop once mounted. 
Within the resulting window, double-click the icon named capture (the OS X 
Finder dies not by default show any file extension). 
4. A Terminal window will launch and prompt the user for an administrator 
password. Enter the password and follow the remaining instructions. The script 
will report the total time elapsed during collection when execution has finished. A 
new, uniquely named directory is created on the USB toolkit containing both the 
image of physical memory and the output from lsof for comparison. 
5. Drag the USB toolkit shown on the desktop to the trash to dismount, then unplug 
the device. 
6. Prior to analysis, the Mac Memory Reader image must first be converted to a 
linear format compatible with volafox. On a forensic workstation, execute the 
following from the volafox source code directory: 
$ python flatten.py SOURCE.mmr DEST.flat  
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4.1.1.4 Results Comparison. 
The tool validate.py is developed to compare output of the lsof command 
with the volafox open files listing using Python’s extensive library of list and string 
operations. The result is a custom diff program used to build the tables throughout this 
chapter and its related appendices. This section describes both the process for using the 
tool, and also the tool’s processes for performing comparison. Two input files are 
required for the results comparison process. First, the baseline file referred to here as 
lsof.out contains an approximate list of open files from the time the memory was 
collected. Second, a linear memory image referred to here as image.mem which can be 
analyzed by volafox. Output of the process depends on the source data. For controlled 
test cases, applicable results are analyzed from the tables in Section 4.2.3 and used to 
validate the tool. Results for real-world test cases are summarized in the tables of Section 
4.2.4. However, these are not considered part of the validation methodology. 
1. Obtain a list of open files from image.mem using volafox, and redirect output to 
file. Include -v switch to print all handles including those with partial support. 
$ python volafox –i image.mem –vo lsof > vlfx.out 
2. Input files vlfx.out and lsof.out are both needed to run validate.py. 
The script compares input using a difference taxonomy (Section 4.1.2). The –s 
switch is used when analyzing 10.7 test cases (E1). Execute the following: 
$ python validate.py [-s] lsof.out vlfx.out 
The validate.py script automates the following sequence of steps: 
a. Read both files from disk, discard the header line, and store the remaining 
lines in a 2D array split on whitespace. The resulting matrices use a row for 
each handle and a column for each lsof field described in Table 3. 
b. Adjust the list of processes in the lsof matrix for E1 and E3 and the list of 
handles in the lsof matrix for E4. 
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c. Adjust the process list in the volafox matrix for E2 and E3. 
d. Align the list of processes in both matrices and report any differences as F2. 
e. Detect differences in the lsof COMMAND and USER fields (columns 0 and 
2 of the matrix), report as F1 and D1 respectively. 
f. Align the list of handles (matrix rows) and report any differences as F3. 
g. Detect differences in the optional file-mode descriptor from the lsof FD 
field (column 3) and report any differences as F4. 
h. Detect differences in the lsof TYPE field (column 4) and report differences 
as F5. Do not consider socket (C1) or symbolic link (E5) handles. 
i. Detect differences in the lsof DEVICE field (column 5) and report 
differences as F6. Do not consider FIFO (E6), non-vnode (C2), or non-
HFS+/DEVFS (C3) handles. 
j. Detect differences in the lsof SIZE/OFF field (column 6) and report 
differences as F7. Do not consider non-vnode (C2) or non-HFS+/DEVFS (C3) 
handles, nor those corresponding to the /dev directory (D2) or the ttys file 
used by lsof (E7). 
k. Detect differences in the lsof NODE field (column 7) and report differences 
as F8. Do not consider non-vnode (C2) or non-HFS+/DEVFS (C3) handles. 
l. Detect differences in the lsof NAME field (column 8) and report differences 
as F8. Do not consider non-vnode (C2) handles. 
3. Print the count of processes or handles affected by the constraints (C1-3), 
deficiencies (D1,2), explained differences (E1-7), and failures (F1-9) described in 
Section 4.1.2 to STDOUT. These text results are transcribed into the detailed test 
case results (Tables 15-28) located in Appendix E. 
4. Ranges of real-world test case results are summarized in Tables 12 and 13 for 
auxiliary research analysis. However, these results are not considered part of the 
implementation validation methodology described in the following steps. 
5. Controlled test cases results are examined with the goal of identifying previously 
unidentified implementation problems. The majority of constraints, deficiencies, 
and explained differences are not considered in this analysis as the failures alone 
describe possible unknown faults in the tool developed. A summary of these 
results is found in Tables 8-11. Note that the username reporting deficiency (D1) 
is listed only to emphasize the number of handles affected since it is already 
classified as a known bug. 
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6. Each failure reported for the controlled test cases is analyzed manually to 
determine if it is likely to represent a validation accuracy fault, or an unknown 
implementation problem. This judgment is based on knowledge of OS X internals 
and the consistency of the failure across test cases. 
7. The difference taxonomy described in Section 4.1.2 is developed through the 
iterative application of this process. Reclassify failures as deficiencies, constraints 
or explained differences when possible and repeat. 
4.1.2 Analysis Taxonomy. 
This section identifies differences between the lsof command and output from 
the volafox open files module as reported by validate.py. Relationships between 
classifications are discussed in Section 4.1.2.4. Order listed does not correspond to the 
order in which the validation script determines differences; see Section 4.1.1.4 for the 
execution sequence. Table 7 compares various file types and the output fields to 
summarize which combinations are affected by the differences classified in the following 
sections. The table is also useful for visualizing the scope of the implementation with 
regard to file type and impact of the known deficiencies. 
Table 7. Field differences versus file type. 
File Type COMMAND PID USER FD+ mode TYPE DEVICE 
SIZE/ 
OFF NODE NAME 
cwd ✓ ✓ D1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
txt ✓ ✓ D1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
REG ✓ ✓ D1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
DIR ✓ ✓ D1 ✓ ✓ ✓ D2 ✓ ✓ 
CHR ✓ ✓ D1 ✓ ✓ ✓ E7 ✓ ✓ 
LINK ✓ ✓ D1 ✓ E5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
FIFO ✓ ✓ D1 ✓ ✓ E6 ✓ ✓ ✓ 
VNODE 
(other) ✓ ✓ D1 ✓ ✓ C3 C3 C3 ✓ 
PSXSHM ✓ ✓ D1 ✓ ✓ C2 C2 C2 C2 
PSXSEM ✓ ✓ D1 ✓ ✓ C2 C2 C2 C2 
KQUEUE ✓ ✓ D1 ✓ ✓ C2 C2 C2 C2 
PIPE ✓ ✓ D1 ✓ ✓ C2 C2 C2 C2 
FSEVENT ✓ ✓ D1 ✓ ✓ C2 C2 C2 C2 
SOCKET ✓ ✓ D1 ✓ C1 C2 C2 C2 C2 
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4.1.2.1 Constraints. 
Constraints are defined as differences in output that occur due to system design 
decisions. As described in Section 3.1.3, the volafox open files module has several 
limitations with regard to handle type and filesystem tag. 
C1. The lsof subtype for socket handles cannot be determined. A value of 
DTYPE_SOCKET for the member filglob.fg_type indicates a socket 
handle. The lsof command reports a number of subtypes for these handles 
including: systm, unix, IPv4, IPv6, rte, key, ndrv, and possibly others 
that were not observed in testing. Sockets are assigned the generic type SOCKET 
in the volafox open files output. 
 
C2. Only handles subscribing to the virtual node (vnode) interface are fully supported. 
A value of DTYPE_VNODE for the member fileglob.fg_type indicates the 
vnode interface is in use for a particular handle. Full support indicates meaningful 
output is reported for all nine lsof command fields. Non-vnode handles show 
the value ‘-1’ for DEVICE, SIZE/OFF, NODE, and NAME to indicate these 
fields are unsupported in the volafox open files output. 
 
C3. Only vnodes tagged HFS+ or DEVFS are fully supported. A value of VT_HFS or 
VT_DEVFS for the member vnode.v_tag indicates a supported filesystem. 
The lsof command fields DEVICE, SIZE/OFF, and NODE are defined outside 
struct vnode and therefore unsupported for other filesystems. Unsupported 
fields are indicated in the volafox open files output with an appropriate value 
from ECODE, a global dictionary defined for lsof.py. 
 
4.1.2.2 Deficiencies. 
Deficiencies are defined as differences in output that occur due to known bugs. As 
described in Section 3.5, the volafox open files module has two open issues. 
D1. The lsof USER field is not correctly reported for all processes in a full file 
listing. This problem is not consistent across all processes and the volafox open 
files module is not capable of detecting its occurrence. 
 
D2. Size of the /dev directory cannot be determined. Handles with vnode.v_type 
of VDIR and vnode.v_tag of VT_DEVFS such as /dev show the value ‘-1’ 
in the SIZE/OFF field. 
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4.1.2.3 Explanations. 
Explained differences are those in output that occur due to reproducible 
idiosyncrasies of the tools used for capture or validation. They are distinct from failures 
because the explanations are not speculative, and the differences can be detected using 
automation. Explanations E4, E5, and E6 are believed to be bugs in the OS X version of 
the lsof program. However, because lsof is defined as the authoritative standard for 
measurement, its bugs are classified as explained differences rather than deficiencies. 
E1. The UNIX lsof command output always includes the lsof command and its 
associated handles, whereas a memory dump does not. For 10.7 only, the 
dependent process sudo is present in addition to lsof. 
 
E2. Memory captured using the Mac Memory Reader tool (see Section 2.4.2) includes 
evidence of the process MacMemoryReader and its dependency image, 
whereas output from the lsof command does not. 
 
E3. Data collected using capture.py (4.4.3) does not share the process sh because 
MacMemoryReader and lsof are executed in different subprocesses. 
 
E4. OS X duplicates some handles in a full listing using lsof. Duplication occurs at 
least once per listing. Figure 36 demonstrates the problem. 
In all observed cases, the file descriptor ‘twd’ (a composite of cwd and txt) 
identifies the duplicate, while all other fields remain the same. 
 
E5. OS X reports the type of symbolic links as ‘0012’ instead of ‘LINK’ in the lsof 
TYPE field. The keyword ‘LINK’ is specified in the manpage and therefore the 
volafox open files module reports symbolic links using that label. The bug has 
only been observed in the 10.7 version of OS X. 
 
$ sudo lsof 
COMMAND PID   USER    FD    TYPE   DEVICE  SIZE/OFF   NODE NAME 
... 
mds      29   root   cwd     DIR     14,2      1088      2 / 
mds      29   root   twd     DIR     14,2      1088      2 / 
... 
Figure 36. lsof handle duplication. 
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E6. OS X does not report the lsof DEVICE field for FIFO type files. The manpage 
does not discuss the omission and the volafox open files module can determine 
the major and minor device number for FIFO special files. 
 
E7. Execution of the lsof command causes the offset of its terminal file (ttys) to 
grow. For cases where a ttys file is the same used by the lsof command, any 
offset difference is classified as E7 rather than F6. 
 
4.1.2.4 Failures. 
Failures are defined as differences in output not already accounted for by 
constraints, deficiencies, or explanations that occur due to asynchronous data collection 
or implementation artifact. It is important to note that the fault causing failure is 
undefined by default. Analysis in Section 4.2 indicates that in most cases failure is a 
consequence of validation accuracy rather than an error in the volafox open files module 
implementation.  
F1. Command name mismatch (field: COMMAND). Adjusted for F2. 
F2. Missing/extra process (field: PID). Adjusted for E1, E2, and E3. 
F3. Missing/extra file descriptor (field: FD). Adjusted for F2 and E4. 
F4. File mode mismatch (field: FD). Adjusted for F3. 
F5. File type mismatch (field: TYPE). Adjusted for F3, C1 and E5. 
F6. Device mismatch (field: DEVICE). Adjusted for F3, C2, C3, and E6. 
F7. Size/offset mismatch (field: SIZE/OFF). Adjusted for F3, C2, C3, D2, and E7. 
F8. Node identifier mismatch (field: NODE). Adjusted for F3, C2 and C3. 
F9. Pathname mismatch (field: NAME). Adjusted for F3, C2. 
Username mismatch is classified as D1 and therefore not listed as a failure. It is 
reported in the results after adjustment for F2. Reporting failures F2 and F3 also aligns 
the process and handle lists of each file respectively for the remaining failure tests. This 
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means, for example, that F1 does not report command name mismatches that occur due to 
a missing process because F2 already accounts for it. 
4.2 Results 
This section describes the experimental setup used to validate the volafox open 
files module, summarizes output from the experiments, and provides analysis of the 
results. Experimental data is partitioned in two sets: controlled test cases collected in the 
lab and real-world collections from physical Mac hardware. Only the controlled test cases 
are directly considered in the validation of the tool, but the real-world data is maintained 
due to a number of ancillary conclusions that can be derived from it. 
4.2.1 Parameters. 
Parameters specify the experimental configurations used to validate the tool. 
4.2.1.1 Common Collection Parameters. 
• Development/analysis platform: iMac (27-inch Mid 2011), 10.7.x, 8 GB RAM 
• Volafox base version: r52, research build (with open files support): 1.0 
• OS X version (with UNIX lsof built-in) 
• RAM installed 
4.2.1.2 Controlled Test Case Parameters. 
• VMware Fusion version: 4.1.0 
• Memory capture format: *.vmem (VMware frozen memory file, linear format) 
• Darwin kernel architecture 
4.2.1.3 Real-world Collection Parameters. 
• Darwin kernel architecture: i386 
• Mac Memory Reader version: 3.0.0 
• capture.py build: 1.1 
• Mac hardware (model specification) 
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4.2.2 Factors. 
Factors specify the subset of parameters discretely varied across experiments. 
4.2.2.1 Virtual Machine Configurations. 
1. OS X version: 10.6.8 
Darwin kernel architecture: i386 
RAM installed: 1 GB 
 
2. OS X version: 10.6.0 Server 
Darwin kernel architecture: x86_64 
RAM installed: 1 GB 
Note: by default, 10.6 Snow Leopard installs a 32-bit kernel for the client 
version. OS X Server was therefore used instead to achieve this configuration. 
 
3. OS X version: 10.7.3 
Darwin kernel architecture: i386 
RAM installed: 2 GB 
 
4. OS X version: 10.7.0 
Darwin kernel architecture: x86_64 
RAM installed: 2 GB 
4.2.2.2 Real-world Machine Configurations. 
1. OS X version: 10.6.8 
RAM installed: 3 GB 
Mac Model: MacBook Pro (15-inch Core 2 Duo), S/N code: X6A 
 
2. OS X version: 10.6.8 
RAM installed: 2 GB 
Mac Model: MacBook Air (13-inch, Late 2010), S/N code: DR2 
 
3. OS X version: 10.6.8 
RAM installed: 3 GB 
Mac Model: iMac (20-inch Late 2006), S/N code: VUW 
 
4. OS X version: 10.6.8 
RAM installed: 4 GB 
Mac Model: MacBook Pro (15-inch, Mid 2010), S/N code: AGU 
 
5. OS X version: 10.6.8 
RAM installed: 2 GB 
Mac Model: Mac mini (Early 2006), S/N code: U35 
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6. OS X version: 10.6.8 
RAM installed: 1 GB 
Mac Model: iMac (24-inch Mid 2007), S/N code: X8A 
 
7. OS X version: 10.6.8 
RAM installed: 4 GB 
Mac Model: iMac (27-inch, Mid 2010), S/N code: DB5 
 
8. OS X version: 10.6.8 
RAM installed: 4 GB 
Mac Model: MacBook Pro (13-inch, Mid 2010), S/N code: ATM 
 
9. OS X version: 10.7.0 
RAM installed: 4 GB 
Mac Model: MacBook (13-inch Early 2008), S/N code: 0P2 
 
10. OS X version: 10.7.2 
RAM installed: 2 GB 
Mac Model: MacBook Air, S/N code: 18X 
4.2.3 Controlled Test Cases. 
Because this research involves implementation of a novel tool, direct validation of 
the results is inherently problematic. An approximation using output from lsof 
therefore demonstrates the capabilities of the system developed. The validation method 
used amounts to a suite of software test cases that either pass or fail. Resulting failures 
are then addressed individually, or reclassified in the difference taxonomy before the 
suite is rerun. Where an explanation is provided for a failure, the discussion must be 
viewed as speculative because all concrete differences identified have been integrated 
with the taxonomy described in Section 4.1.2. Furthermore, the difficulty in defining, 
acquiring, and replicating clean memory captures means no statistical rigor can be 
applied to the validation. The majority of firm numbers from test results are therefore 
located in Appendix E to avoid the inference that results were achieved through 
performance analysis. 
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 As stated in Section 3.1, one design goal for the system implemented is to provide 
coverage for a breadth of operating system versions and kernel architectures. These test 
cases are intended to demonstrate that coverage by representing both i386 and x86_64 
Intel architectures over the span of minor OS X versions (10.6.0-8 and 10.7.0-3) within 
the current and previous releases of the operating system. All tests are performed on 
guest installations of OS X running as a virtual machine. This setup offers the linear file 
format volafox requires in analyzing 64-bit kernel memory, the contents of which are 
written to disk when the VM is suspended. Section 4.1.1.1 describes steps taken to 
minimize operating system interference with the state of open files during collection. 
 Table 8 shows a summary of the results provided in Appendix E (Table 15) for 
the first controlled test case. After accounting for the constraints, deficiencies, and 
Table 8. OS X 10.6.8 x86 test case summary. 
Diff Field Δ Count Details 
F1 COMMAND 0  
F2 PID 0  
D1 USER 5 15% of usernames misreported 
F3 FD 0  
F4 mode 0  
F5 TYPE 0  
F6 DEVICE 0  
F7 SIZE/OFF 1 
process: 
file: 
lsof: 
volafox: 
diff: 
Terminal  
/dev/ptmx 
0t421 
0t452 
+31 bytes 
F8 NODE 2 
process: 
file: 
lsof: 
volafox: 
notifyd  
/usr/share/zoneinfo/America/New_York 
266103 
266579 
process: 
file: 
lsof: 
volafox: 
notifyd  
/usr/share/zoneinfo/UTC 
226396 
266606 
F9 NAME 0  
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explained differences listed in Section 4.1.2 (not shown), this table indicates how similar 
the volafox open files output is to the lsof approximation. 
Table 8 indicates the username deficiency (D1) affects a substantial number of 
processes reported. The file size failure (F7) is for the pseudo-tty device opened by 
process Terminal. The Terminal application is in the process hierarchy for lsof, 
which as explained in E7 is known to modify some ttys device offsets during 
execution. The node identification failures (F8) are both files related to time zone opened 
by the notifyd process. It is unclear why the notification server would make changes 
to these files during lsof execution, however the behavior has been observed in all 
controlled test cases. 
 Table 9 shows a summary for the second controlled test case (Appendix E, Table 
16). The offset and node identification failures (F7, F8) are the same process/file 
combinations described for the 10.6.8 x86 results. 
 
Table 9. OS X 10.6.0 Server x64 test case summary. 
Diff Field Δ Count Details 
F1 COMMAND 0  
F2 PID 0  
D1 USER 6 17% of usernames misreported 
F3 FD 0  
F4 mode 0  
F5 TYPE 0  
F6 DEVICE 0  
F7 SIZE/OFF 1 
process: 
file: 
lsof: 
volafox: 
diff: 
Terminal  
/dev/ptmx 
0t343 
0t360 
+17 bytes 
F8 NODE 1 
process: 
file: 
lsof: 
volafox: 
notifyd  
/usr/share/zoneinfo/UTC 
92583 
92789 
F9 NAME 0  
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Table 10 shows a summary for the third controlled test case (Appendix E, Table 
17). The extra process in the volafox output (F2) is a daemon with the highest PID in the 
process list. It therefore appears to have been launched after executing lsof. Additional 
file descriptors in the volafox output (F3) belong to launchd. Because the launchd 
process manages all other daemons (Singh, 2006b, p. 38), it is very active and therefore 
volatile. For both 10.7.x test cases the lsof and launchd processes appear to be 
confounded. The offset and node identification failures (F7, F8) are the same process/file 
combinations previously described. 
Table 10. OS X 10.7.3 x86 test case summary. 
Diff Field Δ Count Details 
F1 COMMAND 0  
F2 PID +1 process: volafox: 
launchdadd 
146  
D1 USER 17 38 % of usernames misreported 
F3 FD +3 
process: 
volafox: 
type: 
launchd 
8 
SOCKET 
process: 
volafox: 
type: 
launchd 
46 
SOCKET 
process: 
volafox: 
type: 
launchd 
82 
PIPE 
F4 mode 0  
F5 TYPE 0  
F6 DEVICE 0  
F7 SIZE/OFF 1 
process: 
file: 
lsof: 
volafox: 
diff: 
Terminal  
/dev/ptmx 
0t446 
0t508 
+62 bytes 
F8 NODE 1 
process: 
file: 
lsof: 
volafox: 
notifyd  
/usr/share/zoneinfo/UTC 
86138 
86347 
F9 NAME 0  
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Table 11 shows a summary for the last controlled test case (Appendix E, Table 
18). Offset and node identification failures (F7, F8), extra process (F2), and the extra 
launchd handles (F3) are the same previously discussed. The extra WindowServer 
file descriptor appears to be a malformed vnode. All members within the structure are 
invalid, and the file name is made up of non-ASCII characters. This case does call into 
question the methodology described in Section 3.2 for determining valid descriptors in 
Table 11. OS X 10.7.0 x64 test case summary. 
Diff Field Δ Count Details 
F1 COMMAND 0  
F2 PID +1 process: volafox: 
launchdadd 
147  
D1 USER 8 19 % of usernames misreported 
F3 FD +4 
process: 
volafox: 
type: 
launchd 
8 
SOCKET 
process: 
volafox: 
type: 
launchd 
79 
SOCKET 
process: 
volafox: 
type: 
launchd 
85 
PIPE 
process: 
volafox: 
type: 
device: 
WindowServer 
txt 
REG 
-6, size: -7, node: -8, name: -9/0åÜ 
F4 mode 0  
F5 TYPE 0  
F6 DEVICE 0  
F7 SIZE/OFF 1 
process: 
file: 
lsof: 
volafox: 
diff: 
Terminal  
/dev/ptmx 
0t455 
0t509 
+54 bytes 
F8 NODE 1 
process: 
file: 
lsof: 
volafox: 
notifyd  
/usr/share/zoneinfo/UTC 
86138 
86347 
F9 NAME 0  
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the file table. Since the occurrence appears to be isolated, it is particularly difficult to 
debug this potential implementation failure. One possible explanation is that the handle 
may be an initialized but as-yet-unused vnode in the file descriptor table. The current tool 
has no ability to detect this condition, though the template test method described in 
Section 3.4.4 could possibly be used if a reliable test case could be determined for the 
failure. Luckily, the error output is well-handled and therefore a human analyst should be 
able to make this determination with ease even if the tool cannot. 
Results from the four controlled test cases yield several important conclusions. 
First, the volafox open files module is functional for kernels utilizing both Intel i386 and 
x86_64 architectures. Second, the tool provides coverage for OS X 10.6.x Snow Leopard 
and 10.7.x Lion operating systems. Third, as described in Section 3.5.1, the username 
deficiency (D1) results suggest that this field cannot be trusted in the volafox output. 
Finally, the low number of unexplained failures suggests the implementation is successful 
under the definition in Section 4.1.  
4.2.4 Real-world Data Analysis. 
In addition to the controlled test cases described in Section 4.2.2, the volafox open 
files module was also tested against a set of memory collected from physical machines. 
The script capture.py was developed to automate the collection of memory using the 
Mac Memory Reader tool described in Section 2.4.2 and a variety of incident response 
data from Section 2.2.2 for comparison. These real-world collections are invaluable for 
program debugging and revealing edge cases in the open files implementation but are not 
well suited for validation for several reasons. First, because failures cannot be replicated 
it is difficult to determine if a fault is caused by implementation bug or validation 
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accuracy. Second, the collection time required by Mac Memory Reader (see Appendix F) 
assures that output from lsof is always stale when compared to a dump of physical 
memory. Finally, the real-world data available does not cover the breadth of OS versions 
and kernel architectures. 
Appendix F summarizes the collections acquired for analysis. As discussed in 
Section 2.5.2, revision 52 of the volafox project on which the open files implementation 
is based does support the Mac Memory Reader output format directly. As a result, only 
i386 captures can be analyzed with the volafox tool and only after conversion to linear 
format using the flatten.py utility. The ten qualifying captures are listed in Section 
4.2.2 and the full open files results for each is available in Appendix E.  
Table 12. OS X 10.6.8 combined real-world results (8 samples). 
Diff Description Quantity or % Per Sample 
C1 SOCKET handles cannot be subtyped 15-22% of handles affected 
C2 Non-vnode handles are not fully supported 27-40% of handles affected 
C3 Non-HFS+/DEVFS vnodes are not fully supported 0-4% of handles affected 
D1 Δ USER field 16-51% of usernames misreported 
D2 /dev directory cannot be sized 0 handles affected 
E1 lsof process is not shared 1 process removed 
E2 MacMemoryReader and image processes are not shared 2 processes removed 
E3 sh process is not shared 1 process removed 
E4 Duplicate handles labeled FD: ‘twd’ 2-5 handles removed 
E5 LINK handles are mislabeled 0 handles affected 
E6 FIFO handles do not report device identifier 0-2 handles affected 
E7 lsof ttys file size is not shared 10 handles affected 
F1 Δ COMMAND field 0 commands differ 
F2 Δ PID field 0-6% of processes removed 
F3 Δ FD field 4-22% of handles removed 
F4 Δ MODE field 0-2 modes differ 
F5 Δ TYPE field 0-2 types differ 
F6 Δ DEVICE field 0-2 device identifiers differ 
F7 Δ SIZE/OFF field 0-10% of sizes/offsets differ 
F8 Δ NODE field 0-8% of node identifiers differ 
F9 Δ NAME field 0-3% of names differ 
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Table 12 shows a combined summary of the real-world results for 32-bit samples 
running OS X 10.6 Snow Leopard (Appendix E, Tables 19-26). Because the hardware 
and software configurations vary greatly between collections, the data points represent 
different sample populations that cannot be aggregated to produce valid mean or standard 
deviation. Instead, the range of each constraint, deficiency, explained difference, and 
failure is reported to offer a general impression of how commonly these differences 
occur. A few noteworthy conclusions emerge from this analysis. 
1. With up to 6% of processes (F2) and 22% of handles (F3) thrown out for 
comparison during alignment, lsof does not approximate the real-world data 
very closely. This observation supports the earlier statement that such data makes 
a poor choice for tool validation. 
 
2. The set of non-vnode handles (sockets, pipes, semaphores, etc.) make up a 
significant portion of the lsof results (C2). This observation highlights one 
opportunity for future work. 
 
3. Unsupported file systems (C3) in the real-world data were cross-referenced with 
the mount information also collected by the capture.py script to determine 
which types should be considered for future support. The results included one 
instance each of: msdos (FAT32 external hard drive), cddafs (responsible for 
reading audio CDs), and ntfs (Apple Bootcamp installation of Windows). 
 
4. As concluded previously, high occurrence of the username reporting bug (D1) 
makes the results of the USER field unreliable. This impacts not only the open 
files module in volafox, but also affects the process listing module as explained in 
Section 3.5.1. 
 
5. Explained differences (E1-E7) and the /dev sizing deficiency (D2) do not affect 
a large number of processes and handles. However, they are enumerated in detail 
because each occurrence is an important data cleaning consideration during 
validation of the tool. 
 
6. For a given handle the size/offset (F7) and node identifier (F8) information can be 
particularly volatile, with up to 10 and 8 percent change observed respectively. 
This mirrors the failure behavior observed across test cases in Section 4.2.3. 
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7. Upon inspection of the failures by hand, high volatility of the name field (F9) was 
often linked to two applications: Spotlight and the Microsoft suite. Spotlight is 
Apple’s indexed search technology and automatically begins processing external 
media when mounted. Because the capture.py script is delivered on external 
media, the act of collection increases indexing activity. Spotlight should therefore 
be an important consideration during incident response because of this observed 
impact to the state of open files. 
 
Unlike Snow Leopard, Lion installs a 64-bit kernel for the client OS by default. A 
32-bit Lion kernel is only present on older models that received an upgrade installation of 
Lion from 32-bit Snow Leopard. This results in fewer qualifying samples available for 
analysis. 
Table 13 summarizes the remaining real-world results, both taken from 
installations of 32-bit 10.7 Lion (Appendix E, Tables 27-28). The samples are from 
machines running different minor version of the OS and therefore are grouped only for 
Table 13. OS X 10.7.x combined real-world results (2 samples). 
Diff Description Quantity or % Per Sample 
C1 SOCKET handles cannot be subtyped 22% of handles affected 
C2 Non-vnode handles are not fully supported 35,36% of handles affected 
C3 Non-HFS+/DEVFS vnodes are not fully supported 1 handle affected 
D1 Δ USER field 40,54% of usernames misreported 
D2 /dev directory cannot be sized 1 handle affected 
E1 lsof process is not shared 1 process removed 
E2 MacMemoryReader and image processes are not shared 0*,2 processes removed 
E3 sh process is not shared 0*,1 process removed 
E4 Duplicate handles labeled FD: ‘twd’ 5 handles removed 
E5 LINK handles are mislabeled 3 handles affected 
E6 FIFO handles do not report device identifier 0 handles affected 
E7 lsof ttys file size is not shared 0*,13 handles affected 
F1 Δ COMMAND field 0 commands differ 
F2 Δ PID field 4,10% of processes removed 
F3 Δ FD field 11,14% of handles removed 
F4 Δ MODE field 0,2 modes differ 
F5 Δ TYPE field 0,2 types differ 
F6 Δ DEVICE field 0,1 device identifiers differ 
F7 Δ SIZE/OFF field 1% of sizes/offsets differ 
F8 Δ NODE field 0,1% of node identifiers differ 
F9 Δ NAME field 0,1% of names differ 
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convenience. Ranges are replaced with series for values that vary since there are only two 
samples. The general conclusions listed from the 10.6 analysis remain unchanged, but 
there are a few interesting highlights. First, the 10.7 results include the unsupported 
filesystem (C3) mtmfs used to implement the Mobile Time Machine feature unique to 
Lion (Siracusa, 2011). Second, the E2, E3, and E7 results include an asterisk because one 
of the samples experienced an interesting collection failure. The capture.py script 
and all its associated processes (Python, sh, MacMemoryReader, image, etc.) are 
all conspicuously absent from the volafox output for the 18X model sample (see Section 
4.2.2 for model codes). 
The real-world data identifies a number of implementation problems that may not 
have been encountered otherwise. In addition to the truncated process list for 18X, the 
U35 model sample causes a previous version of the open files module to enter an infinite 
loop due to a self-referencing process in the linked list. These two cases led to a host of 
new exception handling code being added to the open files module. Originally for 
debugging purposes, the new warnings reveal an abundance of broken pointers present 
throughout the real-world samples. Model X8A for example generated over 1200 
warnings alone, though this was an extreme case. 
Since the invalid pointer warnings were not observed in the controlled test cases, 
two explanations are postulated. First, the flatten.py image conversion utility may 
not be trustworthy, or there exists a bug in the Mac Memory Reader capture tool itself. 
Second, changes to the layout of memory made during capture may result in instability of 
the linked data structures reflected in the volafox analysis. Given the number of process 
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and handle changes observed from memory capture to lsof execution in the real-world 
results, the second explanation is more likely. One recommendation to mitigate this 
problem is to assure memory capture proceeds as rapidly as possible. As indicated in 
Appendix F, one factor affecting speed is the type of external media used for capture. The 
results show a 16 Mb/s average increase in capture speed when using an external hard 
drive over flash storage. 
4.3 Summary 
Section 4.1 of this chapter introduces the evaluation technique used to validate the 
results of the volafox open files module by comparison with approximate output from the 
UNIX lsof command. Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 describe the methods used to test the 
tool and acquire results. Section 4.2 begins with an overview of the experimental 
parameters and factors used to test the implementation. Section 4.2.3 offers an analysis of 
controlled test cases used to validate the tool across the breadth of designed operating 
system and kernel architecture capabilities. Section 4.2.4 closes with an analysis of 
results from a set of real-world data collections. 
This chapter systematically approaches validation of the volafox open files 
module using a suite of controlled software test cases. The number of failures present 
after cleaning the data of enumerated constraints, deficiencies, and explained differences 
is small enough to permit individual analysis of the faults. Most failures can be 
circumstantially attributed to the precision of the validation method, with one 
implementation fault outstanding. Because bugs are an expected element of any complex 
software system, the results of this analysis are deemed an acceptable research outcome.  
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter reviews the overall conclusions provided by the new volafox open 
files implementation and compares research results with stated objectives. Academic and 
practical contributions of the work are emphasized. Recommendations for future research 
topics related to forensic memory analysis on OS X are also provided. Finally, the future 
of the open source volafox project extended by the implementation is discussed. 
5.1 Research Conclusions 
 This section summarizes research results and the key conclusions derived in 
Chapter 4. The original research goal and supporting objectives from Section 1.1 are 
restated first with a response offered for each. 
5.1.1 Research Goal. 
Implement and document a capability for parsing file handles from raw 
memory captured on OS X. 
Success – the volafox open files module implementation documented in Section 
3.4 can list handles associated with regular files, directories, symbolic links, FIFO, and 
character special files. Memory-mapped files for the process executable are also parsed 
along with the current working directory. Test results are favorable on raw memory from 
suspended instances of OS X running in VMware (Section 4.2.3) and memory captured 
on physical hardware using the Mac Memory Reader tool (Section 4.2.4). 
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5.1.2 Supporting Objectives. 
Perform design recovery of the data structures responsible for handling 
open files. 
Success – the research implementation effectively leverages the data structures 
and references described in Section 3.2 to find and parse file handle information. Class 
structure of the open files source file lsof.py is organized to closely resemble that of 
the design recovery used to build the module (Appendix B, D). 
Develop a flexible process for programmatically handling structures 
defined for different kernel architectures and operating system versions. 
This necessitates extensible software design resilient to changes in future 
versions of OS X. 
Success – the data structure template process described in Sections 3.4.2 – 3.4.3 
effectively parses data and pointer members for 18 different classes written for the 
volafox open files module. Implementation of the process tested favorably against two 
architectures (i386, x86_64) and two major versions of OS X (10.6 Snow Leopard, 10.7 
Lion) in Section 4.2.3. While the template process was found to be flexible across both 
tested versions of OS X, future extensibility relies on consistent naming of key structure 
members (Section 3.4.2). Because the development process requires kernel headers 
defining key structures, extensibility is also dependent on the open source availability of 
the kernel code. 
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5.1.3 Additional Research Conclusions. 
Testing the implementation also produced several additional conclusions not 
directly related to the research goal and its supporting objectives. First, the open files 
module does not reliably output the correct user of a running process, as verified across 
all controlled and real-world test cases (Section 4.2). No fault could be identified in the 
implementation, nor any problem with the kernel structure analysis described in prior 
work (Section 3.5.1). The deficiency is formally listed in Section 4.1.2.2 and represented 
in the results. Because the login username is only indirectly related to the file handles 
through the process, this open issue does not affect the overall research outcome. 
Second, due to the time required for memory capture on physical hardware, 
memory analysis tools are difficult to validate on real-world data (Section 4.2.4). 
Controlled tests using virtual machine memory images should therefore be used in 
development. 
Third, the OS X indexed search technology, Spotlight, changes numerous handles 
in response to the mounting of external media (Section 4.2.4). This observation should be 
considered during incident response and subsequent analysis if the memory capture 
toolkit is delivered via mounted filesystem. 
Finally, memory captured on physical hardware suffers from a high number of 
invalid pointer references, occasionally resulting in malformed linked-lists (Section 
4.2.4). Robust exception handling should be implemented to address this problem in a 
memory analysis tool. Collection must proceed quickly to minimize state changes during 
memory copy and avoid possible loss of evidence. External hard disk is preferable to 
flash media due to faster collection speeds (Appendix F). 
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5.2 Significance of Research 
This research makes three primary contributions to the field of forensic memory 
analysis on OS X. 
Design recovery of kernel structures related to open files. While the Darwin 
kernel foundation of OS X is open source, it is not well documented. Structured memory 
analysis requires knowledge of kernel organization that must be traced by hand from the 
source code. The description of data structures and their relationships in this document 
will be of use to anybody seeking to implement or extend extraction of OS X file handles 
from raw memory. 
Dynamic data structure templates. The repeatable, general-purpose process 
developed to build structure templates for a range of architecture and operating system 
configurations can be applied to existing and future volafox modules. It may also prove 
extensible to future versions of OS X. The method implemented to dynamically select the 
correct template for a given memory image greatly simplifies the programming logic 
needed to support multiple configurations. 
Volafox open files module implementation. Because the research code was 
designed around a minimal interface to the existing project source, the new module can 
be patched against the latest development revision with little or no refactoring. The full 
source code for the new module is available in Appendix G. With follow on efforts to 
address outstanding constraints and deficiencies, this module could be a component in a 
comprehensive tool targeted at technical users and forensic analysts. 
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5.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
The problem outlined in Chapter 1 emphasizes use of forensic memory analysis to 
replace more invasive incident response methods. Section 2.2.2 lists seven pieces of 
information that National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) specifies should 
be captured during the volatile collection process. Including this research, volafox now 
has modules to support four of the seven items. For maximum impact, future OS X 
memory analysis research efforts should consider the remainder: login sessions, network 
configuration, and operating system time. 
Constraints and deficiencies of the research implementation for listing open files, 
Sections 4.1.2.1 and 4.1.2.2 respectively, enumerate the work remaining for this specific 
module. Support for the following features is recommended in particular:  
1. Identifying process ownership – the inability to consistently determine the user 
associated with a particular process reduces the credibility of the volafox output 
and also its usefulness. A process normally expected to run in userland takes on 
new significance when observed executing as root for example. The bug is 
pervasive as it affects both the open files and running process modules in volafox 
so addressing the user problem is a priority. 
 
2. Support for socket handles – sockets make up a significant portion of the 
unsupported handle types. They are of high investigative value and can help 
identify remote activity on a target or highlight exfiltration of data. Because the 
capabilities of the volafox network information module are currently limited 
(Section 2.5.2), the next priority in handle support should include the socket 
subtypes (Section 4.1.2.1). 
 
3. Additional filesystem support – real-world test results identified four filesystems 
currently unsupported by the open files module: msdos, ntfs, cddafs and 
mtmfs. The msdos filesystem (usually FAT32) is a common choice for external 
media that must be interoperable with OS X and Windows. Though ntfs is 
mounted read-only by OS X, mounts may be present if a Mac is partitioned via 
Bootcamp to support dual-boot with Windows. Though not observed in testing, 
two additional network filesystems are also worth considering. The proprietary 
Apple Filing Protocol (AFP) is the default for OS X filesharing and Common 
Internet File System (CIFS) is used for shares mounted over Samba. 
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One final suggestion for future research is to consider the performance analysis of 
memory capture speed, the interval required to image a target, as it relates to data 
structure corruption. This research assumes the occurrence of invalid pointers and broken 
linked data structures (looping references, incomplete listings) is correlated with the time 
required to image physical memory. Exploring this relationship further might offer 
important insights with regard to the development of efficient tools and processes for 
copying physical memory for forensic analysis. 
5.3.1 Future of the Volafox Project. 
The volafox project currently suffers from a lack of contributing members needed 
to build a robust forensics capability that can be relied upon by technical users. This 
thesis represents the second academic work to extend volafox (Leat, 2011), but to move 
beyond the research domain a larger community is required to develop and validate the 
tool. An agenda for the upcoming Forensics and Incident Response Summit (SANS 
Institute, 2012) indicates OS X memory analysis may soon be added to the Volatility 
framework. Volatility is an established project in the field and the de facto standard for 
open source forensic memory analysis. Due to the community support and visibility, it is 
recommended that existing work from volafox be integrated with the future OS X branch 
of Volatility. Because volafox borrows extensively from the Volatility source, the 
transition should not require major refactoring.  
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5.4 Summary 
Section 5.1 restates the original research goal and its supporting objectives before 
comparing both to the conclusions provided in Chapter 4. Testing shows the 
implementation successfully responds to the research goal and the development process 
offers a practical demonstration of the derived objectives. Section 5.2 describes the three 
significant research contributions: design recovery of kernel structures related to open 
files, a process for generating and selecting dynamic data structure templates, and the 
volafox open files module itself. Section 5.3 offers recommendations for future research 
related to OS X forensic memory analysis and the future of the volafox project. 
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Appendix A. Regular Builds OS X 10.4.4 – 10.7.3 
OS X  Build Date Darwin Notes 
10.4.4 8G1165 Jan 2006 8.4 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT2343 
10.4.5 8G1454 Feb 2006 8.5 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT2581 
10.4.6 8I1119 Apr 2006 8.6 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT2200 
10.4.7 8J2135a Jun 2006 8.7 http://support.apple.com/kb/TA24141 
10.4.8 8L2127 Sep 2006 8.8 http://support.apple.com/kb/TA24306 
10.4.9 8P2137 Mar 2007 8.9 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1525 
10.4.10 8R2232 Jun 2007 8.10 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1607 
10.4.11 8S2167 Nov 2007 8.11 http://support.apple.com/kb/TA24901 
10.5 9A581 Oct 2007 9.0 Retail DVD release; http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1633 
10.5.1 9B18 Nov 2007 9.1 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1566 
10.5.2 9C31 Feb 2008 9.2 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1327 
10.5.3 9D34 May 2008 9.3 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1141 
10.5.4 
9E17 
Jun 2008 9.4 
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1994 
9E25 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1633 
10.5.5 9F33 Sep 2008 9.5 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT2405 
10.5.6 
9G55 Dec 2008 
9.6 
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT3194 
9G66 
Jan 2009 
Retail DVD release (part of Mac Box Set); 
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1633 
9G71 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT3192 
10.5.7 9J61 May 2009 9.7 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT3397 
10.5.8 
9L30 
Aug 2009 9.8 
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1633 
9L31a http://support.apple.com/kb/HT3606 
9L34 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT3607 
10.6 
10A432 
Aug 2009 10.0 
Retail DVD release; 
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1633 
10A433 Server retail DVD release; http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1633 
10.6.1 10B504 Sep 2009 10.1 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT3810 
10.6.2 10C540 Nov 2009 10.2 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT3874 
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10.6.3 
10D573 Mar 2010 
10.3 
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4014 
10D575  Retail DVD release; http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1633 
10D578 Apr 2010 http://support.apple.com/kb/DL1017 
10.6.4 
10F569 
Jun 2010 10.4 
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4150 
10F616 http://support.apple.com/kb/DL1050 
10.6.5 
10H574 
Nov 2010 10.5 
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4250 
10H575 http://support.apple.com/kb/DL1327 
10.6.6 10J567 Jan 2011 10.6 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4459 
10.6.7 10J869 Mar 2011 10.7 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4472 
10.6.8 
10K540 Jun 2011 
10.8 
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1633 
10K549 Jul 2011 http://support.apple.com/kb/DL1400 
10.7 
11A511,a Jul 2011 
11.0 
Retail Mac App Store release; 
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1633 
11A511s Aug 2011 Retail USB drive release 
10.7.1 11B26 Aug 2011 11.1 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4764 
10.7.2 11C74 Oct 2011 11.2 http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4767 
10.7.3 10D50 Feb 2012 11.3 
Releases b and d have been observed, symbol 
tables appear to be interchangeable; 
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT5048 
 
Notes: 
1. This information largely summarized from Wikipedia release histories for 10.4-10.7, and 
the Apple knowledgebase article “Finding your Mac OS X version and build information” 
(http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1633). 
2. There are also numerous hardware-specific builds in addition to those listed, some of 
which are available in the Apple knowledgebase article “Mac OS X versions (builds) for 
computers” (http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1159). 
3. Build numbers in bold are those encountered in the course of this research, and therefore 
ones for which volafox could be patched to support using the data collected. 
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Appendix C. Python struct Library 
Figure 37 demonstrates the Python standard library function struct.unpack 
as utilized by the open files module unpacktype() wrapper. The function is used to 
convert C structures represented as binary data to a tuple of equivalent Python types. 
From the documentation http://docs.python.org/library/struct.html: 
struct.unpack(fmt, string)¶ 
Unpack the string (presumably packed by pack(fmt, ...)) 
according to the given format. The result is a tuple even if it 
contains exactly one item. The string must contain exactly the 
amount of data required by the format (len(string) must 
equal calcsize(fmt)). 
 
Within the context of this research string is a variable read from file using either 
IA32PagedMemoryPae or IA32PML4MemoryPae, whichever object class volafox 
is using an instance of. Return value of len(string) is the number of bytes. The fmt 
string literal consists of format characters representing primitive C types from Table 14, 
STR = 0  # string: char (8-bit) * size 
INT = 1  # int:    32 or 64-bit 
SHT = 3  # short:  16-bit 
 
def unpacktype(binstr, member, mtype): 
  offset = member[1] 
  size   = member[2] 
  fmt    = '' 
  
  if mtype == STR: 
    fmt = str(size) + 's' 
  elif mtype == INT: 
    fmt = 'I' if size == 4 else 'Q' 
  elif mtype == SHT: 
    fmt = 'H' 
 
  return struct.unpack(fmt, binstr[offset:size+offset])[0] 
Figure 37. Simplified lsof.py unpacktype() function. 
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any of which can be preceded by an integral to specify a repeat count (e.g. ‘4h’ à 
‘hhhh’). Because pointers are not an available type, the format ‘I’ or ‘Q’ is used to 
represent a 32 or 64-bit pointer respectively. 
The struct.unpack function performs endian conversion as needed, but it is 
not capable of handling the nuances of byte and type alignment for members within a 
struct. Padding must therefore be explicitly defined in the format string, but bytes marked 
‘x’ are not included as items in the output tuple. For the format '2I392xI52sI' 
output would consist of the following sequence of types: int, int, int, string, and int. 
 
Table 14. struct.unpack format characters. 
Format C Type Python Type Standard Size 
x pad byte no value   
c char string of length 1 1 
b signed char integer 1 
B unsigned char integer 1 
? _Bool bool 1 
h short integer 2 
H unsigned short integer 2 
i int integer 4 
I unsigned int integer 4 
l long integer 4 
L unsigned long integer 4 
q long long integer 8 
Q unsigned long long integer 8 
f float float 4 
d double float 8 
s char[] string   
p char[] string   
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Appendix D. Full UML Diagram 
<< abstract >> 
Struct The constant TEMPLATES is an~ 
+mem : IA32*MemoryPae abstract static variable whose definition 
+llrub : bool is deferred to the subclasses. The static 
+illQ.b : int variable template is chosen from 
+~:int TEMPLATES at runtime by _ init_ () 
-TEMPLATEf,? :diet based on the value of arch and kve r s. 
-t!ill!R!rue : diet 
-~:int 
-smem : str {binary} 
+ _init_(addr : int) 
+validaddr(addr : int) : bool 
~ 
I I I 
Session - Ubcinfo Specinfo Filefork 
-TEMPLATES :diet -TEMPLATES :diet -TEMPLATES :diet -TEMPLATES :diet 
+ _init_(addr : int) + _init_(addr : int) + _init_(addr : int) + _init_(addr : int) 
-7 
Fileglob - +Qetuser() : str +Qetoff() : int +getdev() : str +getoff() : int 
-TEMPLATES: diet t t t t 
-FILE TYPE: list I I I I 
I I I 
-MODE: list I L--------~--~ Pgrp 
- I Cnode I--
-ftype : int 
-TEMPLATES :diet I 
-TEMPLATES :diet + _init_(addr : int) + _init_(addr : int) I-- Vnode pager Vnode + _init_(addr : int) +getmode(fd : int) : str +getuser() : str -TEMPLATES :diet ---? 
-TEMPLATES :diet +getnode() : int +gettype() : str t + _init_(addr : int) -VNODE TYPE : list +getentries() : int +getoff(): i nt I +gettxt() : int { pointer } 
-VNODE TAG : list 
-+:f etoff() : int +getdata(): int {pointer} I 
I-- Vm map entry t -vtype : int Proc I--
-TEMPLATES :diet I -tag: int +self_ptr : int { pointer } I 
+ _init_(addr : int) -xnode : *node 
-TEMPLATES :diet Vm object +getnext() : int { pointer } '----
-mount : Mount Devnode I--Fileproc I-- -~ : int { pointer } -TEMPLATES :diet +Qettxt() : list ---? + _init_(addr : int) -TEMPLATES :diet -TEMPLATES :diet 
-filedesc_ptr : int { pointer } -map: Vm map 
+ _init_(addr : int) 
-exe_ptr : int { pointer} t in it _(addr : int) +getnode() : int + _init_(addr : int) 
+getfglob() : int { pointer} I + - +getname() : str -+-g_etnode() : int 
-pgrp_ptr : int { pointer} I +~ ettxt() : list t +getdev() : str 
-pid: int I-- Vm map +getpath() : str I 
I + 
-
init_(int) 
-TEMPLATES :diet +gettype() : str I<>- Mount I--Filedesc I-- +next() : Proc + _init_(addr : int) +getoff(fileglob_offset : int) : str -TEMPLATES :diet 
-TEMPLATES: diet +valid() : bool +gettxt() : list 
-qetparent() : int { pointer } + _init_(addr : int) 
+ _init_(addr : int) +setpid(): bool t t +getmount() : str +getcwd() : int { pointer} +getfd() : int { pointer} I I +getdev() : str 
+getfglobs() : diet +getpid() : int I I 
I 
+getcmd() : str L..._ Task 
+getuser() : str -TEMPLATES :diet lsof.py 
o#0 1 1 • oJ ................... 
-ae, arch : int, kvers : int, +gettxt() : list ---7 + _init_(addr : int) 
t +Qettxt() : list 3r }, pid : int, vflag : int ) : list 
---------- j_-----------------------~-----------------------------------_I ~;;~~~:~~~~~~~~(~~~~t~ Proc) : list 
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Appendix E. Full Test Results 
  
Table 15. OS X 10.6.8 x86 controlled test case results (1 sample). 
Diff Test Count Total % Unit Total XRef 
C1 TYPE: socket 100 624 16.0 handle F3 
C2 TYPE: not(vnode) 239 624 38.3 handle F3 
C3 TYPE: vnode(other) 0 624 0.0 handle F3 
D1 Δ USER 5 34 14.7 process F2 
D2 NAME: /dev 0 624 0.0 handle F3 
E1 COMMAND: lsof,sudo 1 removed process  
E2 N/A: vm capture E3 
E4 FD: twd 1 removed handle  
E5 TYPE: link 0 624 0.0 handle F3 
E6 TYPE: fifo 0 624 0.0 handle F3 
E7 NODE: node(lsof) 7 624 1.1 handle F3 
F1 Δ COMMAND 0 34 0.0 process F2 
F2 Δ PID - 0 + 0 
34 
34 
0.0 
0.0 process 
E1 
 
F3 Δ FD - 0 + 0 
624 
624 
0.0 
0.0 handle 
F2, E4 
F2 
F4 Δ MODE 0 624 0.0 handle F3 
F5 Δ TYPE 0 524 0.0 handle F3,C1,E5 
F6 Δ DEVICE 0 385 0.0 handle F3,C2,C3,E6 
F7 Δ SIZE/OFF 1 378 0.3 handle F3,C2,C3,D2,E7 
F8 Δ NODE 2 385 0.5 handle F3,C2,C3 
F9 Δ NAME 0 385 0.0 handle F3,C2 
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Table 16. OS X 10.6.0 Server x64 controlled test case results (1 sample). 
Diff Test Count Total % Unit Total XRef 
C1 TYPE: socket 98 642 15.3 handle F3 
C2 TYPE: not(vnode) 241 642 37.5 handle F3 
C3 TYPE: vnode(other) 0 642 0.0 handle F3 
D1 Δ USER 6 35 17.1 process F2 
D2 NAME: /dev 1 642 0.2 handle F3 
E1 COMMAND: lsof,sudo 1 removed process  
E2 N/A: vm capture E3 
E4 FD: twd 1 removed handle  
E5 TYPE: link 0 642 0.0 handle F3 
E6 TYPE: fifo 0 642 0.0 handle F3 
E7 NODE: node(lsof) 7 642 1.1 handle F3 
F1 Δ COMMAND 0 35 0.0 process F2 
F2 Δ PID - 0 + 0 
35 
35 
0.0 
0.0 process 
E1 
 
F3 Δ FD - 0 + 0 
642 
642 
0.0 
0.0 handle 
F2, E4 
F2 
F4 Δ MODE 0 642 0.0 handle F3 
F5 Δ TYPE 0 544 0.0 handle F3,C1,E5 
F6 Δ DEVICE 0 401 0.0 handle F3,C2,C3,E6 
F7 Δ SIZE/OFF 1 393 0.3 handle F3,C2,C3,D2,E7 
F8 Δ NODE 1 401 0.2 handle F3,C2,C3 
F9 Δ NAME 0 401 0.0 handle F3,C2 
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Table 17. OS X 10.7.3 x86 controlled test case results (1 sample). 
Diff Test Count Total % Unit Total XRef 
C1 TYPE: socket 140 906 15.5 handle F3 
C2 TYPE: not(vnode) 333 906 36.8 handle F3 
C3 TYPE: vnode(other) 0 906 0.0 handle F3 
D1 Δ USER 17 45 37.8 process F2 
D2 NAME: /dev 1 906 0.1 handle F3 
E1 COMMAND: lsof,sudo 2 removed process  
E2 N/A: vm capture E3 
E4 FD: twd 2 removed handle  
E5 TYPE: link 3 906 0.3 handle F3 
E6 TYPE: fifo 0 906 0.0 handle F3 
E7 NODE: node(lsof) 7 906 0.8 handle F3 
F1 Δ COMMAND 0 45 0.0 process F2 
F2 Δ PID - 0 + 1 
45 
46 
0.0 
2.2 process 
E1 
 
F3 Δ FD - 0 + 3 
906 
909 
0.0 
0.3 handle 
F2, E4 
F2 
F4 Δ MODE 0 906 0.0 handle F3 
F5 Δ TYPE 0 763 0.0 handle F3,C1,E5 
F6 Δ DEVICE 0 573 0.0 handle F3,C2,C3,E6 
F7 Δ SIZE/OFF 1 565 0.2 handle F3,C2,C3,D2,E7 
F8 Δ NODE 1 573 0.2 handle F3,C2,C3 
F9 Δ NAME 0 573 0.0 handle F3,C2 
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Table 18. OS X 10.7.0 x64 controlled test case results (1 sample). 
Diff Test Count Total % Unit Total XRef 
C1 TYPE: socket 133 868 15.3 handle F3 
C2 TYPE: not(vnode) 317 868 36.5 handle F3 
C3 TYPE: vnode(other) 0 868 0.0 handle F3 
D1 Δ USER 8 43 18.6 process F2 
D2 NAME: /dev 1 686 0.1 handle F3 
E1 COMMAND: lsof,sudo 2 removed process  
E2 N/A: vm capture E3 
E4 FD: twd 2 removed handle  
E5 TYPE: link 3 868 0.3 handle F3 
E6 TYPE: fifo 0 686 0.0 handle F3 
E7 NODE: node(lsof) 7 686 0.8 handle F3 
F1 Δ COMMAND 0 43 0.0 process F2 
F2 Δ PID - 0 + 1 
43 
44 
0.0 
2.3 process 
E1 
 
F3 Δ FD 0 4 
868 
872 
0.0 
0.5 handle 
F2, E4 
F2 
F4 Δ MODE 0 868 0.0 handle F3 
F5 Δ TYPE 0 732 0.0 handle F3,C1,E5 
F6 Δ DEVICE 0 551 0.0 handle F3,C2,C3,E6 
F7 Δ SIZE/OFF 1 543 0.2 handle F3,C2,C3,D2,E7 
F8 Δ NODE 1 551 0.2 handle F3,C2,C3 
F9 Δ NAME 0 551 0.0 handle F3,C2 
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Table 19. OS X 10.6.8, model X6A real-world results (1 sample). 
Diff Test Count Total % Unit Total XRef 
C1 TYPE: socket 184 1247 14.8 handle F3 
C2 TYPE: not(vnode) 418 1247 33.5 handle F3 
C3 TYPE: vnode(other) 2 1247 0.2 handle F3 
D1 Δ USER 9 56 16.1 process F2 
D2 NAME: /dev 0 1247 0.0 handle F3 
E1 COMMAND: lsof 1 removed process  
E2 COMMAND: mmr,image 2 removed   
E3 COMMAND: sh 1 removed   
E4 FD: twd 3 removed handle  
E5 TYPE: link 0 1247 0.0 handle F3 
E6 TYPE: fifo 0 1247 0.0 handle F3 
E7 NODE: node(lsof) 10 1247 0.8 handle F3 
F1 Δ COMMAND 0 56 0.0 process F2 
F2 Δ PID - 0 + 2 
56 
58 
0.0 
3.4 process 
E1 
 
F3 Δ FD - 21 + 68 
1268 
1315 
1.7 
5.2 handle 
F2, E4 
F2 
F4 Δ MODE 0 1247 0.0 handle F3 
F5 Δ TYPE 0 1063 0.0 handle F3,C1,E5 
F6 Δ DEVICE 2 827 0.2 handle F3,C2,C3,E6 
F7 Δ SIZE/OFF 27 817 3.3 handle F3,C2,C3,D2,E7 
F8 Δ NODE 29 827 3.5 handle F3,C2,C3 
F9 Δ NAME 27 829 3.3 handle F3,C2 
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Table 20. OS X 10.6.8, model DR2 real-world results (1 sample). 
Diff Test Count Total % Unit Total XRef 
C1 TYPE: socket 208 1364 15.2 handle F3 
C2 TYPE: not(vnode) 419 1364 30.7 handle F3 
C3 TYPE: vnode(other) 0 1364 0.0 handle F3 
D1 Δ USER 22 53 41.5 process F2 
D2 NAME: /dev 0 1364 0.0 handle F3 
E1 COMMAND: lsof 1 removed process  
E2 COMMAND: mmr,image 2 removed   
E3 COMMAND: sh 1 removed   
E4 FD: twd 4 removed handle  
E5 TYPE: link 0 1364 0.0 handle F3 
E6 TYPE: fifo 0 1364 0.0 handle F3 
E7 NODE: node(lsof) 10 1364 0.7 handle F3 
F1 Δ COMMAND 0 53 0.0 process F2 
F2 Δ PID - 0 + 1 
53 
54 
0.0 
1.9 process 
E1 
 
F3 Δ FD 86 98 
1450 
1462 
5.9 
6.7 handle 
F2, E4 
F2 
F4 Δ MODE 1 1364 0.1 handle F3 
F5 Δ TYPE 1 1156 0.1 handle F3,C1,E5 
F6 Δ DEVICE 1 945 0.1 handle F3,C2,C3,E6 
F7 Δ SIZE/OFF 93 935 9.9 handle F3,C2,C3,D2,E7 
F8 Δ NODE 74 945 7.8 handle F3,C2,C3 
F9 Δ NAME 20 945 2.1 handle F3,C2 
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Table 21. OS X 10.6.8, model VUW real-world results (1 sample). 
Diff Test Count Total % Unit Total XRef 
C1 TYPE: socket 186 1065 17.5 handle F3 
C2 TYPE: not(vnode) 369 1065 34.6 handle F3 
C3 TYPE: vnode(other) 37 1065 3.5 handle F3 
D1 Δ USER 22 47 46.8 process F2 
D2 NAME: /dev 0 1065 0.0 handle F3 
E1 COMMAND: lsof 1 removed process  
E2 COMMAND: mmr,image 2 removed   
E3 COMMAND: sh 1 removed   
E4 FD: twd 4 removed handle  
E5 TYPE: link 0 1065 0.0 handle F3 
E6 TYPE: fifo 0 1065 0.0 handle F3 
E7 NODE: node(lsof) 10 1065 0.9 handle F3 
F1 Δ COMMAND 0 47 0.0 process F2 
F2 Δ PID - 1 + 2 
48 
49 
2.1 
4.1 process 
E1 
 
F3 Δ FD - 116 + 146 
1181 
1211 
9.8 
12.1 handle 
F2, E4 
F2 
F4 Δ MODE 0 1065 0.0 handle F3 
F5 Δ TYPE 0 879 0.0 handle F3,C1,E5 
F6 Δ DEVICE 0 659 0.0 handle F3,C2,C3,E6 
F7 Δ SIZE/OFF 11 649 1.7 handle F3,C2,C3,D2,E7 
F8 Δ NODE 14 659 2.1 handle F3,C2,C3 
F9 Δ NAME 5 696 0.7 handle F3,C2 
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Table 22. OS X 10.6.8, model AGU real-world results (1 sample). 
Diff Test Count Total % Unit Total XRef 
C1 TYPE: socket 163 962 16.9 handle F3 
C2 TYPE: not(vnode) 327 962 16.9 handle F3 
C3 TYPE: vnode(other) 0 962 0.0 handle F3 
D1 Δ USER 9 42 21.4 process F2 
D2 NAME: /dev 0 962 0.0 handle F3 
E1 COMMAND: lsof 1 removed process  
E2 COMMAND: mmr,image 2 removed   
E3 COMMAND: sh 1 removed   
E4 FD: twd 2 removed handle  
E5 TYPE: link 0 962 0.0 handle F3 
E6 TYPE: fifo 0 962 0.0 handle F3 
E7 NODE: node(lsof) 10 962 1.0 handle F3 
F1 Δ COMMAND 0 42 0.0 process F2 
F2 Δ PID - 0 + 2 
42 
44 
0.0 
4.5 process 
E1 
 
F3 Δ FD - 34 + 22 
996 
984 
3.4 
2.2 handle 
F2, E4 
F2 
F4 Δ MODE 0 962 0.0 handle F3 
F5 Δ TYPE 0 799 0.0 handle F3,C1,E5 
F6 Δ DEVICE 0 635 0.0 handle F3,C2,C3,E6 
F7 Δ SIZE/OFF 2 625 0.3 handle F3,C2,C3,D2,E7 
F8 Δ NODE 2 635 0.3 handle F3,C2,C3 
F9 Δ NAME 0 635 0.0 handle F3,C2 
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Table 23. OS X 10.6.8, model U35 real-world results (1 sample). 
Diff Test Count Total % Unit Total XRef 
C1 TYPE: socket 361 1972 18.3 handle F3 
C2 TYPE: not(vnode) 595 1972 30.2 handle F3 
C3 TYPE: vnode(other) 18 1972 0.9 handle F3 
D1 Δ USER 24 60 40.0 process F2 
D2 NAME: /dev 0 1972 0.0 handle F3 
E1 COMMAND: lsof 1 removed process  
E2 COMMAND: mmr,image 2 removed   
E3 COMMAND: sh 1 removed   
E4 FD: twd 4 removed handle  
E5 TYPE: link 0 1972 0.0 handle F3 
E6 TYPE: fifo 2 1972 0.1 handle F3 
E7 NODE: node(lsof) 10 1972 0.1 handle F3 
F1 Δ COMMAND 0 60 0.0 process F2 
F2 Δ PID - 0 + 2 
60 
62 
0.0 
3.2 process 
E1 
 
F3 Δ FD - 26 + 51 
1998 
2023 
1.3 
2.5 handle 
F2, E4 
F2 
F4 Δ MODE 1 1972 0.1 handle F3 
F5 Δ TYPE 2 1611 0.1 handle F3,C1,E5 
F6 Δ DEVICE 0 1357 0.0 handle F3,C2,C3,E6 
F7 Δ SIZE/OFF 6 1349 0.4 handle F3,C2,C3,D2,E7 
F8 Δ NODE 2 1359 0.1 handle F3,C2,C3 
F9 Δ NAME 2 1377 0.1 handle F3,C2 
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Table 24. OS X 10.6.8, model X8A real-world results (1 sample). 
Diff Test Count Total % Unit Total XRef 
C1 TYPE: socket 366 1633 22.4 handle F3 
C2 TYPE: not(vnode) 645 1633 39.5 handle F3 
C3 TYPE: vnode(other) 1 1633 0.1 handle F3 
D1 Δ USER 38 74 51.4 process F2 
D2 NAME: /dev 0 1633 0.0 handle F3 
E1 COMMAND: lsof 1 removed process  
E2 COMMAND: mmr,image 2 removed   
E3 COMMAND: sh 1 removed   
E4 FD: twd 5 removed handle  
E5 TYPE: link 0 1633 0.0 handle F3 
E6 TYPE: fifo 0 1633 0.0 handle F3 
E7 NODE: node(lsof) 10 1633 0.0 handle F3 
F1 Δ COMMAND 0 74 0.0 process F2 
F2 Δ PID - 1 + 1 
75 
75 
1.3 
1.3 process 
E1 
 
F3 Δ FD - 150 + 17 
1783 
1650 
8.4 
1.0 handle 
F2, E4 
F2 
F4 Δ MODE 1 1633 0.1 handle F3 
F5 Δ TYPE 0 1267 0.0 handle F3,C1,E5 
F6 Δ DEVICE 1 987 0.1 handle F3,C2,C3,E6 
F7 Δ SIZE/OFF 17 977 1.7 handle F3,C2,C3,D2,E7 
F8 Δ NODE 6 987 0.6 handle F3,C2,C3 
F9 Δ NAME 3 988 0.3 handle F3,C2 
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Table 25. OS X 10.6.8, model DB5 real-world results (1 sample). 
Diff Test Count Total % Unit Total XRef 
C1 TYPE: socket 280 1672 16.7 handle F3 
C2 TYPE: not(vnode) 598 1672 35.8 handle F3 
C3 TYPE: vnode(other) 22 1672 1.3 handle F3 
D1 Δ USER 22 61 36.1 process F2 
D2 NAME: /dev 0 1672 0.0 handle F3 
E1 COMMAND: lsof 1 removed process  
E2 COMMAND: mmr,image 2 removed   
E3 COMMAND: sh 1 removed   
E4 FD: twd 2 removed handle  
E5 TYPE: link 0 1672 0.0 handle F3 
E6 TYPE: fifo 1 1672 0.1 handle F3 
E7 NODE: node(lsof) 10 1672 0.6 handle F3 
F1 Δ COMMAND 0 1672 0.0 process F2 
F2 Δ PID - 0 + 0 
61 
61 
0.0 
0.0 process 
E1 
 
F3 Δ FD - 127 + 50 
1799 
1722 
7.1 
2.9 handle 
F2, E4 
F2 
F4 Δ MODE 0 1672 0.0 handle F3 
F5 Δ TYPE 0 1392 0.0 handle F3,C1,E5 
F6 Δ DEVICE 0 1051 0.0 handle F3,C2,C3,E6 
F7 Δ SIZE/OFF 38 1042 3.6 handle F3,C2,C3,D2,E7 
F8 Δ NODE 33 1052 3.1 handle F3,C2,C3 
F9 Δ NAME 11 1074 1.0 handle F3,C2 
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Table 26. OS X 10.6.8, model ATM real-world results (1 sample). 
Diff Test Count Total % Unit Total XRef 
C1 TYPE: socket 471 2794 16.9 handle F3 
C2 TYPE: not(vnode) 765 2794 27.4 handle F3 
C3 TYPE: vnode(other) 1 2794 0.0 handle F3 
D1 Δ USER 12 65 18.5 process F2 
D2 NAME: /dev 0 2794 0.0 handle F3 
E1 COMMAND: lsof 1 removed process  
E2 COMMAND: mmr,image 2 removed   
E3 COMMAND: sh 1 removed   
E4 FD: twd 3 removed handle  
E5 TYPE: link 0 2794 0.0 handle F3 
E6 TYPE: fifo 0 2794 0.0 handle F3 
E7 NODE: node(lsof) 10 2794 0.0 handle F3 
F1 Δ COMMAND 0 65 0.0 process F2 
F2 Δ PID - 1 + 3 
66 
68 
1.5 
4.4 process 
E1 
 
F3 Δ FD - 352 + 76 
3146 
2870 
11.2 
2.6 handle 
F2, E4 
F2 
F4 Δ MODE 2 2794 0.1 handle F3 
F5 Δ TYPE 2 2323 0.1 handle F3,C1,E5 
F6 Δ DEVICE 1 2027 0.0 handle F3,C2,C3,E6 
F7 Δ SIZE/OFF 55 2017 2.7 handle F3,C2,C3,D2,E7 
F8 Δ NODE 49 2027 2.4 handle F3,C2,C3 
F9 Δ NAME 42 2029 2.1 handle F3,C2 
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Table 27. OS X 10.7.0, model 0P2 real-world results (1 sample). 
Diff Test Count Total % Unit Total XRef 
C1 TYPE: socket 670 3010 22.3 handle F3 
C2 TYPE: not(vnode) 1087 3010 36.1 handle F3 
C3 TYPE: vnode(other) 1 3010 0.1 handle F3 
D1 Δ USER 36 90 40.0 process F2 
D2 NAME: /dev 1 3010 0.0 handle F3 
E1 COMMAND: lsof 1 removed  process  
E2 COMMAND: mmr,image 2 removed   
E3 COMMAND: sh 1 removed   
E4 FD: twd 5 removed handle  
E5 TYPE: link 3 3010 0.1 handle F3 
E6 TYPE: fifo 0 3010 0.0 handle F3 
E7 NODE: node(lsof) 13 3010 0.4 handle F3 
F1 Δ COMMAND 0 90 0.0 process F2 
F2 Δ PID - 0 + 4 
90 
94 
0.0 
4.3 process 
E1 
 
F3 Δ FD - 308 + 139 
3318 
3149 
9.3 
4.4 handle 
F2, E4 
F2 
F4 Δ MODE 2 3010 0.1 handle F3 
F5 Δ TYPE 2 2337 0.1 handle F3,C1,E5 
F6 Δ DEVICE 1 1922 0.1 handle F3,C2,C3,E6 
F7 Δ SIZE/OFF 27 1908 1.4 handle F3,C2,C3,D2,E7 
F8 Δ NODE 17 1922 0.9 handle F3,C2,C3 
F9 Δ NAME 14 1923 0.7 handle F3,C2 
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Table 28. OS X 10.7.2, model 18X real-world results (1 sample). 
Diff Test Count Total % Unit Total XRef 
C1 TYPE: socket 542 2469 22.0 handle F3 
C2 TYPE: not(vnode) 869 2469 35.2 handle F3 
C3 TYPE: vnode(other) 1 2469 0.0 handle F3 
D1 Δ USER 38 70 54.3 process F2 
D2 NAME: /dev 1 2469 0.0 handle F3 
E1 COMMAND: lsof 1 removed  process  
E2 COMMAND: mmr,image 0 removed   
E3 COMMAND: sh 0 removed   
E4 FD: twd 5 removed handle  
E5 TYPE: link 3 2469 0.1 handle F3 
E6 TYPE: fifo 0 2469 0.0 handle F3 
E7 NODE: node(lsof) 0 2469 0.0 handle F3 
F1 Δ COMMAND 0 70 0.0 process F2 
F2 Δ PID - 8 + 0 
78 
70 
10.3 
0.0 process 
E1 
 
F3 Δ FD - 290 + 7 
2759 
2476 
10.5 
0.3 handle 
F2, E4 
F2 
F4 Δ MODE 0 2469 0.0 handle F3 
F5 Δ TYPE 0 1924 0.0 handle F3,C1,E5 
F6 Δ DEVICE 0 1599 0.0 handle F3,C2,C3,E6 
F7 Δ SIZE/OFF 9 1598 0.6 handle F3,C2,C3,D2,E7 
F8 Δ NODE 5 1599 0.3 handle F3,C2,C3 
F9 Δ NAME 2 1600 0.1 handle F3,C2 
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Appendix F. Hardware Capture Summary 
# Arch OS X Type Model Media Time RAM (GB) MB/s 
1 i386 10.6.8 client AGU HDD 02:39 4 25.8 
2 i386 10.6.8 client ATM flash 05:02 4 13.6 
3 i386 10.6.8 client DB5 HDD 02:45 4 24.8 
4 i386 10.6.8 client DR2 flash 02:37 2 13.0 
5 i386 10.6.8 client U35 flash 02:32 2 13.5 
6 i386 10.6.8 client VUW flash 03:59 3 12.9 
7 i386 10.6.8 client X6A HDD 02:18 3 22.3 
8 i386 10.6.8 client X8A HDD 00:38 1 26.9 
9 i386 10.7.0 client 0P2 HDD 02:34 4 26.6 
10 i386 10.7.2 client 18X HDD 01:24 2 24.4 
11 x86_64 10.6.8 client M75 HDD 02:22 4 28.8 
12 x86_64 10.7.1 server XYK HDD 02:32 4 26.9 
13 x86_64 10.7.2 client 1G0 HDD 02:03 4 33.3 
14 x86_64 10.7.2 client 4R1 HDD 01:01 2 33.6 
15 x86_64 10.7.2 client 66D flash 05:20 4 12.8 
16 x86_64 10.7.2 client 66E HDD 01:55 4 35.6 
17 x86_64 10.7.2 client ATM HDD 01:55 4 35.6 
18 x86_64 10.7.2 client D6H HDD 01:56 4 35.3 
19 x86_64 10.7.2 client H2H flash 05:50 4 11.7 
20 x86_64 10.7.2 client H2H HDD 02:17 4 29.9 
21 x86_64 10.7.2 client HJP flash 05:56 4 11.5 
22 x86_64 10.7.2 client HJP HDD 02:39 4 25.8 
23 x86_64 10.7.2 client HJW flash 12:47 8 10.7 
24 x86_64 10.7.2 client JWT HDD 02:42 4 25.3 
25 x86_64 10.7.2 client JWT HDD 02:42 4 25.3 
26 x86_64 10.7.2 client JWV flash 07:46 4 8.8 
27 x86_64 10.7.2 client JYC flash 02:58 2 11.5 
28 x86_64 10.7.2 client JYD flash 06:36 4 10.3 
29 x86_64 10.7.2 client JYD HDD 02:38 4 25.9 
30 x86_64 10.7.2 client MGG HDD 02:39 4 25.8 
31 x86_64 10.7.2 client MW8 flash 05:59 4 11.4 
32 x86_64 10.7.2 client V13 flash 07:07 4 9.59 
33 x86_64 10.7.2 client V7L HDD 02:52 4 23.8 
34 x86_64 10.7.2 client X92 HDD 01:30 2 22.8 
35 x86_64 10.7.2 client YAM flash 03:26 2 9.9 
36 x86_64 10.7.2 client ZE2 HDD 03:20 4 20.5 
37 x86_64 10.7.2 client ZE5 HDD 02:43 4 25.1 
38 x86_64 10.7.2 server MFB flash 08:49 6 11.6 
      MIN: 00:38 1 8.8      MAX: 12:47 8 35.6         27.39
4526
5 
       AVG(flash): 11.5        AVG(HDD): 27.4 
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Appendix G. Complete Source Code: lsof.py 
1 #!/usr/bin/env python 
2  
3 ''' 
4       Author: student researcher, osxmem@gmail.com 
5    Last Edit: 31 Mar 2012 
6  Description: Research implementation of file handle support for volafox. 
7  
8    Dependent: x86.py defines read and is_valid_address functions for the 
9               IA32PagedMemoryPae object passed in the first argument of getfilelist, 
10               though it is not an import dependency. 
11  
12 Constraints: 
13   1. NODE field will only be returned for files opened on HFS+ or DEVFS filesystems 
14   2. Supported filetypes: VNODE 
15   3. Supported subtypes: REG, DIR, CHR, LINK, FIFO 
16   4. No unicode support for filenames (8-bit characters only) 
17  
18 Deficiencies: 
19   1. USER field is not reported correctly for many processes (mismatch with lsof and all 
20      user-related keywords of ps on the OSX command line) 
21   3. Files on DEVFS with vnode type of DIR cannot be sized (e.g /dev) 
22  
23 Notes:  
24   1. All struct classes MUST have at least one element in their template dictionaries 
25      (even if not fully implemented during development) or there will be serious 
26      performance issues as the size is sorted out. 
27 ''' 
28  
29 import sys 
30 import struct 
31 import inspect 
32  
33 from sys import stderr 
34  
35 # error codes which may be printed in the program output 
36 ECODE = { 
37  'unsupported': -1, 
38  'command': -2, 
39  'pid': -3, 
40  'fd': -4, 
41  'type': -5, 
42  'device': -6, 
43  'size': -7, 
44  'node': -8, 
45  'name': -9 
46 } 
47  
48 ####################################### UTILITIES ####################################### 
  
125 
49  
50 # convert dev_t (also first member in struct fsid_t) encoding to major/minor device IDs 
51 def dev_decode(dev_t): 
52    
53  # interpreted from the major(x) and minor(x) macros in bsd/sys/types.h 
54  maj = (dev_t >> 24) & 255 
55  min = dev_t & 16777215 
56  return "%d,%d" %(maj, min) 
57  
58 # print hex representation of a binary string in 8-byte chunks, four to a line 
59 def printhex(binstr): 
60  
61  hexstr = binstr.encode("hex") 
62   
63  l = len(hexstr) 
64  i = 0 
65  while i < l: 
66   if i+32 < l: 
67    line = hexstr[i:i+32] 
68   else: 
69    line = hexstr[i:] 
70   out = "" 
71   j = 0 
72   for k in xrange(len(line)): 
73    out += line[k] 
74    if j == 7: 
75     out += ' ' 
76     j = 0 
77    else: 
78     j += 1  
79   print out 
80   i += 32 
81  
82 # print a string matrix as a formatted table of columns  
83 def columnprint(headerlist, contentlist, mszlist=[]): 
84  num_columns = len(headerlist) 
85  size_list   = [] 
86   
87  # start sizing by length of column titles 
88  for title in headerlist: 
89   size_list.append(len(title)) 
90   
91  # resize based on content 
92  for i in xrange(num_columns): 
93   for line in contentlist: 
94    if len(line) != len(headerlist): 
95     stderr.write("ERROR length of header list does not match content.\n") 
96     return -1 
97    if len(line[i]) > size_list[i]: 
98     size_list[i] = len(line[i]) 
99   
100  # check sizing against optional max size list   
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101  if len(mszlist) > 0: 
102   if len(mszlist) != len(headerlist): 
103    stderr.write("ERROR length of header list does not match max size 
list.\n") 
104    return -1 
105   for i in xrange(num_columns): 
106    if mszlist[i] < size_list[i] and mszlist[i] > 0: # -1/0 for unrestricted 
sz 
107     if mszlist[i] < len(headerlist[i]): 
108      stderr.write("WARNING max size list and column header length 
mismatch.\n") 
109     size_list[i] = mszlist[i] 
110      
111  # prepend header to content list 
112  contentlist = [headerlist] + contentlist 
113   
114  # build comprehensive, justified, printstring 
115  printblock = "" 
116  for line in contentlist: 
117   printline = "" 
118   for i in xrange(num_columns): 
119    if i == 0: 
120     printline += line[i][:size_list[i]].ljust(size_list[i]) 
121    elif i == (num_columns-1): 
122     printline += " " + line[i][:size_list[i]] 
123    else: 
124     printline += line[i][:size_list[i]].rjust(size_list[i]+1) 
125   printblock += printline + '\n' 
126  
127  sys.stdout.write('%s' %printblock) 
128  
129 # mtype (enum) 
130 STR = 0  # string: char (8-bit) * size 
131 INT = 1  # int:    32 or 64-bit 
132 SHT = 3  # short:  16-bit 
133  
134 # return unpacked member from a struct given its memory and a member template 
135 def unpacktype(binstr, member, mtype): 
136  offset = member[1] 
137  size   = member[2] 
138  fmt    = '' 
139   
140  if mtype == STR: 
141   fmt = str(size) + 's' 
142  elif mtype == INT: 
143   fmt = 'I' if size == 4 else 'Q' 
144  elif mtype == SHT: 
145   fmt = 'H' 
146  else: 
147   calling_fxn = sys._getframe(1) 
148   stderr.write("ERROR %s.%s tried to unpack the unknown type %d.\n" 
%(callingclass(calling_fxn), calling_fxn.f_code.co_name, mtype)) 
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149   return None   
150   
151  if struct.calcsize(fmt) != len(binstr[offset:size+offset]): 
152   calling_fxn = sys._getframe(1) 
153   stderr.write("ERROR %s.%s tried to unpack '%s' (fmt size: %d) from %d bytes.\n" 
%(callingclass(calling_fxn), calling_fxn.f_code.co_name, fmt, struct.calcsize(fmt), 
len(binstr[offset:size+offset]))) 
154   return None 
155  
156  return struct.unpack(fmt, binstr[offset:size+offset])[0] 
157   
158 # return the enclosing class when called inside a function (error reporting) 
159 def callingclass(calling_fxn): 
160  try: 
161   classname = calling_fxn.f_locals['self'].__class__.__name__ 
162  except KeyError: 
163   classname = "<unknown>" 
164  return classname 
165   
166 #################################### PRIVATE CLASSES ##################################### 
167  
168 # parent from which all structures derive, an abstract class 
169 class Struct(object): 
170  
171  # static variables (common to all structure subclasses) 
172  mem   = None 
173  verb  = False 
174  arch  = -1 
175  kvers = -1 
176   
177  # abstract static variables (subclass-specific) 
178  TEMPLATES = None 
179  template = None 
180  ssize = -1 
181   
182  def validaddr(self, addr): 
183   if addr == 0: 
184    calling_fxn = sys._getframe(1) 
185    stderr.write("WARNING %s.%s was passed a NULL address.\n" 
%(callingclass(calling_fxn), calling_fxn.f_code.co_name)) 
186    return False 
187   elif not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(addr)): 
188    calling_fxn = sys._getframe(1) 
189    stderr.write("WARNING %s.%s was passed the invalid address %.8x.\n" 
%(callingclass(calling_fxn), calling_fxn.f_code.co_name, addr)) 
190    return False 
191   return True 
192   
193  def __init__(self, addr): 
194   self.smem = None 
195   
196   if self.__class__.template == None: 
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197    
198    # configure template based on architecture and kernel version 
199    if Struct.arch in self.__class__.TEMPLATES: 
200     if Struct.kvers in self.__class__.TEMPLATES[Struct.arch]: 
201      self.__class__.template = 
self.__class__.TEMPLATES[Struct.arch][Struct.kvers] 
202     else: 
203      stderr.write("ERROR %s has no template for x%d Darwin %d.x.\n" 
%(self.__class__.__name__, Struct.arch, Struct.kvers)) 
204      sys.exit()  
205    else: 
206     stderr.write("ERROR %s does not support %s architecture.\n" 
%(self.__class__.__name__, str(Struct.arch))) 
207     sys.exit() 
208     
209    # set size of the structure by iterating over template 
210    for item in self.__class__.template.values(): 
211     if ( item[1] + item[2] ) > self.__class__.ssize: 
212      self.__class__.ssize = item[1] + item[2] 
213       
214   if self.validaddr(addr): 
215    self.smem = Struct.mem.read(addr, self.__class__.ssize); 
216   else: 
217    stderr.write("ERROR instance of %s failed to construct with address 
%.8x.\n" %(self.__class__.__name__, addr)) 
218     
219 # Cnode --> Filefork 
220 class Filefork(Struct): 
221   
222  TEMPLATES = { 
223   32:{ 
224    10:{'ff_data':('struct 
cat_fork',16,96,'',{'cf_size':('off_t',16,8,'SIZE/OFF(LINK)')})} 
225    , 11:{'ff_data':('struct 
cat_fork',16,96,'',{'cf_size':('off_t',16,8,'SIZE/OFF(LINK)')})} 
226   }, 
227   64:{ 
228    10:{'ff_data':('struct 
cat_fork',32,96,'',{'cf_size':('off_t',32,8,'SIZE/OFF(LINK)')})} 
229    , 11:{'ff_data':('struct 
cat_fork',32,96,'',{'cf_size':('off_t',32,8,'SIZE/OFF(LINK)')})} 
230   } 
231  } 
232  
233  def __init__(self, addr): 
234   super(Filefork, self).__init__(addr) 
235    
236  def getoff(self): 
237   return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['ff_data'][4]['cf_size'], INT) 
238  
239 # Vnode --> Cnode 
240 class Cnode(Struct): 
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241  
242  TEMPLATES = { 
243   32:{ 
244    10:{'c_desc':('struct 
cat_desc',68,20,'',{'cd_cnid':('cnid_t',80,4,'NODE')}),'c_attr':('struct 
cat_attr',88,92,'',{'ca_fileid':('cnid_t',88,4,'NODE'),'ca_union2':('union',140,4,'entries
->SIZE/OFF(dir)')}),'c_datafork':('struct filefork *',204,4,'->datafork')} 
245    , 11:{'c_desc':('struct 
cat_desc',72,20,'',{'cd_cnid':('cnid_t',84,4,'NODE')}),'c_attr':('struct 
cat_attr',92,92,'',{'ca_fileid':('cnid_t',92,4,'NODE'),'ca_union2':('union',144,4,'entries
->SIZE/OFF(dir)')}),'c_datafork':('struct filefork *',208,4,'->datafork')} 
246   }, 
247   64:{ 
248    10:{'c_desc':('struct 
cat_desc',104,24,'',{'cd_cnid':('cnid_t',116,4,'NODE')}),'c_attr':('struct 
cat_attr',128,120,'',{'ca_fileid':('cnid_t',128,4,'NODE'),'ca_union2':('union',204,4,'entr
ies->SIZE/OFF(dir)')}),'c_datafork':('struct filefork *',288,8,'->datafork')} 
249    , 11:{'c_desc':('struct 
cat_desc',112,24,'',{'cd_cnid':('cnid_t',124,4,'NODE')}),'c_attr':('struct 
cat_attr',136,120,'',{'ca_fileid':('cnid_t',136,4,'NODE'),'ca_union2':('union',212,4,'entr
ies->SIZE/OFF(dir)')}),'c_datafork':('struct filefork *',296,8,'->datafork')} 
250   } 
251  } 
252  
253  def __init__(self, addr): 
254   super(Cnode, self).__init__(addr) 
255    
256  def getnode(self): 
257   return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['c_desc'][4]['cd_cnid'], INT) 
258    
259  def getentries(self):  # used to calculate size for DIR files 
260   return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['c_attr'][4]['ca_union2'], INT) 
261    
262  def getoff(self):   # returns the size for LINK files 
263   datafork_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['c_datafork'], INT) 
264   datafork = Filefork(datafork_ptr) 
265   return datafork.getoff() 
266  
267 # Vnode --> Devnode 
268 class Devnode(Struct): 
269  
270  TEMPLATES = { 
271   32:{ 
272    10:{'dn_ino':('ino_t',112,4,'NODE(CHR)')} 
273    , 11:{'dn_ino':('ino_t',112,4,'NODE(CHR)')} 
274   }, 
275   64:{ 
276    10:{'dn_ino':('ino_t',192,8,'NODE(CHR)')} 
277    , 11:{'dn_ino':('ino_t',192,8,'NODE(CHR)')} 
278   } 
279  } 
280  
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281  def __init__(self, addr): 
282   super(Devnode, self).__init__(addr) 
283    
284  def getnode(self): 
285   return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['dn_ino'], INT) 
286  
287 # Vnode --> Specinfo 
288 class Specinfo(Struct): 
289  
290  TEMPLATES = { 
291   32:{ 
292    10:{'si_rdev':('dev_t',12,4,'->DEVICE(CHR)')} 
293    , 11:{'si_rdev':('dev_t',12,4,'->DEVICE(CHR)')} 
294   }, 
295   64:{ 
296    10:{'si_rdev':('dev_t',24,4,'->DEVICE(CHR)')} 
297    , 11:{'si_rdev':('dev_t',24,4,'->DEVICE(CHR)')} 
298   } 
299  } 
300  
301  def __init__(self, addr): 
302   super(Specinfo, self).__init__(addr) 
303    
304  def getdev(self): 
305   dev_t = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['si_rdev'], INT) 
306   return dev_decode(dev_t) 
307     
308 # Vnode --> Ubcinfo 
309 class Ubcinfo(Struct): 
310   
311  TEMPLATES = { 
312   32:{ 
313    10:{'ui_size':('off_t',20,8,'SIZE/OFF(REG)')} 
314    , 11:{'ui_size':('off_t',20,8,'SIZE/OFF(REG)')} 
315   }, 
316   64:{ # NOTE: 10.6/7x64 offset for ui_size edited manually 32 --> 40 
317    10:{'ui_size':('off_t',40,8,'SIZE/OFF(REG)')} 
318    , 11:{'ui_size':('off_t',40,8,'SIZE/OFF(REG)')} 
319   } 
320  } 
321  
322  def __init__(self, addr): 
323   super(Ubcinfo, self).__init__(addr) 
324    
325  def getoff(self): 
326   return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['ui_size'], INT) 
327    
328 # Vnode --> Mount 
329 class Mount(Struct): 
330  
331  TEMPLATES = { 
332   32:{ 
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333    10:{'mnt_vfsstat':('struct 
vfsstatfs',76,2152,'',{'f_fsid':('fsid_t',132,8,'',{'val[0]':('int32_t',132,4,'-
>DEVICE'),'val[1]':('int32_t',136,4,'')}),'f_mntonname':('char[]',168,1024,'->NAME')})} 
334    , 11:{'mnt_vfsstat':('struct 
vfsstatfs',76,2152,'',{'f_fsid':('fsid_t',132,8,'',{'val[0]':('int32_t',132,4,'-
>DEVICE'),'val[1]':('int32_t',136,4,'')}),'f_mntonname':('char[]',168,1024,'->NAME')})} 
335   }, 
336   64:{ 
337    10:{'mnt_vfsstat':('struct 
vfsstatfs',136,2164,'',{'f_fsid':('fsid_t',196,8,'',{'val[0]':('int32_t',196,4,'-
>DEVICE'),'val[1]':('int32_t',200,4,'')}),'f_mntonname':('char[]',232,1024,'->NAME')})} 
338    , 11:{'mnt_vfsstat':('struct 
vfsstatfs',132,2164,'',{'f_fsid':('fsid_t',192,8,'',{'val[0]':('int32_t',192,4,'-
>DEVICE'),'val[1]':('int32_t',196,4,'')}),'f_mntonname':('char[]',228,1024,'->NAME')})} 
339   } 
340  } 
341  
342  def __init__(self, addr): 
343   super(Mount, self).__init__(addr) 
344    
345  def getmount(self): 
346   return unpacktype(self.smem, Mount.template['mnt_vfsstat'][4]['f_mntonname'], 
STR).split('\x00', 1)[0].strip('\x00') 
347    
348  def getdev(self): 
349   dev_t = unpacktype(self.smem, 
Mount.template['mnt_vfsstat'][4]['f_fsid'][4]['val[0]'], INT) 
350   return dev_decode(dev_t) 
351  
352 # Proc     --> Vnode (exe) 
353 # Filesesc --> Vnode (cwd) 
354 # Fileglob --> Vnode 
355 # Vnode    --> Vnode (parent) 
356 class Vnode(Struct): 
357   
358  TEMPLATES = { 
359   32:{ 
360   
 10:{'v_type':('uint16_t',68,2,'TYPE(vnode)'),'v_tag':('uint16_t',70,2,'vfs-
type'),'v_un':('union',76,4,'->ubc_info/specinfo'),'v_name':('const char 
*',116,4,'NAME'),'v_parent':('vnode_t',120,4,'-
>vnode(parent)'),'v_mount':('mount_t',136,4,'->mount'),'v_data':('void *',140,4,'-
>cnode/devnode')} 
361    , 
11:{'v_type':('uint16_t',64,2,'TYPE(vnode)'),'v_tag':('uint16_t',66,2,'vfs-
type'),'v_un':('union',72,4,'->ubc_info/specinfo'),'v_name':('const char 
*',112,4,'NAME'),'v_parent':('vnode_t',116,4,'-
>vnode(parent)'),'v_mount':('mount_t',132,4,'->mount'),'v_data':('void *',136,4,'-
>cnode/devnode')} 
362   }, 
363   64:{ 
364   
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 10:{'v_type':('uint16_t',112,2,'TYPE(vnode)'),'v_tag':('uint16_t',114,2,'vfs-
type'),'v_un':('union',120,8,'->ubc_info/specinfo'),'v_name':('const char 
*',184,8,'NAME'),'v_parent':('vnode_t',192,8,'-
>vnode(parent)'),'v_mount':('mount_t',224,8,'->mount'),'v_data':('void *',232,8,'-
>cnode/devnode')} 
365    , 
11:{'v_type':('uint16_t',104,2,'TYPE(vnode)'),'v_tag':('uint16_t',106,2,'vfs-
type'),'v_un':('union',112,8,'->ubc_info/specinfo'),'v_name':('const char 
*',176,8,'NAME'),'v_parent':('vnode_t',184,8,'-
>vnode(parent)'),'v_mount':('mount_t',216,8,'->mount'),'v_data':('void *',224,8,'-
>cnode/devnode')} 
366   } 
367  } 
368   
369  # NOTE 1: type LINK below is called just "LNK" in the source but lsof uses "LINK" 
370  # NOTE 2: 10.7 version of lsof appears to be broken for LINK types, it outputs the 
371  #         undocumented type "0012" instead 
372  # NOTE 3: these static lists defined in bsd/sys/vnode.h but modified for printing 
373  VNODE_TYPE = ["NON", "REG", "DIR", "BLK", "CHR", "LINK", "SOCK", "FIFO", "BAD", 
"STR", "CPLX"] 
374  VNODE_TAG = ['NON', 'UFS', 'NFS', 'MFS', 'MSDOSFS', 'LFS', 'LOFS', 'FDESC', 
'PORTAL', 'NULL', 'UMAP', 'KERNFS', 'PROCFS', 'AFS', 'ISOFS', 'UNION', 'HFS', 'ZFS', 
'DEVFS', 'WEBDAV', 'UDF', 'AFP', 'CDDA', 'CIFS', 'OTHER'] 
375   
376  def __init__(self, addr): 
377   super(Vnode, self).__init__(addr) 
378   self.vtype = None 
379   self.tag  = None 
380   self.xnode = None # cnode, devnode 
381   self.mount = None 
382    
383  def getnode(self): 
384   
385   if self.xnode == None: 
386    x_node_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_data'], INT) 
387   
388    if self.tag == None: 
389     self.tag = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_tag'], SHT) 
390     
391    if self.tag == 16:  # VT_HFS 
392     self.xnode = Cnode(x_node_ptr) 
393  
394    elif self.tag == 18: # VT_DEVFS 
395     self.xnode = Devnode(x_node_ptr) 
396        
397    else: 
398     if self.tag < len(Vnode.VNODE_TAG): 
399      s_tag = Vnode.VNODE_TAG[self.tag] 
400     else: 
401      s_tag = str(self.tag) 
402     stderr.write("WARNING Vnode.getnode(): unsupported FS tag %s, 
returning %d.\n" %(s_tag, ECODE['node'])) 
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403     return ECODE['node'] 
404      
405   return self.xnode.getnode() 
406   
407  def getname(self): 
408   name_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_name'], INT) 
409    
410   if name_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(name_ptr)): 
411    return None 
412     
413   # NOTE: this may be trouble for the 255 UTF-16 filename characters HFS+ allows 
414   name_addr = Struct.mem.read(name_ptr, 255) 
415   name = struct.unpack('255s', name_addr)[0] 
416   return name.split('\x00', 1)[0].strip('\x00') 
417    
418  def getparent(self): 
419   parent_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_parent'], INT) 
420    
421   if parent_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(parent_ptr)): 
422    return None 
423   return parent_ptr 
424    
425  def getdev(self): 
426   
427   if self.tag == None: 
428    self.tag = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_tag'], SHT) 
429   
430   if self.tag == 18: # CHR 
431    vu_specinfo = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_un'], INT) 
432     
433    # this pointer is invalid for /dev (special case DIR using VT_DEVFS) 
434    if not(vu_specinfo == 0) and Struct.mem.is_valid_address(vu_specinfo): 
435     specinfo = Specinfo(vu_specinfo) 
436     return specinfo.getdev() 
437     
438   # default return for REG/DIR/LINK 
439   if self.mount == None: 
440    mount_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_mount'], INT) 
441     
442    if mount_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(mount_ptr)): 
443     stderr.write("WARNING Vnode.getdev(): v_mount pointer invalid, 
returning %d.\n" %ECODE['device']) 
444     return ECODE['device'] 
445  
446    self.mount = Mount(mount_ptr) 
447  
448   return self.mount.getdev() 
449   
450  def getpath(self): 
451   path  = "" 
452   mntonname = "" 
453   parent  = self 
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454    
455   if self.tag == None: 
456    self.tag = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_tag'], SHT) 
457     
458   if self.mount == None: 
459    mount_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_mount'], INT) 
460     
461    if mount_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(mount_ptr)): 
462     stderr.write("WARNING Vnode.getpath(): v_mount pointer invalid, 
returning %d.\n" %ECODE['name']) 
463     mntonname = str(ECODE['name']) 
464      
465    else: 
466     self.mount = Mount(mount_ptr) 
467      
468   if self.mount != None: 
469    mntonname = self.mount.getmount() 
470     
471   while True: 
472    parent_ptr = parent.getparent() 
473    if parent_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(parent_ptr)): 
474     break 
475    
476    name = parent.getname() 
477    if name == None: 
478     break 
479      
480    path = name + "/" + path 
481    parent = Vnode(parent_ptr) 
482    
483   if len(path) < 2:     # file is root 
484    return mntonname     
485     
486   if len(mntonname) == 1:    # mount is root, delete trailing slash 
487    return mntonname + path[:-1] 
488    
489   return mntonname + "/" + path[:-1] # mount + path, delete trailing slash 
490    
491  def gettype(self): 
492   
493   if self.vtype == None: 
494    self.vtype = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_type'], SHT) 
495     
496   if self.vtype < len(Vnode.VNODE_TYPE): 
497    return Vnode.VNODE_TYPE[self.vtype] 
498    
499   return -1 # check for this in the Vnode_pager validation 
500    
501  def getoff(self, fileglob_offset): 
502   
503   if self.vtype == None: 
504    self.vtype = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_type'], SHT) 
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505   if self.tag == None: 
506    self.tag = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_tag'], SHT) 
507    
508   # NOTE: UBC information not valid for vnodes marked as VSYSTEM 
509   if self.vtype == 1:   # REG 
510    ubcinfo_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_un'], INT) 
511     
512    if ubcinfo_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(ubcinfo_ptr)): 
513     stderr.write("WARNING Vnode.getoff(): v_un pointer invalid, returning 
%d.\n" %(ECODE['size'])) 
514     return ECODE['size'] 
515      
516    ubcinfo = Ubcinfo(ubcinfo_ptr) 
517    return ubcinfo.getoff() 
518     
519   elif self.tag == 16:  # VT_HFS 
520    if self.xnode == None: 
521     x_node_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['v_data'], INT) 
522     self.xnode = Cnode(x_node_ptr) 
523      
524    if self.vtype == 2:  # DIR 
525     entries = self.xnode.getentries() 
526     return (entries + 2) * 34 # AVERAGE_HFSDIRENTRY_SIZE: bsd/hfs/hfs.h 
527      
528    elif self.vtype == 5: # LINK 
529     return self.xnode.getoff() 
530      
531    elif self.vtype == 7: # FIFO 
532     return "0t%i" %fileglob_offset 
533      
534   elif self.tag == 18:  # VT_DEVFS 
535    if self.vtype == 4:  # CHR 
536     return "0t%i" %fileglob_offset 
537      
538    elif self.vtype == 2: # /dev 
539     return "-1"   # not returning ECODE because this 
deficiency known 
540     
541   if self.tag < len(Vnode.VNODE_TAG): 
542    s_tag = Vnode.VNODE_TAG[self.tag] 
543   else: 
544    s_tag = str(self.tag) 
545   if self.vtype < len(Vnode.VNODE_TYPE): 
546    s_type = Vnode.VNODE_TYPE[self.vtype] 
547   else: 
548    s_type = str(self.vtype)  
549   stderr.write("WARNING Vnode.getoff(): unsupported type %s, tag %s. Returning 
%d.\n" %(s_type, s_tag, ECODE['size'])) 
550   return ECODE['size'] 
551    
552 # Fileproc --> Fileglob 
553 class Fileglob(Struct): 
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554  
555  TEMPLATES = { 
556   32:{ 
557   
 10:{'fg_flag':('int32_t',16,4,'MODE'),'fg_type':('file_type_t',20,4,'FTYPE'),'fg_off
set':('off_t',40,8,'SIZE/OFF'),'fg_data':('caddr_t',48,4,'->vnode')} 
558    , 
11:{'fg_flag':('int32_t',16,4,'MODE'),'fg_type':('file_type_t',20,4,'FTYPE'),'fg_offset':(
'off_t',40,8,'SIZE/OFF'),'fg_data':('caddr_t',48,4,'->vnode')} 
559   }, 
560   64:{ 
561   
 10:{'fg_flag':('int32_t',32,4,'MODE'),'fg_type':('file_type_t',36,4,'FTYPE'),'fg_off
set':('off_t',64,8,'SIZE/OFF'),'fg_data':('caddr_t',72,8,'->vnode')} 
562    , 
11:{'fg_flag':('int32_t',32,4,'MODE'),'fg_type':('file_type_t',36,4,'FTYPE'),'fg_offset':(
'off_t',64,8,'SIZE/OFF'),'fg_data':('caddr_t',72,8,'->vnode')} 
563   } 
564  } 
565   
566  # global defined in bsd/sys/file_internal.h but modified to match lsof output 
567  FILE_TYPE = ["-1", "VNODE", "SOCKET", "PSXSHM", "PSXSEM", "KQUEUE", "PIPE", 
"FSEVENT"] 
568  MODE      = ["  ", "r ", "w ", "u "] 
569   
570  def __init__(self, addr): 
571   super(Fileglob, self).__init__(addr) 
572   self.ftype = None 
573    
574  def getmode(self, fd): 
575   self.ftype = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['fg_type'], INT) 
576   filemode = "  " 
577   
578   # NOTE: in limited lsof testing types known to include file mode reporting are: 
579   #       VNODE, SOCKET, PSXSHM, PSXSEM, and KQUEUE. Others do not append any 
580   #       character to the FD identifier. 
581   if self.ftype in xrange(1,6): 
582    flag = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['fg_flag'], INT) 
583    filemode = Fileglob.MODE[flag & 3] 
584  
585   return str(fd)+filemode 
586    
587  def gettype(self): 
588   
589   if self.ftype == None: 
590    self.ftype = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['fg_type'], INT) 
591     
592   if self.ftype < 0 or self.ftype > ( len(Fileglob.FILE_TYPE) -1 ): 
593    stderr.write("WARNING Fileglob.gettype(): unknown file type %d, excluding 
this result.\n" %self.ftype) 
594    return -1  # check for this in the getfilelistbyproc() 
595     
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596   return Fileglob.FILE_TYPE[self.ftype] 
597    
598  def getoff(self): 
599   return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['fg_offset'], INT) 
600    
601  def getdata(self): 
602   data_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['fg_data'], INT) 
603    
604   if self.validaddr(data_ptr): 
605    return data_ptr 
606   return None 
607    
608 # Filedesc --> Fileproc 
609 class Fileproc(Struct): 
610  
611  TEMPLATES = { 
612   32:{ 
613    10:{'f_fglob':('struct fileglob *',8,4,'->fileglob')} 
614    , 11:{'f_fglob':('struct fileglob *',8,4,'->fileglob')} 
615   }, 
616   64:{ 
617    10:{'f_fglob':('struct fileglob *',8,8,'->fileglob')} 
618    , 11:{'f_fglob':('struct fileglob *',8,8,'->fileglob')} 
619   } 
620  } 
621   
622  def __init__(self, addr): 
623   super(Fileproc, self).__init__(addr) 
624    
625  def getfglob(self): 
626   fileglob_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['f_fglob'], INT) 
627    
628   if self.validaddr(fileglob_ptr): 
629    return fileglob_ptr 
630   return None 
631  
632 # Proc --> Filedesc 
633 class Filedesc(Struct): 
634   
635  TEMPLATES = { 
636   32:{ 
637    10:{'fd_ofiles':('struct fileproc **',0,4,'-
>fileproc[]'),'fd_cdir':('struct vnode *',8,4,'->CWD'),'fd_lastfile':('int',20,4,'-
>fileproc[LAST_INDEX]')} 
638    , 11:{'fd_ofiles':('struct fileproc **',0,4,'-
>fileproc[]'),'fd_cdir':('struct vnode *',8,4,'->CWD'),'fd_lastfile':('int',20,4,'-
>fileproc[LAST_INDEX]')} 
639   }, 
640   64:{ 
641    10:{'fd_ofiles':('struct fileproc **',0,8,'-
>fileproc[]'),'fd_cdir':('struct vnode *',16,8,'->CWD'),'fd_lastfile':('int',36,4,'-
>fileproc[LAST_INDEX]')} 
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642    , 11:{'fd_ofiles':('struct fileproc **',0,8,'-
>fileproc[]'),'fd_cdir':('struct vnode *',16,8,'->CWD'),'fd_lastfile':('int',36,4,'-
>fileproc[LAST_INDEX]')} 
643   } 
644  } 
645   
646  def __init__(self, addr): 
647   super(Filedesc, self).__init__(addr) 
648   
649  def getcwd(self): 
650   cwd_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['fd_cdir'], INT) 
651   if self.validaddr(cwd_ptr): 
652    return cwd_ptr 
653   return None 
654    
655  def getfglobs(self): 
656   
657   # sometimes the fd is valid, but this array address is not (e.g. kernel_task) 
658   ofiles_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, Filedesc.template['fd_ofiles'], INT) 
659   if ofiles_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(ofiles_ptr)): 
660    return None 
661    
662   # construct a list of addresses from the fd_ofiles array 
663   fd_lastfile = unpacktype(self.smem, Filedesc.template['fd_lastfile'], INT) 
664   ptr_size = 4 if (Struct.arch == 32) else 8 
665   fmt   = 'I' if (Struct.arch == 32) else 'Q' 
666   fglobs  = {} 
667   for i in xrange(fd_lastfile+1): 
668    
669    # **fd_ofiles is an array of pointers, read address at index i 
670    fileproc_ptr = Struct.mem.read(ofiles_ptr+(i*ptr_size), ptr_size) 
671    fileproc_addr = struct.unpack(fmt, fileproc_ptr)[0] 
672    
673    # not every index points to a valid file 
674    if fileproc_addr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(fileproc_addr)): 
675     continue 
676      
677    fileproc = Fileproc(fileproc_addr) 
678    fileglob_ptr = fileproc.getfglob() 
679     
680    if fileglob_ptr != None: 
681     fglobs[i] = fileglob_ptr 
682     
683   return fglobs 
684  
685 # Vm_object --> Vnode_pager 
686 class Vnode_pager(Struct): 
687  
688  TEMPLATES = { 
689   32:{ 
690    10:{'vnode_handle':('struct vnode *',16,4,'->txt')} 
691    , 11:{'vnode_handle':('struct vnode *',16,4,'->txt')} 
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692   }, 
693   64:{ # NOTE: 10.6/7x64 offset for vnode_pager edited manually 24 --> 32 
694    10:{'vnode_handle':('struct vnode *',32,8,'->txt')} 
695    , 11:{'vnode_handle':('struct vnode *',32,8,'->txt')} 
696   } 
697  } 
698  
699  def __init__(self, addr): 
700   super(Vnode_pager, self).__init__(addr) 
701   
702  def gettxt(self): 
703   txt_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['vnode_handle'], INT) 
704    
705   # self may not actually be a vnode pager (there are other valid types), need to 
706   # run several tests without generating warnings to be sure. 
707   if txt_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(txt_ptr)): 
708    return None 
709    
710   # this pointer test ensures the target memory matches the vnode template 
711   vnode = Vnode(txt_ptr) 
712   if vnode.gettype() == -1 or vnode.getname() == None: 
713    return None 
714    
715   # return the pointer rather than vnode because duplicates will occur as a 
result 
716   # of recursive calls in Vm_object 
717   return txt_ptr 
718  
719 # Vm_map_entry --> Vm_object 
720 class Vm_object(Struct): 
721  
722  TEMPLATES = { 
723   32:{ 
724    10:{'memq':('queue_head_t',0,8,'',{'next':('struct queue_entry 
*',4,4,'type test(vm_object)'),'prev':('struct queue_entry *',0,4,'type 
test(vm_object)')}),'shadow':('struct vm_object *',52,4,'-
>vm_object(recurse)'),'pager':('memory_object_t',64,4,'->pager')} 
725    , 11:{'memq':('queue_head_t',0,8,'',{'next':('struct queue_entry 
*',4,4,'type test(vm_object)'),'prev':('struct queue_entry *',0,4,'type 
test(vm_object)')}),'shadow':('struct vm_object *',52,4,'-
>vm_object(recurse)'),'pager':('memory_object_t',64,4,'->pager')} 
726   }, 
727   64:{ 
728    10:{'memq':('queue_head_t',0,16,'',{'next':('struct queue_entry 
*',8,8,'type test(vm_object)'),'prev':('struct queue_entry *',0,8,'type 
test(vm_object)')}),'shadow':('struct vm_object *',72,8,'-
>vm_object(recurse)'),'pager':('memory_object_t',88,8,'->pager')} 
729    , 11:{'memq':('queue_head_t',0,16,'',{'next':('struct queue_entry 
*',8,8,'type test(vm_object)'),'prev':('struct queue_entry *',0,8,'type 
test(vm_object)')}),'shadow':('struct vm_object *',72,8,'-
>vm_object(recurse)'),'pager':('memory_object_t',88,8,'->pager')} 
730   } 
  
140 
731  } 
732  
733  def __init__(self, addr): 
734   super(Vm_object, self).__init__(addr) 
735   self.map = None 
736    
737   # this test determines wether self matches the struct vm_object template, or 
the 
738   # vm_map template. 
739   ptr1 = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['memq'][4]['next'], INT) 
740   ptr2 = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['memq'][4]['prev'], INT) 
741   if ptr1 == 0 or ptr2 == 0 \ 
742    or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(ptr1)) \ 
743    or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(ptr2)): 
744     
745     # on failure, create map instance to be called recursively 
746     self.map = Vm_map(addr) 
747  
748  def gettxt(self): 
749   
750   # recurse on vm_map type 
751   if self.map != None: 
752    return self.map.gettxt() 
753   
754   pager_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['pager'], INT) 
755    
756   # objects for memory-mapped files keep the pager in the shadow object rather 
757   # than the original, this test determines which self is. 
758   if pager_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(pager_ptr)): 
759     
760    shadow_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['shadow'], INT) 
761    if shadow_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(shadow_ptr)): 
762     return [] # Vm_map expects an empty list, never None 
763      
764    # make recursive call on shadow object 
765    shadow = Vm_object(shadow_ptr) 
766    return shadow.gettxt() 
767     
768   # the default case here wraps the return in a list for compatibility with the 
769   # recursive map case. 
770   pager = Vnode_pager(pager_ptr) 
771   return [ pager.gettxt() ]  # NOTE: this may return [ None ] without error 
772  
773 # Vm_map_entry --> Vm_map_entry 
774 # Vm_map       --> Vm_map_entry 
775 class Vm_map_entry(Struct): 
776  
777  TEMPLATES = { 
778   32:{ 
779    10:{'links':('struct vm_map_links',0,24,'',{'prev':('struct vm_map_entry 
*',0,4,''),'next':('struct vm_map_entry *',4,4,'->vm_map_entry')}),'object':('union 
vm_map_object',24,4,'->vm_object')} 
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780    , 11:{'links':('struct vm_map_links',0,24,'',{'prev':('struct vm_map_entry 
*',0,4,''),'next':('struct vm_map_entry *',4,4,'->vm_map_entry')}),'object':('union 
vm_map_object',36,4,'->vm_object')} 
781   }, 
782   64:{ 
783    10:{'links':('struct vm_map_links',0,32,'',{'prev':('struct vm_map_entry 
*',0,8,''),'next':('struct vm_map_entry *',8,8,'->vm_map_entry')}),'object':('union 
vm_map_object',32,8,'->vm_object')} 
784    , 11:{'links':('struct vm_map_links',0,32,'',{'prev':('struct vm_map_entry 
*',0,8,''),'next':('struct vm_map_entry *',8,8,'->vm_map_entry')}),'object':('union 
vm_map_object',56,8,'->vm_object')} 
785   } 
786  } 
787  
788  def __init__(self, addr): 
789   super(Vm_map_entry, self).__init__(addr) 
790  
791  def getnext(self): 
792   return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['links'][4]['next'], INT) 
793   
794  def gettxt(self): 
795   vmobject_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['object'], INT) 
796    
797   # some entries lack an object, check manually to prevent error 
798   if vmobject_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(vmobject_ptr)): 
799    return [] # Vm_map expects an empty list, never None 
800     
801   vm_object = Vm_object(vmobject_ptr) 
802   return vm_object.gettxt() 
803    
804 # Vm_object --> Vm_map 
805 # Task      --> Vm_map 
806 class Vm_map(Struct): 
807  
808  TEMPLATES = { 
809   32:{ 
810    10:{'hdr':('struct vm_map_header',12,32,'',{'links':('struct 
vm_map_links',12,24,'',{'prev':('struct vm_map_entry *',12,4,''),'next':('struct 
vm_map_entry *',16,4,'->vm_map_entry')}),'nentries':('int',36,4,'no. nodes')})} 
811    , 11:{'hdr':('struct vm_map_header',12,44,'',{'links':('struct 
vm_map_links',12,24,'',{'prev':('struct vm_map_entry *',12,4,''),'next':('struct 
vm_map_entry *',16,4,'->vm_map_entry')}),'nentries':('int',36,4,'no. nodes')})} 
812   }, 
813   64:{ 
814    10:{'hdr':('struct vm_map_header',16,40,'',{'links':('struct 
vm_map_links',16,32,'',{'prev':('struct vm_map_entry *',16,8,''),'next':('struct 
vm_map_entry *',24,8,'->vm_map_entry')}),'nentries':('int',48,4,'no. nodes')})} 
815    , 11:{'hdr':('struct vm_map_header',16,56,'',{'links':('struct 
vm_map_links',16,32,'',{'prev':('struct vm_map_entry *',16,8,''),'next':('struct 
vm_map_entry *',24,8,'->vm_map_entry')}),'nentries':('int',48,4,'no. nodes')})} 
816   } 
817  } 
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818  
819  def __init__(self, addr): 
820   super(Vm_map, self).__init__(addr) 
821  
822  def gettxt(self): 
823   vmmapentry_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, 
self.template['hdr'][4]['links'][4]['next'], INT) 
824   nentries = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['hdr'][4]['nentries'], INT) 
825   ret_ptrs = [] 
826    
827   # iterate over map entries in the linked-list and collect any backing vnode 
ptrs 
828   for i in xrange(nentries): 
829  
830    if self.validaddr(vmmapentry_ptr): 
831     vm_map_entry = Vm_map_entry(vmmapentry_ptr) 
832     txt_ptrs = vm_map_entry.gettxt() 
833      
834     for txt_ptr in txt_ptrs: 
835      
836      # filter duplicates and check for null returns 
837      if txt_ptr != None and not(txt_ptr in ret_ptrs): 
838       ret_ptrs.append(txt_ptr) 
839      
840    vmmapentry_ptr = vm_map_entry.getnext() 
841    
842   # unique list of verified vnode pointers 
843   return ret_ptrs 
844  
845 # Proc --> Task 
846 class Task(Struct): 
847  
848  TEMPLATES = { 
849   32:{ 
850    10:{'map':('vm_map_t',24,4,'->vm_map')} 
851    , 11:{'map':('vm_map_t',20,4,'->vm_map')} 
852   }, 
853   64:{  
854    10:{'map':('vm_map_t',40,8,'->vm_map'),} # NOTE: 10.6x64 offset for vm_map 
edited manually 36 --> 40 
855    , 11:{'map':('vm_map_t',32,8,'->vm_map')} # NOTE: 10.7x64 offset for vm_map 
edited manually 28 --> 32 
856   } 
857  } 
858  
859  def __init__(self, addr): 
860   super(Task, self).__init__(addr) 
861  
862  def gettxt(self): 
863   vmmap_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['map'], INT) 
864    
865   if self.validaddr(vmmap_ptr): 
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866    vm_map = Vm_map(vmmap_ptr) 
867    return vm_map.gettxt() 
868  
869   return None 
870    
871 # Pgrp --> Session 
872 class Session(Struct): 
873  
874  TEMPLATES = { 
875   32:{ 
876    10:{'s_login':('char[]',28,255,'USER')} 
877    , 11:{'s_login':('char[]',28,255,'USER')} 
878   }, 
879   64:{ 
880    10:{'s_login':('char[]',48,255,'USER')} 
881    , 11:{'s_login':('char[]',48,255,'USER')} 
882   } 
883  } 
884   
885  def __init__(self, addr): 
886   super(Session, self).__init__(addr) 
887    
888  def getuser(self): 
889   return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['s_login'], STR).split('\x00', 
1)[0].strip('\x00') 
890   
891 # Proc --> Pgrp 
892 class Pgrp(Struct): 
893  
894  TEMPLATES = { 
895   32:{ 
896    10:{'pg_session':('struct session *',12,4,'->session')} 
897    , 11:{'pg_session':('struct session *',12,4,'->session')} 
898   }, 
899   64:{ 
900    10:{'pg_session':('struct session *',24,8,'->session')} 
901    , 11:{'pg_session':('struct session *',24,8,'->session')} 
902   } 
903  } 
904  
905  def __init__(self, addr): 
906   super(Pgrp, self).__init__(addr) 
907  
908  # skipped the full validator here because pg_session is the only pointer/target 
909  def getuser(self): 
910   session_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['pg_session'], INT) 
911    
912   if self.validaddr(session_ptr): 
913    session = Session(session_ptr) 
914    return session.getuser() 
915     
916   return None 
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917  
918 # _kernproc --> Proc 
919 class Proc(Struct): 
920  
921  TEMPLATES = { 
922   32:{ 
923    10:{'p_list':('LIST_ENTRY(proc)',0,8,'',{'le_next':('struct proc 
*',0,4,''),'le_prev':('struct proc **',4,4,'-
>next')}),'p_pid':('pid_t',8,4,'PID'),'task':('void *',12,4,'->task'),'p_fd':('struct 
filedesc *',104,4,'->filedesc'),'p_textvp':('struct vnode *',388,4,'-
>proc(exe)'),'p_comm':('char[]',420,17,'COMMAND'),'p_pgrp':('struct pgrp *',472,4,'-
>pgrp')} 
924    , 11:{'p_list':('LIST_ENTRY(proc)',0,8,'',{'le_next':('struct proc 
*',0,4,''),'le_prev':('struct proc **',4,4,'-
>next')}),'p_pid':('pid_t',8,4,'PID'),'task':('void *',12,4,'->task'),'p_fd':('struct 
filedesc *',128,4,'->filedesc'),'p_textvp':('struct vnode *',412,4,'-
>proc(exe)'),'p_comm':('char[]',444,17,'COMMAND'),'p_pgrp':('struct pgrp *',496,4,'-
>pgrp')} 
925   }, 
926   64:{ 
927    10:{'p_list':('LIST_ENTRY(proc)',0,16,'',{'le_next':('struct proc 
*',0,8,''),'le_prev':('struct proc **',8,8,'-
>next')}),'p_pid':('pid_t',16,4,'PID'),'task':('void *',24,8,'->task'),'p_fd':('struct 
filedesc *',200,8,'->filedesc'),'p_textvp':('struct vnode *',664,8,'-
>proc(exe)'),'p_comm':('char[]',700,17,'COMMAND'),'p_pgrp':('struct pgrp *',752,8,'-
>pgrp')} 
928    , 11:{'p_list':('LIST_ENTRY(proc)',0,16,'',{'le_next':('struct proc 
*',0,8,''),'le_prev':('struct proc **',8,8,'-
>next')}),'p_pid':('pid_t',16,4,'PID'),'task':('void *',24,8,'->task'),'p_fd':('struct 
filedesc *',216,8,'->filedesc'),'p_textvp':('struct vnode *',680,8,'-
>proc(exe)'),'p_comm':('char[]',716,17,'COMMAND'),'p_pgrp':('struct pgrp *',768,8,'-
>pgrp')} 
929   } 
930  } 
931   
932  head = None 
933   
934  def __init__(self, addr): 
935   super(Proc, self).__init__(addr) 
936    
937   if Proc.head == None: 
938    Proc.head = addr 
939     
940   self.self_ptr  = addr # store this for cycle detection by 
getfilelist() 
941   self.filedesc_ptr = None 
942   self.exe_ptr  = None 
943   self.pgrp_ptr  = None 
944   self.pid   = -1 
945     
946  def next(self): 
947   nxt_proc = unpacktype(self.smem, Proc.template['p_list'][4]['le_prev'], INT) 
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948    
949   if nxt_proc == Proc.head: 
950    stderr.write("ERROR %s.%s encountered a circular list.\n" 
%(self.__class__.__name__, sys._getframe().f_code.co_name)) 
951    return None 
952     
953   elif nxt_proc != 0 and Struct.mem.is_valid_address(nxt_proc): 
954    return Proc(nxt_proc) 
955    
956   return None 
957    
958  # this method has evolved to check ALL requisite proc structure pointers 
959  def valid(self): 
960    
961   # check *p_fd 
962   filedesc_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['p_fd'], INT) 
963   if filedesc_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(filedesc_ptr)): 
964    return False 
965    
966   # check *p_textvp 
967   exe_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['p_textvp'], INT) 
968   if exe_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(exe_ptr)): 
969    return False 
970    
971   # check *p_pgrp 
972   pgrp_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['p_pgrp'], INT) 
973   if pgrp_ptr == 0 or not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(pgrp_ptr)): 
974    return False 
975     
976   self.filedesc_ptr = filedesc_ptr 
977   self.exe_ptr    = exe_ptr 
978   self.pgrp_ptr  = pgrp_ptr 
979   return True 
980    
981  def setpid(self, pid): 
982   self.pid = unpacktype(self.smem, Proc.template['p_pid'], INT) 
983    
984   while self.pid != pid: 
985    nxt_proc = unpacktype(self.smem, Proc.template['p_list'][4]['le_prev'], 
INT) 
986     
987    if nxt_proc == Proc.head: 
988     stderr.write("ERROR %s.%s encountered a circular list.\n" 
%(self.__class__.__name__, sys._getframe().f_code.co_name)) 
989     return False 
990    elif nxt_proc != 0 and Struct.mem.is_valid_address(nxt_proc): 
991     self.smem = Struct.mem.read(nxt_proc, Proc.ssize); 
992     self.pid = unpacktype(self.smem, Proc.template['p_pid'], INT) 
993    else: 
994     return False 
995    
996   filedesc_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['p_fd'], INT) 
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997   if filedesc_ptr == 0: 
998    print "\nPID: %d (%s) has no open files." %(pid, self.getcmd()) 
999    sys.exit() 
1000   if not(Struct.mem.is_valid_address(filedesc_ptr)): 
1001    print "\nPID: %d (%s) has an invalid file descriptor." %(pid, 
self.getcmd()) 
1002    sys.exit() 
1003   if not self.valid(): 
1004    print "\tPID: %d appears in the in process list, but is not compatible 
with lsof." %pid 
1005    sys.exit() 
1006    
1007   return True 
1008    
1009  def getfd(self): 
1010   return self.filedesc_ptr 
1011    
1012  def getpid(self): 
1013   if self.pid < 0: 
1014    return unpacktype(self.smem, Proc.template['p_pid'], INT) 
1015   return self.pid 
1016    
1017  def getcmd(self): 
1018   return unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['p_comm'], STR).split('\x00', 
1)[0].replace(' ', '\\x20').strip('\x00') 
1019    
1020  def getuser(self): 
1021   pgrp = Pgrp(self.pgrp_ptr) 
1022   return pgrp.getuser() 
1023  
1024  def gettxt(self): 
1025   task_ptr = unpacktype(self.smem, self.template['task'], INT) 
1026   task = Task(task_ptr) 
1027   txt_ptrs = task.gettxt() 
1028    
1029   if not(self.exe_ptr in txt_ptrs): 
1030    txt_ptrs.append(self.exe_ptr) 
1031  
1032   return txt_ptrs 
1033  
1034 ################################### PRIVATE FUNCTIONS #################################### 
1035  
1036 # given a validated proc stucture, return a list of open files 
1037 def getfilelistbyproc(proc): 
1038   
1039  filedesc = Filedesc(proc.getfd()) 
1040  fglobs = filedesc.getfglobs() 
1041  filelist = [] 
1042   
1043  if fglobs == None: 
1044   return [] 
1045   
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1046  cwd = Vnode(filedesc.getcwd()) 
1047  if cwd: 
1048   filelist.append( (proc.getcmd(), proc.getpid(), proc.getuser(), "cwd  ", 
1049    cwd.gettype(), cwd.getdev(), cwd.getoff(-1), cwd.getnode(), cwd.getpath()) 
1050   ) 
1051    
1052  txt_ptrs = proc.gettxt() 
1053  for txt_ptr in txt_ptrs: 
1054   txt = Vnode(txt_ptr) 
1055   filelist.append( (proc.getcmd(), proc.getpid(), proc.getuser(), "txt  ", 
1056    txt.gettype(), txt.getdev(), txt.getoff(-1), txt.getnode(), txt.getpath()) 
1057   ) 
1058   
1059  # iterate over fileglob structures, note: items() is unsorted by default 
1060  for fd, fglob in sorted(fglobs.items()): 
1061   
1062   # this has been observed as an invalid pointer even when fileproc is not 
1063   if fglob == 0 or not Struct.mem.is_valid_address(fglob): 
1064    continue 
1065    
1066   fileglob = Fileglob(fglob) 
1067    
1068   # full support for VNODE (1) only, otherwise, just print ftype for verbose 
1069   ftype = fileglob.gettype() 
1070    
1071   # exclude file if type cannot be resolved 
1072   if ftype == -1: 
1073    continue 
1074    
1075   if ftype != 'VNODE': 
1076    if Struct.verb: 
1077     filelist.append( (proc.getcmd(), proc.getpid(), proc.getuser(), 
1078      fileglob.getmode(fd), ftype, -1, -1, -1, -1) 
1079     ) 
1080    continue 
1081    
1082   vnode_ptr = fileglob.getdata() 
1083   if vnode_ptr == None: 
1084    continue 
1085     
1086   vnode = Vnode(vnode_ptr) 
1087   filelist.append( (proc.getcmd(), proc.getpid(), proc.getuser(), 
1088    fileglob.getmode(fd), vnode.gettype(), vnode.getdev(), 
1089    vnode.getoff(fileglob.getoff()), vnode.getnode(), vnode.getpath()) 
1090   ) 
1091    
1092  return filelist 
1093   
1094 #################################### PUBLIC FUNCTIONS #################################### 
1095   
1096 # build list of processes with open files, and return the aggregate listing 
1097 def getfilelist(mem, arch, kvers, proc_head, pid, vflag): 
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1098  
1099  Struct.mem   = mem 
1100  Struct.arch  = arch 
1101  Struct.kvers = kvers 
1102  Struct.verb  = bool(vflag) 
1103   
1104  proc = Proc(proc_head) 
1105  if pid > -1: 
1106   if proc.setpid(pid): # returns True on success 
1107    return getfilelistbyproc(proc) 
1108   print "\tPID: %d not found in process list." %pid 
1109   sys.exit() 
1110  
1111  ptr_list = [] # this list catches cycles in the linked list (known to occur) 
1112  proclist = [] 
1113  while proc: 
1114   
1115   if proc.self_ptr in ptr_list: # test for cycle 
1116    stderr.write("ERROR getfilelist(): proc linked-list cycles, results may be 
incomplete.\n") 
1117    break 
1118   ptr_list.append(proc.self_ptr) 
1119    
1120   if proc.valid(): 
1121    proclist.append(proc) 
1122   proc = proc.next() 
1123   
1124  fullfilelisting = [] 
1125  for proc in proclist: 
1126   fullfilelisting += getfilelistbyproc(proc) 
1127  
1128  return fullfilelisting 
1129   
1130 # given the output of getfilelist(), build a string matrix as input to columnprint() 
1131 def printfilelist(filelist): 
1132  headerlist = ["COMMAND", "PID", "USER", "  FD  ", "TYPE", "DEVICE", "SIZE/OFF", 
"NODE", "NAME"] 
1133  contentlist = [] 
1134   
1135  for file in filelist: 
1136   line = ["%s" %file[0]] 
1137   line.append("%d" %file[1]) 
1138   line.append("%s" %file[2]) 
1139   line.append("%s" %file[3]) 
1140   line.append("%s" %file[4]) 
1141   line.append("%s" %file[5]) 
1142   line.append("%s" %file[6]) 
1143   line.append("%d" %file[7]) 
1144   line.append("%s" %file[8]) 
1145   contentlist.append(line) 
1146    
1147  #columnprint(headerlist, contentlist) 
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1148   
1149  # use optional max size list here to match default lsof output, otherwise specify 
1150  # lsof +c 0 on the command line to print full name of commands 
1151  mszlist = [9, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1] 
1152  columnprint(headerlist, contentlist, mszlist) 
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